Apel and Habermas: Some further thoughts. . .

Note: Moving forward this post due to recent comments.

Note:Read a previous related post here and important comments on the post by Andrew Montin here.

Herbert Schnädelbach masterfully brings out the key difference between Apel and Habermas in the following:

“Irrespective of how one may judge the details of the project Habermas develops, I do not in principle see in what way a reconstructive philosophy with merely hypothetical claims is supposed to be suited to generating the ‘moment of unconditionality’ without which ‘normative foundations’ are simply not to be had. The alternative would be hermeneutics as a practical philosophy free of any claim to unconditionality, and all the relativist consequences this entails. It may indeed be the case that communicative action always involves unconditional claims being made, but this does not qualify it to provide the foundations for Critical Theory. To do so, it would itself have to be open to critical assessment. In other words, the theorist would have unconditionally to provide the unconditional standards for critique from the outset and s/he will never be able to derive these form the subject matter via hypothetical reconstruction. It is no coincidence that Karl Otto Apel staunchly retains his transcendental philosophy. Critical unconditionality, without foundationalism – this is the aim Habermas has set himself; doubts are in order whether he has reached it.” (Herbert Schnädelbach, “The transformation of Critical Theory,” in Communicative action : essays on Jürgen Habermas's The theory of communicative action, 7-22, here 22, italics in the original.).

This is an extremely important passage. Schnädelbach alludes to two important distinctions in the above passage. He differentiates between two different conceptions of ‘unconditionality’: a) One conception of unconditionality refers to the ‘unconditionality’ of the claims as claims (within communicative action or discourse). Such claims are raised within communicative action or discourse and are always (in principle) open to criticism. b) On the other hand we have a conception of unconditionality that is the property of certain ‘rules’ or ‘standards’ themselves and not of the claims about standards or rules. This second sort of unconditionality cannot be situated within discourse for the reasons Schnädelbach mentions and hence cannot be open to criticism and reassessment.

As I argue in the thesis Habermas only adheres to the first conception of unconditionality and deems the second conception of unconditionality incompatible with a thoroughgoing detranscendentalisation and with a postmetaphysical notion of rationality. To defend the conception of unconditionality one would have to exclude these conditions from the all encompassing ambit of detranscendentalisation and this is according to Schnädelbach what Apel does.

Thus it is clear from the above that the real difference between Habermas and Apel is about the extent and status of detranscendentalisation. We can make this more clear and specific by focusing on the concrete problem which Apel highlights in his critique of Habermas, i.e. their different conceptions of what the principle of fallibilism is and what it requires in terms of presuppositions. According to Apel the principle of fallibilism is not liable to empirical testing because it is what makes empirical testing possible in the first place:

“. . . whether it makes sense to expect those philosophical statements spelling out fallibilism and its call for ongoing attempts at falsification will themselves one day will prove fallible. The decisive, meaning-critical argument against this possibility runs as follows: If, or the extent to which, this would occur, one could no longer understand what “fallible” or “falsification” mean at all, since the statement at issue here explicate the principle of fallibilism, that is, the presuppositions necessarily implied by it (which are precisely the necessary presuppositions of argumentation that Habermas himself has explicated in the postulates of discourse and consensus). To be sure, these statements can, as explications of meaning, be corrected under the presupposition that they are true. But they are infallible precisely insofar as they state necessary presuppositions of the principle of fallibilism.” (“Normative grounding of “Critical theory”,” 164 n. 9, italics in the original.)

Habermas’ reply is terse and (in my opinion) devastating:

“We understand the term ‘justify’ when we know the rules for an argumentation game within which validity claims can be redeemed discursively. Now, we can make these rules the object of theory of argumentation or truth – or, if we have to do with special discourse, we can make it the object of a moral theory or a philosophy of science. Yet, justifying these theories – as is the case with justifying a theory per se – must itself fit into the framework of an argumentation game to the same extent as must the justification of harmless, e.g. practical everyday utterances. Certainly, the claims made of justification vary according to the argumentation form and context. Yet, which reason counts as a good or indeed as the better reason for what object in what context has to be assessed in terms of standards which under certain conditions become problematical and in turn require justification. Justifications must always be provided in one and the same place – there are no meta-discourses in the sense that a higher discourse is able to prescribe rules for a subordinate discourse. Argumentation games do not form a hierarchy. Discourses regulate themselves. Discourses are in principle open. And it is impossible to predict the outcome of discourses, that is, except from the perspective of an observer who is not a party to the discourse, yet who has to enter into another discourse in order to be able to justify his/her prognosis.” (Jürgen Habermas, “ A reply,” in Communicative action : essays on Jürgen Habermas's The theory of communicative action; 214-264, here 231.)

Habermas starts his argument against Apel through clarification of his understanding of justification. It clearly excludes any notion of ultimate justification as that would require going back to the conception of “transcendental” that is incompatible with detranscendentalisation. When Habermas says that his understanding of justification is ‘grammatical matter’ it is only so within the context of his understanding of Modernity which includes commitment to a thoroughgoing detranscendentalisation. His understanding of Modernity as committed to a thoroughgoing detranscendentalisation excludes conception of ‘ultimate justification’ to which Apel is still committed. It is this same understanding of Modernity which bars acceptance of any hierarchy among discourses as there is no space outside “this world” where to anchor the ultimate or higher discourse. Reflections and distance are possible but they themselves are in turn situated within “this very same world” in which the discourse which is being reflected upon is situated. In this sense there is in principle no hierarchy possible between discourse of reflection and a discourse which is being reflected upon. To still believe that we can step out would be to still clinging to the notion of subjectivity having anchored in a realm beyond this world and hence in fact that would be not carrying out detranscendentalisation thoroughly enough. In fact this is what has happened with Apel.

That Apel still believes in some such notion is evident form the fact that from his Cartesian conception of reflection (on this more later).

Ending Ph.D. related blogging

because there is not much to blog on the topic anymore. I am in the process of finishing the first draft and then drafting and redrafting (a never ending game it seems)...

I would like to thank all those who commented and gave me advice here or via emails. Sorry to those I have been unable to get back to. Special thanks to Carl Sachs for making me realise the importance of the work of John McDowell for my project.

I do not know what I will do with this blog in the future. For now I will just post occasionally on anything interesting related to Habermas.

European Journal of Philosophy Annual Lecture 2005 : Given by Jürgen Habermas

European Journal of Philosophy Annual Lecture 2005

Given by Jürgen Habermas

Religion in the Public Sphere



Date: 1 July 2005
Time: 5pm
Location: Beveridge Hall, ground floor of University of London Senate House, Malet Street

All are welcome to attend

Synopsis of the paper

The paper will address the debate that has arisen in the wake of John Rawls' political theory, in particular his concept of the "public use of reason". How does the constitutional separation of state and church influence the role which religious traditions, communities and organizations are allowed to play in the political public sphere and in the state in general, but above all in the political opinion and will formation of citizens themselves? Where should the dividing line be in the opinion of those who wish to challenge the view of these matters that has arisen since the Enlightenment?

"The Public Role of Religion in Secular Context"

"Among ethical philosophers, Jurgen Habermas is a star. Which means he is not quite as famous as Paris Hilton's dog, Tinkerbell.

You won't find him in People or on "Entertainment Tonight." But you will find courses on his thoughts and theories in the philosophy departments of U.S. and European universities. While Habermas, 75, still writes and teaches, his work has acquired a life of its own. There's an entire cottage industry of philosophers who seek to defend or contradict the Habermasian worldview.

That may be why his speech tomorrow at the University of San Diego has already drawn a standing-room-only crowd.

"We have close to 1,400 registered for professor Habermas' presentation," said Stephanie Kellems, who is helping to organize this week's Kyoto Laureate Symposium events. "The Web site has stopped taking reservations."

For 20 years Kazuo Inamori, the founder of Kyocera, has bestowed the Kyoto Prize on international trailblazers in advanced technology, basic science and arts and philosophy.

This is the fourth consecutive year the laureates have visited San Diego, home of Kyocera's North American headquarters.

Among this week's events:

This morning's advanced technology presentation by Alan Curtis Kay, 9:30 to 11, Smith Recital Hall, San Diego State University;

This afternoon's basic science presentation by Dr. Alfred George Knudson, 4:30 to 6 p.m., Price Center Theatre, University of California San Diego; and

Habermas' speech tomorrow, which will be followed by comments from Robert Bellah, professor emeritus at the University of California Berkeley and an old friend.

While Habermas resists talking about himself – "the life of philosophers is rather poor in notable outside occurrences" – the white-haired academic has lived in extraordinary and tragic times. Born in 1929, Habermas grew up in Nazi-ruled Germany. His father was a supporter of the regime and Jurgen himself a Hitler Youth.

The Nuremburg Trials were a revelation to the teen, and he began to ask questions about civil rights, democracy and open discourse.

We had a few questions ourselves. While in Germany preparing tomorrow's speech, Habermas took time off to respond to our queries."

from here

Habermas and Religion: An Interview with Habermas

Spotlight on public role of religion

QUESTION: The title of your speech, "The Public Role of Religion in Secular Context," might puzzle some Americans. As Robert Bellah notes, the Religious Right's strong political role in recent elections has many echoes in American history. Religious figures, for instance, were in the forefront of the abolitionist movement and the struggles for civil rights. Is this a dangerous tradition?

ANSWER: No, the U.S. is the great example for a liberal political culture with roots in an active civil society which is shaped, from the very beginning, by the vital pluralism of churches and religious associations. And the civil rights movement indeed provides striking evidence for the welcome influence of religious leaders and communities who inspire the fight for a more inclusive implementation of human rights. The research of professor Bellah and others stresses the social capital and the civic engagement of religious people. In (the United States), religious organizations do play an important role for the political socialization of citizens and the integration of society at large. At present, the Religious Right is a rather mixed phenomenon, however.

All political programs and legally binding decisions are implemented with the backing of state power. This is why they must be (at) any time justifiable in a language that is equally accessible to all citizens. The state could no longer remain impartial vis-à-vis competing worldviews and different subcultures, once a religious majority, be it in court or parliament, or within the administration, would appeal to its doctrine instead of providing secular reasons. Imposing just its own will on people of different faith or on secular citizens, such a majority could no longer claim democratic legitimacy.

You've written that "religious communities are entitled to be called 'reasonable' only if they renounce the use of violence as a means of propagating the truths of their faith." How, then, should civilization respond to the radical Islamists of al-Qaeda?

Obviously not by going to war with a regime that, albeit being bad enough anyway, had no connection with al-Qaeda. What we must do is clearly to pursue terrorists with all available means of legal repression. We must reach and hit their logistics, we must persecute, find and prosecute them. But we must not let our own society become infected by the enemy's mentality. The virus of ideological fervor must not encroach upon our liberal institutions and practices.

In one of your essays, you encouraged secular society to "retain a feeling for the articulative power of religious discourse." Would you give us some examples of this "articulative power" and its uses in a secular society?

In the past, many of our most powerful conceptions derived from religious sources. That God created man in his own image is a wording of lasting influence. The modern idea of human dignity, which is claimed equally for all and everybody, is inspired by this image of all human beings created "in the likeness of God." A similar connection exists (for example) between the individuating force of a life history, for which each person is responsible, and the expectation of the Last Judgment. In our culture the loaded meaning of an "individual," that is of a unique and irreplaceable person, has Biblical origins. Why should this rich semantic potential not continue to inform our secular culture in the future, too?

You've lived in both the United States and Germany. How would you compare the role of religion in both societies?

The religious life in our countries is shaped by contrasting traditions. While we in Germany have the Lutheran tradition of state church, you enjoy a flourishing plurality of more or less autonomous religious associations. Quite a few of them originate from dissenting sects. Even the Catholics seem to have acquired in this country some of the mental features typical of a religious minority, whereas Catholicism in Europe radiates the aura of an imperial power. The most striking difference today is, of course, the rapid spread of secularism in Europe, especially since after World War II, whereas in this country an incredibly high proportion of believers has remained at the same level throughout the last 60 years.

Don't ask me why. Sociologists discuss several hypotheses. I am not an expert in this field. My American colleague (University of Michigan philosopher) Ronald Inglehart defends the more conventional idea that secularization goes hand-in-hand with an increased existential security in economic and social living conditions; according to this expectation, more developed countries provide more secure life patterns and have a greater proportion of secularized people. This hypothesis is combined with the view that demographic changes in developed countries prevent secularization sweeping the world.

From this perspective, the surprising persistence of a comparatively large religious population in the United States is explained by two facts: first, by a higher level of risk-taking and personal vulnerability in an environment of increasing pressures for competition and increasing inequalities in distribution; and second, by an immigration from more traditional countries with higher fertility rates.

Does that difference help explain why the United States and Germany – and most of Europe, for that matter – have experienced so many fundamental disagreements on how to respond to terrorism?

From a European point of view, there is a much more trivial explanation. Allow me to put it in a nutshell: The horrible event of 9/11 has caused a well understandable shock in the population. It appears as if a clever government had exploited this condition for pursuing a strategy under false pretences, while the media failed to fulfill their critical function. If 75 percent of the Bush voters at election day still believed that Saddam Hussein had a link to al-Qaeda and was somehow responsible for the attack on the Twin Towers, something must have gone wrong.

Habermas, Quine and Heidegger - some more contrasts

Recall that in weak naturalism Habermas’ aim is to explain the transcending power of reason without reverting to the Kantian dichotomy between reason and nature and without reverting to the Kantian two realm dichotomy. In other words the aim of weak naturalism is to explain the transcending powers of reason within overall naturalistic framework. Quine and Heidegger fail in this although on different grounds.

Quine’s strong naturalism cannot account for the transcending powers of reason and consequently the ability of subjects capable of speech and actions to accomplish things rationally. Quine’s theory fails because it does not take seriously the Kantian insight about the normativity and uniqueness of human reason seriously. It does not feel any need to differentiate between the space of reason and the space of causality. However this cannot explain our ability to learn form mistakes as learning is closely related to grounds (reasons). Causality cannot explain the learning process (as well as unlearning process).

On the other hand Heidegger’s fault is that he ignores two important facts: a) on the one hand he ignores causality altogether. Causality is devoured by the all consuming powers of linguistic world disclosure. b) The linguistic world disclosure also devours the ability of subjects capable of speech and act to rationally assess and revise the given meaning. These revisionary powers have two aspects: a) on the one hand given meaning is the condition for subjects to understand and raise validity claims in the first place. In this sense it is an enabling power. b) Thus it is impossible for subjects to transcend their linguistic background in to to. In fact it would be undesirable given this background is the condition of the possibility for anything subjects are capable of doing and saying. Thus the conditions of possibility of understanding and meaning are not only limiting conditions they are also enabling conditions. They enable the formation of subjects that are capable of initiation, accomplishment and revision. Thus though the lifeworld and linguistic background is immune from objectification the process within disclosed world can lead to the indirect revision of the very conditions of possibility sometime partially sometime radically. Thus the revisions are the indirect result of accomplishments of subjects capable of speech and action but they are not the direct subjects of these processes for two reasons: a) Changes in lifeworld are affected by the plurality of subjects and their interactions. So we cannot reduce changes in lifeworld to the intentions of subjects even if their attitudes play a role in the change. b) Even with a) there is no total change as lifeworld and language cannot be objectified in to to. There can be radical changes but there is no overall subject of these changes.

Heidegger though emphasises the disclosive power of language he does not emphasise with equal force the enabling possibilities within the world disclosed and does not in turn relate the disclosive function of language with these enabling possibilities.

Finally both Heidegger and Quine ignore our non linguistic non conceptual non causal contact with the reality. The recalcitrant reality with which we are in direct contact resist both the disclosing function and our accomplishments within it. Both have to prove themselves in the face of this pro-active reality.

Habermas, Quine and Heidegger

While Habermas accuses Quine of levelling the distinction between lifeworld and objective world in the favour of the objective world he faults Heidegger for levelling it in the favour of the lifeworld. Heidegger, according to Habermas, gives so much prominence to the disclosive function of language and lifeworld that the inneroworldly phenomena go into oblivion.

Though the levelling of the distinction between lifeworld and objective world occurs form two different angles in Quine and Heidegger, the result is albeit the same. The transcending power or reason as well as the initiating and accomplishing powers of subjects capable of speech and acts are sacrificed on the one hand on the alter of the objective world and on the other hand on the alter of language and lifeworld.

The above might seem strange on the first impression but should fall in place once we understand that weak naturalism depends on dialectical relationship between lifeworld and objective world on the one hand and disclosed world and innerworldly on the other hand, a dialectical relation which is mediated through the ‘yes’ and ‘no’ of subjects capable of speech and action.

While Quine is lambasted for ignoring the world disclosive function of language, Heidegger for ignoring innerworldly learning processes that have power to revise the disclosed meaning we start with. The linguistic meaning we start with has to prove itself in the tribunal of the exchange of reasons (exchange of the yes and no’s of the participants) as well as against the recalcitrant reality. However such a “revisionory” conception of meaning is impossible either if we consider meaning in causal terms, or if we consider meaning as linguistically given.

Apel, Habermas and 'Weak" Naturalism

In a foot note to his introduction to TJ Habermas attributes his difference with Apel to the theme of 'weak' naturalism. Here is the original note:

"K.-O. Apel has pursued [epistemological project] more consistently since his program of a 'transformation of philosophy" to this day continue to align itself with a Kantian transcendental philosophy. The deeper source of our difference . . . I attribute to my opting for a "weak" naturalism." (TJ: 294 n. 10.).

Declaration on Globalization

"Jürgen Habermas, David Held and Will Kymlicka published a ”declaration on globalization” in the Spanish newspaper ”El Pais” on June 6, 2005.

It is called ”The Granada Declaration on Globalization” and was written when they in May participated at an international conference in Granada on ”Law and Justice in a Global Society”."

from here

Declaration on Globalization (English)

Declaration on Globalization (Spanish)

Andrew Montin's blog

I have just discovered that our regular 'commentator' Andrew Montin has a blog entitled Hold That Thought! Worth visiting and having on your links.

The myth of the given

McDowell’s account of the myth of the given is derived from Sellers. Moreover this account makes sense only in the context of Seller’s normative conception of knowledge (intro. to Mind and World, xiv). McDowell extends this to include not only knowledge but to the very notion of having contact with reality: normative context is necessary for being in touch with the world at all, whether knowledgeable or not.” (xiv).

Sellers attack on the myth of the given is an attack on the notion of ‘immediacy,” which is at the heart of the whole empiricist tradition as well as at the heart of the Cartesian tradition in general).

Habermas agrees with the basic thrust of this thinking by not only explicitly rejecting the myth of the given but also through his background in Hegel he is aware of the Hegel’s critique of the immediacy. Furthermore with his linguistic turn it become clear that reality is linguistically constituted and that there is no God’s eye view from which we can access naked reality. With the linguistic turn the whole notion of “purified experience’ or immediate contact with experiential reality becomes suspect.

The rejection of ‘immediacy’ is the rejection of two important factors:

1) The Lockean myth of the pure passivity of subject vis a vis external experience is rejected. There is no purely ‘passive’ experience as such because even in the purest of all pure experiences the active side of human subject is already implicated.

2) Locke’s confusion of explanation and justification is rejected. The thought that the bare experience can on its own act as reason is rejected. The thought behind this is that ‘reason’ involves actors and subjects who are responsible for not only making claims but also responsible for defending or rejecting and consequences ensuing form those claims. The idea is that ‘reasons’ presuppose the existence of social space in which claims can be made and defended. The idea already presupposes the idea of responsible actors. (for the above two points see Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature)

Thus the idea is incompatible with the myth of the given as far as the idea consists in the fact that bare perceptions in their givenness can stand as reasons. The myth of the given turns out to be a contradictory idea in this vein as the idea of reason presupposes the idea of an active subject while the myth is founded on the idea of purely passive subject while the very idea of reason requires at least two active subjects.

Sellers’ and Brandom’ idea of the priority of inference is built on the above insight. The same is the idea behind Habermas’ radicalisation of Dummet’s epistemic turn in the theory of meaning. The space of reason presupposes actors who can make claims and defend them. This is the basis of the rejection of the myth of the given by Sellers, Brandom, Davidson, Habermas.

Relating the problem of detranscendentalisation with the problem of naturalism

"[Even after the detranscendentalisation of the knowing and acting subject] the problem of naturalism does not simply vanish into thin air. It merely arises in another way for those theories that do indeed being with questions posed transcendentally, yet do not get stuck cutting the intelligible off from the phenomenal once for all. These theories must find answer to the question of how Kant can be reconciled with Darwin. It seems to me that it has been clear since Marx that the normative content of modernity can be taken up and preserved even and especially under materialistic premises. "Nature in itself" does not coincide with objectivated nature. What Marx has in mind is the emergence in natural history of the sociocultural form of life Homo sapiens, which goes beyond physcially objectified natura naturata to conceptually include, as it were, a piece of natura naturans. A naturalism of this sort need not be accompanied by an objectivistic self description of culture, society, and the individual." (PT: 20).

In the light of the above we must ask how the problem of detranscendentalisation is related to the problem of naturalism and how Habermas’ project of transcendence from within is related to his project of weak naturalism?

The problem of detranscendentalisation is to save the transcending power of reason. In this sense problem of detranscendentalisation is to avoid contextualism. Detranscendentalisation places the context and its understanding at the heart of our understanding the problem of rationality. Contexts are by definition particular and the problem of detranscendentalisation then becomes preserving the transcending powers of reason within this inevitable contextualisation. Thus the project of transcendence form within aims at proving and preserving the transcending powers of reason which is akin to showing that reason has ability to transcend the context in which it is inevitably situated and hence of transcending particularity, from within.

The problem of naturalism is akin to the problem of detranscendentalisation in the sense that as in the case of detranscendentalisation the transcending power of reason has to be proven and preserved in the face of a particularity (in this case nature). The problem of contextualism arises with a thorough going detranscendentalisation while the problem of naturalism arises with theory of evolution and a thorough going materialism (hence) Habermas mentions Kant in conjunction with Darwin. Thus the problem of naturalism is to reconcile Kant with Darwin, i.e. to show how we can believe in a through going naturalism without forsaking the transcending powers of reason (i.e. the task of weak naturalism).

Detranscendentalisation in itself does not entail reconciliation with nature or reconciliation of Kant with Darwin because we can suppose detranscendentalisation and still think that nature and reason belong to two different realms. One can maintain that reason emerges from social and that nature is non social (something Habermas also maintains in one form), and hence there is no compulsion to think that reason (social thing) have evolved from nature (a non social thing). Thus one can maintain a dichotomy between nature and reason without maintaining a dichotomy between the realm of intelligibility and realm of social. In other words one can be an anti naturalist in the sense of maintaining that reason has not evolved form nature without being a transcendentalist. Thus detranscendentalisation is compatible with anti naturalism.

Religion in the Public Sphere

"Religion in the Public Sphere" Jürgen Habermas, March 4, 2005 at the University of San Diego thanks to Gary for the pointer.

Distinction between facticity and validity

Habermas describes the fusion of facticity and validity as the defining characteristic of traditional or pre modern societies. Habermas presents a differentiation between facticity and validity as a key accomplishment of modernity. According to Habermas in the pre-modern worldviews the notion of validity is still confused with empirical efficacy. The distinct notion of ‘causality of reason’ has not yet emerged in these worldviews. Thus speaking of the mythical worldviews Habermas writes:

“Evidently there is not yet any precise concept for the nonempirical validity that we ascribe to symbolic expressions. Validity is confounded with empirical efficacy. I am not referring here to special validity claims . . . . But even the diffuse concept of validity in general is still not freed from empirical admixtures. Concepts of validity such as morality and truth are amalgamated with empirical ordering concepts, such as causality and health. Thus a linguistically constituted worldview can be identified with the world order to such an extent that it cannot be perceived as an interpretation of the world that is subject to error and open to criticism. In this respect the confusion of nature and culture takes on the significance of a reification of worldview” (TCA I: 50, emphasis added).

Habermas is saying few very important things in this passage. On the one hand he is claiming that in pre modern worldview there is not yet a concept of validity “which is freed from empirical admixture.” A notion of validity which is free of such admixture is for Habermas a notion that is not based on the notion of “empirical efficacy.”

For Habermas a notion of validity free of “empirical admixture.”, a notion of validity that is not based on the notion of “empirical efficacy” is a singular achievement of modernity. It is with modernity that we arrive at a notion of ‘rational efficacy’ which is distinct from the notion of ‘empirical efficacy’. Given such an important role that the distinct notion of validity and its emergence plays in Habermas’ understanding of modernity it is small wonder that Habermas spends so much time and so much of his energy in trying to differentiate the illocutionary force of speech acts from perlocutionary effects.

But why is such a clear cut distinction between validity and empirical efficacy so important for Habermas’ understanding of modernity? The answers to this question lies in what Habermas’ says further in the above: “Thus a linguistically constituted worldview can be identified with the world order to such an extent that it cannot be perceived as an interpretation of the world that is subject to error and open to criticism.”

For Habermas it follows form the fact the in the premodern worldviews there is no clear distinction between validity and empirical efficacy that in those worldviews a) there is no distinction between “a linguistically constituted worldview” and “the world order as such” b) Thus in the absence of any distinction between validity and empirical efficacy the notion of any alternative world interpretations becomes impossible and c) consequently the notion that a worldview or an interpretation of world is subject to error thus fallibility loses its importance. d) Furthermore, the notion of interpretations of the world being open to criticism and hence open to alternatives remains incomprehensible. The notion of inherently open ended worldviews is an alien concept to worldviews which are unable to make clear cut distinction between validity and “empirical efficacy”.

Obviously Habermas is not claiming that in premodern worldviews notions of error, critique or alternatives do not exist in the factual sense, what he is claiming is rather that such concepts have no normative power in these societies.

related posts here, here and here

Apel and Habermas: a thought. . .

Note: Moving forward this post due to recent comments.

Habermas’ debate with Apel can be considered as a debate about how far detranscendentalisation should be taken and how much detranscendentalisation should be carried out. While Habermas is concerned with how this detranscendentalisation turn is carried out (it needs a balancing act according to some of his interpreters), this does not inhibit him to carry out the turn thoroughly.

For Habermas’ typical response to those who he deems to have carried out the turn before him (like Hegel and Heidegger) is that they have not carried out it thoroughly and wholeheartedly. There is no stage at which this thoroughgoing detranscendentalisation should stop.

One of the most fascinating thought Habermas has is that in order to preserve the transcending character of reason it is necessary (though obviously not sufficient) to carry out the detranscendentalisation more and not less robustly. Thus we can differentiate between robust and non robust conceptions of detranscendentalisation.

Apel has been a colleague and mentor of Habermas for a long time. In Habermas’ own words, “under the living philosophers non one has more lastingly determined the direction of my thinking than Karl-Otto Apel.” Habermas and Apel share the detranscendentalisation turn. However despite this a difference has emerged in recent days between them about what kind of justification or what notion of justification is compatible with the detranscendentalisation turn. Apel thinks that we can maintain a version of “ultimate grounding or justification,” despite the turn. Habermas on the other hand thinks that ultimate justification of grounding is incompatible with the turn. Habermas insists that only a modest conception of grounding and justification is compatible with the turn.

The debate between Apel and Habermas can be read as a debate about which of the two notions of detranscendentalisation (roust or non-robust) are to be espoused. Habermas claims that detranscendentalisation should be carried out thoroughly and nothing should be immune form it. Apel on the other hand thinks that there is a limit to detranscendentalisation (thus he adopts a less robust conception of it). According to Apel there are certain principles and certain hierarchy among principles that is immune from detranscendentalisation and hence they retain their old transcendental character.

Habermas considers this half hearted detranscendentalisation not only incoherent but also anti-modern in its spirit (as it is more clear in is debate with Henrich on the status of metaphysics).
--
related posts:
Apel's critique of Habermas

two sense of linguistic turn

Apel and Habermas

Kant and Darwin

Morality,law and deliberative democracy

irreversibility of learning process

“The religious forces of social integration grew weaker in the wake of a process of enlightenment that is just as little susceptible of being revoked as it was arbitrarily brought about in the first place. One feature of this enlightenment is that irreversibility of learning process, which is based on the fact that insights cannot be forgotten at will; they can only be repressed or corrected by better insights. Hence, enlightenment can only make good its deficits by radicalized enlightenment: this is why Hegel and his disciples had to place their hope in a dialectic of enlightenment in which reason was validated as an equivalent for the unifying power of religion. They worked out concepts of reason that were supposed to fulfil such a program.” (The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, p. 84).

Pragmatism: four theses

"(1) antiskepticism: pragmatism hold that doubt requires justification just as much as belief (recall Peirce ’s famous distinction between “real” and “philosophical” doubt); (2) fallibilism: pragmatists hold that there is never a metaphysical guarantee to be had that such and – such belief will never need revision (that one can be both fallibilistic and antiskeptical is perhaps the unique insight of American pragmatism); (3) the thesis that there is no fundamental dichotomy between “facts” and values”; and (4) the thesis that, in a certain sense, practice is primary in philosophy.” (Words and Life, p. 152).

Habermas would accept all the above theses except (3).

Habermas and Brandom on empiricism: An interesting contrast

Consider the following remarks by Brandom about the tradition of empiricism in the English-speaking world:

“Empiricism has been the fighting faith and organizing principle of philosophy in the English-speaking world since at least the time of Locke. Its distinctive twentieth-century form, developed by thinkers such as Russell, Carnap, and Quine, joins to the classical insistence on the origin of knowledge in experience an emphasis on the crucial cognitive role played by language and logic.” (Articulating reasons, p. 23).

Brandom describes his own project with reference to the above mentioned tradition of empiricism in the following way:

“A central goal of [my project] is to introduce a way of thinking about these latter topics [i.e. language and logic] – and so about meaning, mind, and knowledge-that swings free of the context of empiricist commitments that has shaped discussion within this tradition.” (ibid.).

Now consider the following description by Habermas:

“. . . there continues from Russel and Carnap onward an empiricist analysis of language with a merely methodological understanding of the linguistic turn, a strand that has gained worldwide acceptance through the work of Quine and Davidson.” (TJ: 69, italics added).

Interestingly Habermas includes Brandom in what he terms as ‘nonempiricist’ branch of Frege tradition and contrasts it with ‘empiricist branch’ which he terms as Carnap-Quine-Davidson tradition:

“. . . Wittgenstein serves as the inspiration for the nonempiricist branch of the Frege tradition all the way to Dummett and Brandom. In contrast to the Carnap-Quine-Davidson tradition, these authors start from normatively regulated practices in which we engage together and which give rise to an intersubjectively shared context of meaning.” (TJ: 121).

It can be said without the fear of contradiction that Habermas would agree with description of his own project as “a way of thinking about . . . meaning, mind, and knowledge-that swings free of the context of empiricist commitments that has shaped discussion within this tradition.”

Habermas' (alleged) formalism

This is an excerpt from a short note, which I will post latr. I think it clarifies an important point about Habemras' formalism:

"Admittedly Habermas still insists on a certain sort of formalism and takes procedural rationality as central to his project of postmetaphyscial thinking. However it would be an error to construe Habermas’ conception of formalism and procedural thinking as a form of abstraction. Habermas’ formal conditions of pragmatic rationality are not the formal grid imposed on the existing practices from “without” but are the conditions that are immanent to those practices themselves and hence conditions that emerge from “within” those practices rather than imposed on them from without. Similarly Habermas’ proceduralism has specific meaning to it which must be understood on its own ground rather than construed in Kantian terms. Proceduralism for Habermas derives from his rejection of the metaphysical conception of reason. Reason does not have the capability to tell us about the nature of things or of morals. From this Habermas infers that the only way for reason to exist in the postmetaphycial world is to go procedural, that is, to become a practice of raising and defending claims within conversation (within dialogue). This conception of proceduralism obviously has nothing to do with what Adorno or Bernstein are criticising."

Habermas and Argumentation Theory

Informal Logic has just published a special issue on Special issue on Habermas and Argumentation Theory. Eminent Habermas scholar William Rehg is a guest editor for the issue. Apart from guest editor's introduction following articles are included in the issue.

Predicaments of Communication, Arguments and Power G.T. Goodnight
The Rationality of Legal Discourse in Habermas' s Discourse Theory E. Feteris
The Public Metonym P.A. Cramer
Habermas, Argumentation Theory and Science Studies W. Rehg

Reflections on McDowell

I have been reading McDowell’s introduction to the (1996) edition of his Mind and World (pp. xi-xxiv). Here are few thoughts on McDowell’s project (with specific reference to Habermas).

•McDowell describes what he calls minimal empiricism as an idea whose core concept is that we are answerable to what he calls, quoting Quine, ‘the tribunal of experience.’ (p. xii).

•As I have noted earlier, Habermas would accept the concept of answerability to ‘experience’ but his concept of experience is radically different from McDowell as Habermas attempts to transcend the empiricist conception of experience through his pragmatist concept of experience and knowledge (for Habermas’ pragmatist conception of knowledge see TJ: 12-17). Habermas would be specifically troubled by the view McDowell propagates that our contact with world itself is normative (xiv).

•The second important difference between Habermas and McDowell is that Habermas as against McDowell sharply distinguishes between knowledge and rationality (see TCA I: 8-41). This Habermas from over intellectualising the conception of knowledge. In this Habermas is nearer to McDowell’s colleague Brandom (see Articulating reasons: 22-35, also see "Non inferential knowledge, perceputal experience, and secondary qualities," 93 and 105 n.3).

•Having said above we note many similarities between McDowell’s and Habermas’ project of weak naturalism.

•According to McDowell the above mentioned notion of the tribunal of experience is challenged by Sellers and Davidson’s assault on the ‘Myth of the Given.’ (xiv and xvii, for Habermas’ views on the Myth of the Given, see TJ: 178-179).[Addendum: "The Myth of the Given is the claim that there is some kind of experience the having of which does not presuppose grasp of concepts, such that merely having having the experience counts as knowing something, or can serve as evidence for beliefs, judgements, claims, and so on, that such a non-cocneptual experience can raitonally ground, and not just causally occasion, belief." (Robert Brandom, "Non inferential knowledge, perceputal experience, and secondary qualities," in Reading McDowell, pp. 92-119, here 93, emphasis in the original. Needless to say that Habermas would take (unlike McDowell) the Myth of the Given relavent only on the level of raitonality and not knowledge as such.]

•The idea behind the rejection of the Myth of the Given is that there is a sharp dichotomy between space of reason (or spontaneity) and space of law (or passivity). Since experience is located in the latter it cannot act as the tribunal and consequently we cannot be answerable to it. McDowell accepts the force of the argument but does not go from there with Sellers and Davidson to the conclusion that we cannot have any rational contact with the reality. In this Habermas is certainly with McDowell even when he would disagree with McDowell on how to explain it (mainly because of their different notions of experience). It should be noted however that Habermas would not concur with McDowell in calling the distinction between space of reason and space of law as a dichotomy, he would rather go for ‘sharp distinction’ which is not same as dichotomy (McDowell uses both 'distinction in kind' and dichotomy to describe the difference between the two spaced see p. xv and xix).

•So McDowell poses the problem of reconciliation between nature and reason (McDowell would reject such description of his project see Reading McDowell, p. 269) as transcending the apparent incompatibility between two equally persuasive appeals. On the one hand it seems intuitive to us to think of our judgments and claims to be answerable to nature and experience in a sense McDowell describes. On the other hand there is power to objections of both Sellers and Davidson. So what is the way out of this dilemma which is described by McDowell as interminable oscillation between coherentism and the Myth of the Given?

•Habermas’ project can be described in similar terms. On the one hand he agrees with Sellers and Davidson (and ultimately with Kant) that ‘reason’ is to be situated outside the space of law (that is the point of his categorical distinction between instrumental reason and communicative reason) but on the other hand he also emphasises the need to assert the centrality of experience for the process of learning and ultimately for reasoning processes themselves (As early as in TCA I: p. 18, italics in the original) Habermas wrote: “The concept of grounding is interwoven with that of learning.”. As far as learning is concerned it is situated in the context of reality which resists our claims and we have to prove the wroth of our claims against this resisting and surprising reality (on this last point see Habermas' critique of Rorty in OPC: 343-382 and TJ: introduction and passim).

•Now McDowell rejects one way out of the above mentioned oscillation which he terms as ‘bald naturalism.’ (xiii). Bald naturalism is no solution because it levels the legitimate distinction between space of reason and space of law. Habermas rejects the solution on the same lines. Habermas calls this strong naturalism and equates it with Quine’s naturalism (Habermas in this context invokes Putnam’s slogan that reason cannot be naturalised TJ: 218-219). Bald or strong naturalism does not take into account the unique characteristics of the space of reason and does not respond adequately to the critique of the Myth of the Given [It can be argued that Quine has taken the critique fo the Myth into account by abandoning mentalism of the old empiricism of the Humean and Lockean type (see his "Epistemology Nautralized" in Ontological Relativity and Other essays, 69-90, here 89) but Habermas would argue that Quine is still attached to the Myth of the Given to the extent that he does not take a methodlogicla disitnciton between observation and understanding seriously and to the extent that he levels distinction between the lifeworld and the objective world (TJ: 218). It is interesting to note that in the context of his discussion on Putnam Habermas attributes a view to Quine according to which “language and world are connected only causally and not semantically.” (TJ: 219). Here ‘semantically’ should be read as rationally.] .

•So what is McDowell’s preferred solution? McDowell starts with saying that though there is a dichotomy between the space of law and space of reason it does not follow from this that there is a dichotomy between natural and normative. However this statement does not make much sense in Habermasian terms. However the way McDowell explains the idea is compatible with Habermas’ solution. What McDowell concludes form the above is that the space of law does not exhaust nature. Thus both Habermas and McDowell assume that natural scientific intelligibility does not exhaust concept of nature as such. The space of law cannot exhaust nature as such (xix) [McDowell says that he agrees with Davidson and Sellers that the space of reason is sui generis, so that he sides with them against bald naturalism but he goes on to says that against Sellers and Davidson he still holds that the notion of experience is natural and empirical thinking is answerable to experience (xix). Habermas would accept the contention that experience is natural in a broad sense but the point of McDowell as irrelevant to the debate because the question of answerability to experience arises within space of reason and not on the level of experience itself and transition from the former to the latter is not automatic. On this see TJ: 154 where Habermas makes this point against Brandom).

•Thus one of McDowell’s basic moves is to argue that nature is not exhausted by the space of law. This is similar to Habermas’ move where by he differentiates between ‘objective nature,’ ‘subjective nature,’ and ‘nature in itself.’ (TJ: 22). The rationale of the move is to show that the objectification of nature can never exhaust nature itself and thus the space of law can not be taken as covering nature as a whole (It is important to remember however that Habermas’ conception of ‘nature in itself’ is totally different from the Kantian concept because according to Habermas’ pragmatic conception of knowledge we are in direct contact with a naked reality on the pragmatic level).

•The second of McDowell’s move is similar to that of Habermas’ move in his weak naturalism as well. Here McDowell shows that the space of reason itself is ‘natural’ to the extent that we can conceive of nature in non causal terms. Here McDowell brings in his conception of second nature. A. C. Genova, in his review of Reading McDowell perceptively calls this notion of the space of reason ‘naturalised spontaneity.’ This is also the point of Habermas’ weak naturalism to the extent that it presupposes that the space of reason has evolved ‘naturally.’ (TJ: 28).

•The combination of the above two insights allows both Habermas and McDowell to transcend the interminable oscillation between the Myth of the Given and coherentism. It allows them to escape equally unacceptable solution of the empiricist tradition that falls prey to the Myth of the Given as well as the rationalist tradition that loses contact with reality.

•But from a Habermasian point of view McDowell’s position ultiamtely remains engulfed within the Myth of the Given to the extent that it still remains attached to the overintellectualised conception of knowledge and over-intellectualised notion of contact with the reality to be found in the empiricist and Kantian traditions. To this extent he still remains within the interminable oscillation . . .

Le non illusoire de la gauche

Le non illusoire de la gauche

Exclusif. Pour le grand philosophe allemand, si le non l’emportait en France, «il est certain qu’une dépression s’abattrait sur toute l’Europe, et pour longtemps»

L’unification de l’Europe n’a longtemps été l’affaire que des élites politiques. Tant qu’ils en ont profité, les citoyens n’y ont rien vu à redire. Les résultats, jusqu’ici, ont suffi à donner au projet européen sa légitimité. Mais dans l’Europe des 25, confrontée à ses conflits d’attribution (sièges, postes, voix...), une telle légitimation au rendement ne permet plus que chacun y trouve son compte. Les citoyens rechignent à être dirigés de manière bureaucratique, et même au sein des Etats membres les plus europhiles la population se montre de moins en moins encline à tout accepter. En outre, le tandem franco-allemand est sorti de la cadence et n’est plus en position, désormais, de donner le sens de la marche.

Dans cette situation, le gouvernement français a eu le courage de soumettre la ratification de la Constitution à référendum. En tant qu’Allemand à qui la pusillanimité de son personnel politique a fait perdre toute illusion, j’envie la France. Cette République française a encore au moins conscience des critères démocratiques qui font sa tradition et en deçà desquels il convient de ne pas tomber. L’acte constituant s’accomplira dans la confrontation des opinions polarisées et des voix dissonantes, et par le décompte des oui et des non exprimés par les citoyens. Nous devrions donc être satisfaits par ces discussions où se mêlent toutes les voix, et dont la presse française nous transmet l’écho de ce côté-ci du Rhin nous le serions sans doute, n’était un petit problème. Nous qui portons nos regards vers la France par-delà nos frontières nationales nous rendons compte que c’est aussi notre Constitution qui risque d’être mise en échec par le vote des Français.
Publicité

Certes, de la même manière, les Français sont dépendants du vote des Britanniques, des Polonais, des Tchèques et de tous les autres. Alors que normalement un peuple se prononce sur sa propre Constitution, la Constitution européenne ne pourra naître que du vote d’adhésion de vingt-cinq peuples et non de la volonté formée en commun par l’ensemble des citoyens européens. En effet, il n’existe toujours ni espace public européen, ni thématiques transfrontalières, ni discussions communes. Chaque vote se déroule donc au sein des frontières de son propre espace public national. Or une telle asymétrie est dangereuse, car la priorité accordée aux problèmes nationaux par exemple les reproches faits au président Chirac et au gouvernement Raffarin fausse le regard que l’on doit porter sur les problèmes effectifs posés par l’adoption ou le rejet de la Constitution européenne. Il faudrait au moins que les pour et les contre des autres nations aient également accès à chacun de nos espaces publics nationaux. C’est aussi en ce sens que je comprends l’invitation qui m’est faite de prendre position dans le débat électoral français.

A mon avis, une gauche qui, désireuse de dompter et de civiliser le capitalisme , se prononcerait contre la Constitution européenne le ferait au mauvais moment et en choisissant le mauvais côté. Il existe naturellement de bonnes raisons de critiquer le chemin pris par l’unification européenne. Jacques Delors et sa vision politique ont été mis en échec. C’est au contraire une intégration horizontale qui a eu lieu, avec l’instauration d’un marché commun et la création d’une union monétaire partielle. Et il est même vraisemblable que, sans cette dynamique des intérêts économiques, la perspective d’une union politique n’aurait sans doute jamais vu le jour. Il est vrai qu’une telle dynamique ne fait que renforcer la tendance à la dérégulation des marchés à l’échelle mondiale; pour autant, l’idée droitière et xénophobe selon laquelle l’abolition des frontières entraîne des conséquences sociales indésirables que l’on pourrait éviter par un repli sur les forces de l’Etat-nation est non seulement une idée suspecte pour des raisons normatives, mais encore tout à fait irréaliste. Une gauche digne de ce nom n’a pas le droit de se laisser contaminer par ce genre de réflexes régressifs.
La capacité de régulation de l’Etat-nation ne suffit plus depuis longtemps à faire pièce aux conséquences ambivalentes de la mondialisation économique. Ce qui est célébré aujourd’hui comme «modèle social européen» ne peut être défendu que si, dans le cadre même de l’Europe, la politique est capable de revenir à la hauteur des marchés. Ce n’est qu’au niveau européen que l’on pourra récupérer tout ou partie de la capacité de régulation politique de toute façon perdue au niveau de l’Etat-nation. Les membres de l’UE renforcent aujourd’hui leur coopération dans les domaines qui relèvent de la politique de sécurité – la justice, le droit pénal et l’immigration. Une gauche active et lucide dans sa politique européenne aurait déjà depuis longtemps incité à une harmonisation beaucoup plus poussée, y compris dans les domaines de la politique économique et fiscale.
A cet égard, la Constitution européenne a au moins le mérite d’offrir une telle latitude. Il faut que l’Union retrouve, après l’élargissement à l’Est, toute sa capacité d’action, or c’est un objectif que peut permettre d’atteindre la Constitution. Nous sommes actuellement mis en demeure de coordonner, dans cette Europe des 25, des intérêts divergents selon les procédures conclues à Nice, et il en est ainsi parce que l’Europe des 15 ne fut pas en mesure de se doter en temps voulu d’une constitution politique. Si nous devions en rester là après un rejet du projet constitutionnel, l’Union ne serait certes pas ingouvernable, mais elle retomberait à un niveau d’immobilité et d’impuissance décisionnelle dont les néolibéraux feraient leur miel – eux dont les intentions sont de ne pas aller au-delà du traité de Maastricht.
Une gauche qui entend tenir tête au régime économique néolibéral doit regarder plus loin que l’Europe. Face au consensus dominant qu’est en train d’arracher Washington, elle ne peut proposer une solution sociale-démocrate au sens large que si l’Union européenne est capable d’agir non seulement à l’intérieur, mais également à l’extérieur. Contre un libéralisme hégémonique qui associe élections libres et marchés libres et entend imposer ses vues à l’échelle mondiale – s’il le faut en solo et par les armes –, l’Europe doit, de toute façon, apprendre à mener une politique extérieure où elle parlera d’une seule voix.

C’est George Bush qui ne pourrait que se réjouir d’un échec de la Constitution européenne. Grâce à cette Constitution, en effet, l’Europe pourrait développer une politique extérieure et de sécurité commune qui disposerait d’un soft power suffisant pour conforter l’opposition aux idées que se font les néoconservateurs de l’ordre mondial, et ce aux Etats-Unis même. Il est dans notre intérêt commun d’aider au développement des Nations unies et du droit international en vue d’une société mondiale politiquement constituée, sans gouvernement mondial. Nous devons parvenir à faire entrer effectivement dans un vrai cadre juridique les relations internationales, avant que d’autres puissances mondiales ne soient à même d’imiter, dans sa conception étroite du droit international, la politique de la force de l’administration Bush.
Nous ne pourrons faire face de manière offensive aux défis et aux risques liés à un monde en rupture que si nous renforçons l’Europe plutôt que de chercher à exploiter, au prix d’un vieux populisme, les angoisses, par ailleurs bien compréhensibles, de la population. La coalition malgré elle du non de gauche avec le non réactionnaire d’une certaine droite a par surcroît une note tragique, en ce qu’elle repose sur une illusion de la gauche. Elle fait fond en effet sur cette illusion qu’un non émis par la France conduirait nécessairement les autres membres à reprendre les négociations sur la Constitution européenne. Attendre cela revient à commettre une double erreur.

Du point de vue de toutes les autres nations, un non venant de France aura, s’il se produit, une signification spécifique. C’est de la nation française qu’est venue, dans une belle largeur de vues, l’initiative de la réconciliation avec l’Allemagne. Et c’est elle, du même coup, qui a mis l’unification européenne sur ses rails – une unification qu’elle n’a cessé de stimuler par des impulsions constamment renouvelées. S’il advenait, au moment précis où nous nous trouvons à la croisée des chemins, que cette France-là s’écarte de la route jusqu’ici suivie, il est certain qu’une dépression s’abattrait sur toute l’Europe, et pour longtemps.
C’est une conséquence que je tiens quasiment pour inévitable. La France, en effet, n’est pas la Grande-Bretagne. Si le référendum britannique sur la Constitution débouchait sur un non – ce que je n’espère certes pas –, il est probable que la plupart des autres Etats membres réagiraient, du moins je le crois, par le défi. Qu’on réponde «maintenant ou jamais!» à un pays qui, après avoir en permanence tergiversé, mettrait en échec la Constitution n’aurait après tout rien d’extraordinaire. Un non français, en revanche, ne pourrait que paralyser durablement l’Europe; une telle décision aurait en effet pour tous les autres pays européens valeur de signal, et il est probable que dans sa fragilité leur opinion publique se renverserait en faveur de tous les europhobes – nationalistes et souverainistes de tout poil –, mais aussi en faveur des néolibéraux, pour qui la Constitution de l’Europe trouve sa pleine et entière expression dans l’économisme de la Constitution actuelle.

Il faut enfin se surestimer de manière grotesque pour imaginer comme le font les partisans du non de gauche que la Constitution serait renégociée au seul prétexte qu’au sein de la coalition perverse du non français se trouvent également quelques europhiles pour qui l’intégration politique ne va pas assez loin. Et là réside la seconde illusion : s’il advenait effectivement qu’un rejet par la France du traité constitutionnel entraîne sa renégociation, ce serait le triomphe de ceux pour qui, au contraire, le compromis constitutionnel va trop loin. Le résultat ne serait nullement un approfondissement des institutions, mais bien plutôt un renforcement de l’intergouvernementalisme.
Je n’abandonne toutefois pas l’espoir que la gauche française reste fidèle à elle-même et qu’elle se range à des arguments plutôt que de succomber à des états d’âme.

Traduit de l’allemand par Christian Bouchindhomme.

Jürgen Habermas est professeur émérite à l’Université de Francfort et professeur invité à l’Université de Northwestern. Ses derniers ouvrages en français sont « Après l’Etat-nation » (Fayard, 2000) et « l’Avenir de la nature humaine » (Gallimard, 2002). « Une époque de transition (écrits politiques 1998-2003) » paraît chez Fayard le 11 mai et « De l’usage public des idées » sortira à l’automne.

Das illusionäre 'Nein der Linken'

Das illusionäre 'Nein der Linken'
Die Verfassung annehmen, um Europas Handlungsfähigkeit zu stärken. Von Jürgen Habermas

Die europäische Einigung ist lange genug von den politischen Eliten vorangetrieben worden. Solange alle davon profitierten, waren's die Bürger zufrieden. Das Projekt hat sich bisher durch seine Ergebnisse allein legitimiert. Aber im Europa der 25 bahnen sich Verteilungskonflikte an, für die diese Art der output-Legitimation nicht mehr ausreicht. Die Bürger sind mit dem bürokratischen Steuerungsmodus unzufrieden, die Akzeptanz lässt auch in der Bevölkerung der europafreundlichen Mitgliedstaaten nach. Das Tandem Frankreich und Deutschland ist aus dem Tritt geraten und bestimmt nicht mehr die Richtung der Tour.

In dieser Situation hatte die französische Regierung den Mut zum Verfassungsreferendum. Als Deutscher, der über den Kleinmut seiner Politiker enttäuscht ist, beneide ich Frankreich. Diese französische Republik hat noch ein Bewusstsein von den demokratischen Maßstäben einer Tradition, hinter die sie nicht zurückfallen will. Der Akt der Verfassungsgebung vollzieht sich durch die polarisierten Meinungen und dissonanten Stimmen, durch das kumulierte "Ja" und "Nein" der Bürger hindurch. So könnten wir mit den vielstimmigen Diskursen, die aus der französischen Presse über den Rhein zu uns dringen, zufrieden sein - wenn es da nicht ein Problem gäbe. Wir, die wir von jenseits der nationalen Grenzen nach Frankreich schauen, wissen, dass es ebenso unsere Verfassung ist, die am Votum der Franzosen scheitern kann.

Auf die gleiche Weise sind die Franzosen vom Votum der Engländer, der Polen, der Tschechen und aller anderen abhängig. Während im normalen Fall ein Volk über seine eigene Verfassung beschließt, muss die europäische Verfassung aus den übereinstimmenden Voten von 25 Völkern hervorgehen, und nicht aus einem gemeinsam gebildeten Willen der europäischen Bürger. Denn noch besteht keine europäische Öffentlichkeit, keine grenzüberschreitende Bündelung von Themen, keine gemeinsame Diskussion. Jedes dieser Voten bildet sich in den Grenzen der jeweils eigenen nationalen Öffentlichkeit. Diese Asymmetrie ist gefährlich, weil der Vorrang nationaler Probleme, beispielsweise Vorbehalte gegenüber der Regierung Chirac, den Blick auf diejenigen Probleme verstellt, die sich mit der Annahme oder Ablehnung der europäischen Verfassung tatsächlich stellen. In jede unserer nationalen Öffentlichkeiten müsste auch das Für und Wider der anderen Nationen Eingang finden.

In diesem Sinne verstehe ich auch die Einladung, mich in den französischen Wahlkampf einzumischen. Nach meiner Auffassung würde sich eine Linke, die den Kapitalismus zähmen und zivilisieren will, mit einem "Nein" zur europäischen Verfassung zum falschen Zeitpunkt für die falsche Seite entscheiden.

Natürlich gibt es gute Gründe, den Weg zu kritisieren, den die Einigung Europas genommen hat. Delors ist mit seiner politischen Vision gescheitert. Europa ist stattdessen horizontal, über die Herstellung eines Gemeinsamen Marktes und die Schaffung eines partiell gemeinsamen Währungsgebietes, integriert worden. Die Politische Union wäre vermutlich ohne die Dynamik wirtschaftlicher Interessen gar nicht zustande gekommen. Diese Dynamik verstärkt nur die Tendenz der weltweiten Deregulierung von Märkten. Aber die xenophobische Vorstellung der Rechten, dass die sozial unerwünschten Folgen dieser Entgrenzung durch den Rückzug auf die protektionistischen Kräfte des Nationalstaates abgewendet werden könnten, ist nicht nur aus normativen Gründen dubios, sondern ganz und gar unrealistisch. Die Linke darf sich von diesen regressiven Reflexen nicht anstecken lassen.

Die Regulierungskraft des Nationalstaates reicht längst nicht mehr aus, um ambivalente Folgen der wirtschaftlichen Globalisierung abzufedern. Was heute als "europäische Gesellschaftsmodell" gerühmt wird, lässt sich nur dadurch verteidigen, dass die Politik den Märkten in Europa selbst nachwächst. Allein auf europäischer Ebene kann ein Teil der politischen Steuerungsfähigkeit zurückgewonnen werden, die auf nationaler Ebene so oder so verloren geht. Die Mitglieder der EU verstärken heute ihre Kooperation auf den sicherheitspolitischen Feldern von Justiz, Strafrecht und Immigration. Eine europapolitisch aufgeklärte und aktive Linke hätte längst auf eine weitergehende Harmonisierung, auch in Bereichen der Steuer- und Wirtschaftspolitik drängen können.

Dafür eröffnet die europäische Verfassung nun wenigstens den Spielraum. Sie dient dem Ziel, die Handlungsfähigkeit der Europäischen Union auch nach der Osterweiterung zu erhalten. Im Europa der 25 müssen die auseinanderstrebenden Interessen nach den in Nizza beschlossenen Verfahren koordiniert werden, weil das Europa der 15 nicht in der Lage war, sich rechtzeitig eine politische Verfassung zu geben. Wenn die EU nach Ablehnung des Verfassungsentwurfs in diesem Zustand verharrt, wird sie zwar nicht unregierbar. Aber sie fällt dann auf ein Niveau der Unbeweglichkeit und der Entscheidungsschwäche zurück, das den Neoliberalen nur recht sein kann. Denn diese hatten ihr Ziel mit dem Vertrag von Maastricht schon erreicht.

Eine Linke, die sich gegen das neoliberale Wirtschaftregime stemmt, muss auch über Europa hinausschauen. Eine im weitesten Sinne sozialdemokratische Alternative zum herrschenden Washington Konsens kann sie nur verfolgen, wenn die Europäische Union Handlungsfähigkeit nicht nur nach innen, sondern auch nach außen gewinnt. Sie muss ohnehin lernen, außenpolitisch mit einer Stimme zu sprechen, wenn sie einem hegemonialen Liberalismus begegnen will, der freie Wahlen und freie Märkte notfalls im Alleingang und mit militärische Gewalt weltweit durchsetzen will.

Es ist Bush, der sich über ein Scheitern der europäischen Verfassung freuen dürfte. Im Rahmen dieser Verfassung könnte Europa nämlich eine gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik entwickeln, die über genügend soft power verfügt, um der Opposition gegen die Weltordnungsvorstellungen der Neokonservativen, auch in den Vereinigten Staaten selbst, den Rücken zu stärken. Es liegt in unserem gemeinsamen Interesse, die Vereinten Nationen und das Völkerrecht zu einer politisch verfassten Weltgesellschaft ohne Weltregierung fortzuentwickeln. Wir müssen zu einer effektiven Verrechtlichung der internationalen Beziehungen gelangen, bevor andere Weltmächte in die Lage versetzt werden, die völkerrechtswidrige Machtpolitik der Bush-Regierung nachzuahmen.

Den Herausforderungen und Risiken einer Welt im Umbruch können wir nur offensiv begegnen, wenn wir Europa stärken und nicht die verständlichen Ängste der Bevölkerung auch noch populistisch ausbeuten. Die unfreiwillige Koalition des Neins der Linken mit dem reaktionären Nein der Rechten hat eine tragisch Note, weil sie auf einer Illusion der Linken beruht. Sie kommt auf der Grundlage der Illusion zustande, dass ein Nein aus Frankreich die anderen Mitgliedstaaten dazu veranlassen könnte, die Verhandlungen über die europäische Verfassung wieder aufzunehmen. Diese Erwartung ist ein doppelter Irrtum.

Aus der Sicht aller übrigen Nationen hat das französische Nein eine spezifische Bedeutung. Die französische Nation hat nach dem Ende des Zweiten Weltkrieges die großzügige Initiative zur Aussöhnung mit Deutschland ergriffen. Damit hat sie die europäische Einigung erst auf den Weg gebracht; sie hat dieser auch fortan immer wieder neue Impulse gegeben. Wenn sich dieses Frankreich an der kritischen Wegkreuzung, an der wir heute stehen, von der bisher verfolgten Route abwendet, wird sich eine langanhaltende Depression über ganz Europa ausbreiten.

Ich halte das für eine fast unvermeidliche Folge. Denn Frankreich ist nicht Großbritannien. Wenn das Verfassungsreferendum in England scheitern sollte, was ich nicht hoffe, halte ich eine Trotzreaktion der meisten anderen Mitgliedstaaten für wahrscheinlich. Auf das Scheitern in einem Lande, das immer schon gezögert hat, könnte ein "Nun erst recht!" die Antwort sein. Aber ein Nein aus Frankreich müsste Europa auf lange Zeit lähmen, weil diese Entscheidung eine Signalwirkung für alle anderen europäischen Länder hätte und dort die prekären Stimmungslagen zugunsten der Europagegner umkippen ließe - zugunsten der Nationalisten und Souveränisten aller Couleurs, auch zugunsten der Neoliberalen, für die sich die Verfassung Europas in der bestehenden Wirtschaftsverfassung erschöpft.

Es ist eine groteske Selbstüberschätzung der linken Neinsager anzunehmen, dass die Verfassung nur deshalb neu verhandelt werden würde, weil sich in der perversen Koalition der französischen Neinstimmen auch die von einigen Europafreunden befinden, denen die politische Integration nicht weit genug geht. Denn das ist die zweite Illusion: Wenn es aufgrund des französischen Votums tatsächlich zu einer Neuverhandlung käme, würden diejenigen triumphieren, denen der Verfassungskompromiss zu weit geht. Das Resultat wäre keineswegs eine weitere Vertiefung der europäischen Institutionen, sondern eine Verstärkung des Intergouvernementalismus.

Ich gebe die Hoffnung nicht auf, dass sich die französische Linke treu bleibt. Dann wird sie auch dieses Mal Argumenten und nicht Stimmungen folgen.

Jürgen Habermas

Dieser Artikel erschien zuerst auf französisch im Nouvel Observateur. Wir danken Jürgen Habermas für die Nachdruckgenehmigung.

The illusionary "Leftist No"

The illusionary "Leftist No"
Adopting the constitution to strengthen Europe's power to act. By Jürgen Habermas

European unification has been pushed for long enough by political elites. As long as everyone profited, the citizens were content. Until now, the project has been granted legitimacy by its results. But the Europe of 25 is in store for conflicts over distribution which will not be appeased by this kind of output legitimation. Citizens are dissatisfied with the modus of bureaucratic control, and acceptance is also dwindling among the populations of Europe-friendly member states. The France-Germany tandem has been out of step for a while, and no longer decides what direction is to be taken.

In this situation, the French government had the courage to hold a constitutional referendum. As a German who is disappointed with the faint-heartedness of his own politicians, I envy France. This French republic is still conscious of the democratic standards of a tradition it does not want to fall short of. The act of choosing a constitution is taking place among polarised opinions and dissonant voices, through the cumulative "Yes" and "No" of the French citizens. So we could be content with the many-sided discourses from the French press that reach us over the Rhine - if it weren't for one problem. Those of us looking towards France from beyond its national boundaries know that it is also our constitution which can miscarry with the French vote.

In the same way, the French are dependent on the votes of the English, the Poles, the Czechs and all the others. While in the normal case a people decides on its own constitution, the European constitution must result from the supporting votes of 25 peoples, and not from the common will of the citizens of Europe. For there is still no European public space, no transnational bundling of themes, no common discussion. Each one of these votes takes place within the bounds of the individual country's public sphere. This asymmetry is dangerous, because the primacy of national problems, for instance reservations about Chirac's government, can obstruct the view of the problems actually posed by the acceptance or rejection of the European constitution. In each of our national public spheres, the pros and cons of the other nations should also find a voice.

It is in this spirit that I understand the invitation for me to become involved in the French electoral campaign. In my view, a Left which aims to tame and civilise capitalism with a "No" to the European constitution would be deciding for the wrong side at the wrong time.

Of course there are good reasons to criticise the course that the unification of Europe has taken. Delors failed with his political vision. Instead, Europe has been integrated horizontally, through the creation of a common market and a partially common currency. Without the dynamic of economic interests, the political union would have probably never gotten off the ground. This dynamic only strengthens the worldwide tendency toward market deregulation. But the xenophobic perception of the Right that the socially undesirable consequences of this lifting of boundaries could be avoided by returning to the protectionist forces of the nation state is not only dubious for normative reasons, it is also outright unrealistic. The Left must not let itself be infected by such regressive reflexes.

The regulative capacity of the nation state has long been insufficient to buffer the ambivalent consequences of economic globalisation. What is vaunted today as the "European social model" can only be defended if European political strength grows alongside the markets. It is solely on the European level that a part of the political regulatory power that is bound to be lost on the national level can be won back. Today the EU member states are strengthening their cooperation in the areas of justice, criminal law and immigration. An active Left taking an enlightened stance toward European politics could have also pressed long ago for greater harmonisation in the areas of taxation and economic policy.

The European constitution now creates at least the conditions for this. It will maintain the European Union's power to act, even after the eastward expansion. In the Europe of 25, divergent interests must be coordinated according to the procedure decided on in Nice, because the Europe of 15 was not able to give itself a political constitution in due time. If this state continues after the rejection of the draft constitution, the EU will certainly not become ungovernable. But it will fall back to a level of immobility and indecisiveness that can only add grist to the mill of the neoliberals. They already achieved their goal with the Treaty of Maastricht.

A Left that opposes the neoliberal economic regime must also look beyond Europe. It can only follow a social-democratic - in the largest sense of the term – alternative to the ruling consensus in Washington, if the European Union acquires the power to act not only on its home turf, but also in international affairs. It must learn to speak the language of foreign policy with a single voice, if it wants to counter the hegemonic liberalism that is willing to push through free elections and the free market on its own and backed by military might, if need be.

Bush is the one who would rejoice at the failure of the European constitution, for it would allow Europe to develop a common foreign and security policy with enough soft power to bolster opposition to the neoconservative view of global order, also within the United States. It is in our common interest to develop the United Nations, and the law of nations, into a politically constituted world community without a world government. We must attain an effective juridification of international relations, before other world powers are in a position to emulate the power politics of the Bush government in violation of the law of nations.

We can only meet the challenges and risks of a world in upheaval in an offensive way by strengthening Europe, not by exploiting the understandable fears of the people in a populist manner. The involuntary coalition of the Leftist "No" with the reactionary "No" of the Right has a tragic note to it, because it rides on a Leftist illusion: that a "No" in France could prompt other member states to renew negotiations on the European constitution. This idea contains a twofold error.

From the perspective of all the other nations, the French "No" has a specific significance. After the end of the Second World War, the French nation took the generous initiative of reconciliation with Germany. In doing so, it started the ball rolling for European unification. And France has continually given new impulses to this unification. If now, at this critical junction, France departs from the route it has been following, a prolonged depression will spread across Europe.

I hold this for practically unavoidable. France is not Great Britain. If the constitutional referendum were to fail there, which I hope it will not, I think most of the member states would probably react defiantly. Their answer to a constitutional "No" in a country that had always been hesitant could well be "all the more reason!" But a "No" in France would paralyse Europe in the long term, because it would send a signal to all other European countries, and tip the precarious balance of opinion in favour of Europe's adversaries – nationalists and sovereigntists of all stripes. And it would play into the hands of the neoliberals, for whom the concept of a European constitution goes no further than the existing economic constitution.

It is a grotesque overestimation on the part of the Leftist naysayers to presume that the constitution would be reopened to negotiation because the perverse coalition of French "No" votes also includes a few friends of Europe who feel the political integration does not go far enough. And that is the second illusion: if in fact the French vote did lead to new negotiations, the winners would be those who feel the constitution compromise goes too far. The result would in no means be a further strengthening of European institutions, but a strengthening of intergovernmentalism.

I do not relinquish the hope that the French Left will remain true to itself, and that this time too, it will be swayed by arguments, and not by sentiment.

*

The article was originally published in French in the Nouvel Observateur on 7 May, 2005, and in German on the Perlentaucher website on 11 May, 2005.

Jürgen Habermas, born in 1929, is one of Germany's foremost intellectual figures. A philosopher and sociologist, he is professor emeritus at the Johann Wolfgang Goethe University in Frankfurt and the leading representative of the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory. His works include "Legitimation Crisis", "Knowledge and Human Interests", "Theory of Communicative Action" and "The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity".

The rationality of worldviews

Habermas often speaks as though the question of the rationality of a worldviews as a whole cannot be judged within the parameters of a post metaphysical concept of rationality. However this is true only regarding the substantive portion of any worldview is concerned (its conception of good life for example). The same does not apply to the formal character of a worldview. Thus two worldviews can be judged and compared as a whole as regard to their formal-prgamtic rational potential. Hence on this level we can judge one worldview as less or more rational than other or can even judge some worldviews as irrational if they lack the basic formal-pragmatic concepts!

As Habermas puts it:

“The rationality of worldviews is not measured in terms of logical and semantic properties but in terms of formal-pragmatic basic concepts they place at the disposal of individuals for interpreting their world. We could also speak of the “ontologies” built into worldviews, providing that this concept, which stems from the tradition of Greek metaphysics, is not restricted to a special world-relation that is, to the cognitive relation to the world of existing things [Seienden]. There is no corresponding concept in philosophy that includes relations to the social and the subjective worlds as well as to the objective world. The theory of communicative action is also meant to remedy this lack.” (TCA I: p. 45).

Thus the modern worldview is superior to pre modern worldviews because it possesses richer formal-pragmatic basic concepts.

Addendum:

“On the other hand, worldviews differ form portraits in that they in turn make possible utterances that admit of truth. To this extent they have a relation, albeit indirect, to truth . . . . Owing to their reference to totality, worldviews are indeed removed from the dimension in which judgment of them according to criteria of truth makes sense; even the choice of criteria according to which the truth of statements is to be judged may depend on the basic conceptual context of a worldview . . . worldviews can be compared with one another not only form the quasiaesthetic and truth-indifferent standpoints of coherence, depth, economy, completeness, and the like, but also form the standpoint of cognitive adequacy. The adequacy of a linguistically articulated worldview is a function of the true statements that are possible in this language system.” (TCA I: 58-59, italics in the original).