Continental Philosophy of Social Science: Hermeneutics, Genealogy, and Critical Theory from Greece to the Twenty-First Century

"This ambitious and wide-ranging book asks what recent continental philosophy can contribute to our understanding of the social sciences. Yvonne Sherratt argues that continental thought since the late nineteenth century offers a distinctive way of reflecting on social science. She sets out to explain what is unique about the continental approach, to distinguish its main strands, and to show that it is a promising alternative to Anglo-American work in the field. Sherratt's subject is important, and a discussion of it is long overdue. Unfortunately, Sherratt's book is not as original or as well-informed as the topic warrants."

full here

Religion and public spehre

Some comments here

Habermas in action: Impressions about Habermas' seminar

"It was interesting to see Habermas back down so easily on this and other matters; indeed, throughout the presentation you simply wouldn't have known just how famous (and deservedly so) he is. His modesty was extremely attractive -- and was a model for all of us. He didn't assume he had an answer for everything -- and his dialogue mirrored the paper's emphasis on learning from one another. One area where he was especially coy was when he was pressed for institutional design ideas or practical ways to police the sort of reason-giving he thinks critical to the public political sphere. For a colloquium in a law school, he was notably short on practical ideas. This didn't seem to matter much to him; it seemed clear that he just thinks there is a division of labor in the academy and it isn't his role to specify how to bring his ideas into a workable set of legal rules. It was interesting especially for me -- since the tone of my first book is very aggressive toward Habermas's talking big about deliberative democracy without making any effort to offer real, practical ways to imagine one."

Read full here

"Critical Theory is dead"

This guy thinks so

A review of "Truth and Justification"

Magda Dumitru, The University at Buffalo, SUNY

Written by 'the greatest philosopher alive', as many would put it, this
volume will be particularly rewarding for specialists in Semantics and
Pragmatics in the field of Linguistics and Philosophy of language, but
also for those interested in less 'advertised' aspects of the philosophies
of Kant, Hegel, and Juergen Habermas himself, among others. It is the 17th
of his volumes Habermas sees appearing in the series "Studies in
Contemporary German Social Thought", under the series editorship of Thomas
McCarthy. The volume is a translation of the 1999 edition of "Wahrheit und
Rechtfertigung" -- except for chapters 2 and 5, which have been replaced.
The editor of "Truth and Justification" is Barbara Fultner who, apart from
editing the Notes and Index, is doing a nice job of translating chapters
2, 5, 6, and 7, editing earlier translations of chapters 1, 3, and 4 (by
Hella Beiser, Maeve Cooke, and Peter Dews respectively), and writing an
excellent "Translator's Introduction", where she confesses that great care
had to be taken in translating the original articles, under the danger of
creating "confusion in transposing a philosophical debate from one
language into another, one philosophical culture into another, even
challenging one's faith in the principle of translatability" (p. XXI).

The book includes seven chapters, preceded by the author's "Introduction:
Realism after the Linguistic Turn", which is a welcome synopsis of the
volume, with further implications for Habermas' philosophical thought. In
the following, I am presenting summaries of the chapters, including
several examples of the author's wording, followed by a short critical
evaluation.

SUMMARY

Chapter 1 "Hermeneutic and Analytic Philosophy: Two Complementary Versions
of the Linguistic Turn"

The first chapter traces the road from hermeneutics (the fief of
continental philosophy) to formal pragmatics (Habermas's own theory). The
linguistic turn initiated by Frege has given rise to three 'currents',
according to Habermas. The first current, represented by the philosophies
of Wittgenstein and Heidegger, takes the linguistic turn as a paradigm
shift: it is true what is taken to be true. The second current,
represented by Russel, Carnap, Quine, and Davidson, views the linguistic
turn simply as a methodological device. The third current, represented by
Putnam, Dummett, and Apel, sees the linguistic turn as a paradigm shift
towards a formal pragmatics, defined as a theory of the general structures
of action. Habermas, whose philosophy is centered around both language and
culture, salutes the third current, since it is in discourse that
participants challenge "the truth for propositions about things and events
in the objective world, and rightness for propositions about normative
expectations and interpersonal relations" (p. 79). This challenging of
truth in discourse is made possible by a "decentering of lifeworld
perspectives" (p. 78).

Chapter 2 "From Kant's 'Ideas' of Pure Reason to the 'Idealizing'
Presuppositions of Communicative Action: Reflections on the
Detranscendentalized 'Use of Reason'"

The second chapter establishes a Kantian genealogy for Habermas' formal
pragmatics, by analyzing his idealizing presuppositions of communicative
action: the presupposition of a common objective world is based on Kant's
idea of the unity of the world; the rationality of accountable agents
corresponds to Kant's idea of freedom; the unconditionality of validity
claims raised in communicative action corresponds to the Kantian
unconditionality of reason; rational discourse as the forum of possible
justification echoes the Kantian idea that reason is 'the highest court of
appeal'. The main difference between Kantian philosophy and the concept of
communicative action is the level at which idealization operates: the
objective world for Kant, and the social world for Habermas. The latter
believes in an "ineluctable grounding of objectivity in linguistic
intersubjectivity" (p. 130); intersubjectivity leads participants in
communication to decenter their interpretive perspectives, approaching
thus the ideal limit of complete inclusiveness of all relevant
contributions to discourse. Truth can only be ascertained through
discourse: the two-place relation of validity is replaced by a 3-place
relation: a proposition is true for a certain audience.

Chapter 3 "From Kant to Hegel: On Robert Brandom's Pragmatic Philosophy of
Language"

The third chapter aims at presenting "the state of the art of pragmatic
approaches in analytic philosophy of language". William Brandom's "Making
it Explicit", a milestone in theoretical philosophy, outlines the theses
of 'conceptual realism': there is no difference between thoughts and the
world captured in thoughts ("facts are just true claims"); the objectivity
of the world is not attested by sensations, but only "through the
discoursive resistance of persistent objections" raised in discourse;
discoursive practice generates concepts and is not "hostage to a knowledge
of meanings inherited a priori"; the utterance of an interlocutor is taken
to be true (has objective content) by another interlocutor if the latter
comes to acknowledge it as correct. Habermas has several objections to
Brandom's theory: rational norms are unduly assimilated to practical
norms; Brandom neglects the cognitive significance of the second person
since, as a consequence of Brandom's proposal, interlocutors do not answer
each other and hence do not coordinate each other's action plans, but just
inform each other about their beliefs and intentions; a consequence of
assimilating norms to facts is a moral realism, not likely to be
defensible.

Chapter 4 "From Kant to Hegel and Back Again: The Move toward
Detranscendentalization"

The fourth chapter discusses the Hegelian origins of the phenomenon of
detranscendentalizing the knowing subject. Kant introduced the
transcendental turn; post-Hegelian philosophy is marked by the
detranscendentalization of the knowing subject, as a result of the
postmentalist turn introduced by Hegel. Decentering one's perspective is
considering everyone else's perspectives. Kantian mentalist dualism can be
overcome by assimilating the subject-object relations to intersubjective
relations, which would presuppose, according to Habermas, that
interlocutors assume the existence of "an independent world of objects
that is the same for all of them" (p. 193). This is the reason why
Habermas believes that Hegel's theory still maintains a Kantian gap, not
between the world of appearances and the things in themselves, but between
the social world (shared intersubjectively) and the objective world we
must cope with. The issue becomes vital in cases where the law is enforced
selectively, giving rise to what Habermas refers to as 'Brazilianization'
(p. 210); the danger awaits even contemporary democratic societies, if
there is an unbalance between globalized markets and international
politics.

Chapter 5 "Norms and Values: On Hilary Putnam's Kantian Pragmatism"

The fifth chapter is centered around Hilary Putnam's "Norms and Values",
in order to investigate how one can be a realist epistemologist without
being a moral realist as well. The question Habermas raises in this
chapter is whether Hilary Putnam would not have been "better off if he
remained a Kantian all the way", that is, if he adopted not only a Kantian
metaphysics and epistemology, but also a Kantian practical philosophy. It
should be reminded that Putnam maintains the core of Kant's philosophy,
namely that "subjects are rational beings operating with reasons". Also,
he believes, with Kant and against Quine, that there are a priori
analythic thruths, e.g. that ethics (values) makes possible the
epistemology (the knowledge of the world), since reason is practical.
However, Putnam does not make a deontological distinction between
universal norms of action and particular values, since he considers that
the objectivity of value judgments is always indexed to particular
communities; the universal and the ideal would result from an ever
inclusive universe of perspectives. Putnam does not make a distinction
between judgments of fact and judgments of value neither; he believes that
both objective and normative validity must be justified by reasons, albeit
of a different sort. What Habermas notices though is that the two
validities are not identical, but similar: whereas 'rightness' is an
epistemic concept, the meaning of true statements "cannot be reduced to
epistemic conditions of confirmation, no matter how rigorous they might
be: truth goes beyond idealized justification." (p. 230). The chapter ends
with the following critique: "given a pluralism of legitimate world views,
conflicts of justice can be resolved only if the disputing parties agree
to create an inclusive We-perspective by mutual perspective-taking" (p.
235); only in a horizontal We- perspective (not vertical, as Aristotle and
Dewey -- and eventually Putnam himself -- propose) are individuals unique,
since "only as irreplaceable and unmistakable persons do they belong to
the moral realm." (p. 235).

Chapter 6 "Rightness versus Truth: On the Sense of Normative Validity in
Moral Judgments and Norms"

The sixth chapter aims at distinguishing between truth and moral
rightness. Moral knowledge is different from empirical knowledge in
that "it says how people ought to act, and not how things are with objects
in the world" (p. 239). However, both rightness of moral judgment and
truth of descriptions are found through argumentation (can be justified or
validated), as a result of the linguistic turn. Habermas proposes a
pragmatic conception of truth, since contextualism (another consequence of
the linguistic turn) cannot explain how a belief is true just because
it 'hangs together' with other beliefs: "beliefs are confirmed in action
by something different than in discourse" (p. 254). The concrete moral
world has become procedural, as a result of giving up the simple concept
of 'collective good' (vertical We-perspective) and assuming an
intersubjectively shared lifeworld (horizontal We- perspective). This
leads to a functional equivalence -- not to an assimilation - of the
projection of the moral world to the presupposition of the objective world.

Chapter 7 "The Relationship between Theory and Practice Revisited"

The last chapter shows that a division between truth and rightness is
advisable in the sociocultural forms of life as well. The chapter opens
with a historical perspective on the role of philosophy in politics,
culture, and education, from Plato and Aristotle to Kant, Hegel, and Marx.
Habermas notes that, since the disastrous consequences of Marx's praxis,
philosophy has lost its power to give direction to people's lives. Also,
since philosophy has become an academic endeavour -- fallible by default,
it has relinquished "the claim of holding the key to the Truth" (p. 285).
However, philosophy continues to maintain a unique 'polyglot trait'
through its connection to truth, law, morality, and art. What philosophy
can do today, according to Habermas, is evaluate competing expert
opinions, handle questions concerning ecology, medicine, and genetic
engineering, discuss criminal political regimes and 'unmasterable pasts'
(in terms of trial and forgetting), make individual lives 'meaningful' and
provide the society with 'public intellectuals'. In the second part of the
chapter, Habermas turns to the importance of the intersubjective approach
developed in philosophy: it is only through individuation and
socialization incorporated by an intersubjective approach, that legal
persons become individuals; the concept of 'human rights' is thus
translated into 'subjective rights'. Also, acknowledging that "every
person is of equal value precisely as a person" (p. 292), which is the
result of taking up an intersubjective approach, ensures that different
cultures and societies agree on binding norms (reciprocal rights and
duties). However, very importantly, the practice of argumentation insures
that such an agreement need not and must not "require the mutual
appreciation for one another's cultural achievements and life style" (p.
292).

CRITICAL EVALUATION

Special credit goes for novelty; according to the author, the present
volume is investigating a domain neglected in his previous
writings: 'theoretical philosophy', that is, issues in epistemology,
metaphysics, and philosophy of language. In so doing, Habermas wishes to
reconcile the hermeneutic tradition and the analytic tradition, since he
believes that the former is lacking a semantics (a theory of truth, after
all), while the latter is lacking a cultural perspective (of
the 'Zeitgeist', for instance).

Credit goes also for style; it is a pleasure to follow the 'hypertext' the
author is constantly establishing between different philosophical
theories, both hermeneutical and analytical, and the beauty of the
argumentation, running in typical German style. The volume does not make
for an easy reading though, which is the inescapable effect of
translation; the 'shortcoming' is however largely compensated for by the
generous introductions to the volume, mentioned above.

Much credit goes for richness; there are various issues disscussed
throughout the volume, but perhaps the most interesting one, from a
linguist's point of view, is Habermas's definition of truth. It is a
formal pragmatic definition, according to which something is true if it
comes forward as being certain. It is important to understand that, from
this point of view, something is taken to be true prior to becoming
certain to someone; therefore truth is not the result of consensus, as one
could have infered from the earlier "Wahrheitstheorien". Habermas's is not
a mere pragmatic theory (something is true if it is taken to be true), but
a Kantian pragmatic theory, since it embraces a linguistic transcendental
perspective, in the sense that both propositions and reality are
considered to be already filtered by language. Once something becomes
certainty, it becomes a symptom of truth, so to speak; further,
certainties are beliefs that guide actions.

Less convincing is the rationale for which, after rejecting both the
correspondence theory (something is true if it corresponds to a fact), and
the coherence theory (something is true if it is part of a coherent set of
beliefs), Habermas seems to favor deflationist theories (truth is
redundant). Such theories are far from being unproblematic within the
analytic tradition, while the author offers no detailed discussion of the
topic.

More problematic, in the absence of a well argued definition of truth from
the analytic perspective, are the consequences of the 'marriage' between
the two philosophical traditions -- continental and analytical. One is
told where truth resides -- beyond justification (the goal of
justification is to "discover a truth that exceeds all justifications" p.
40) - and how to access it -- by switching from discourse to action and
thereby 'finding' certainties. The problem of reconciling the hermeneutic
and the analytical traditions is not solved, but eliminated: a
deflationist account of truth - 'truth is truth', so to speak -- prevents
the hermeneutic tradition from having a 'terminus ad quem'. The issue of
defining truth has further consequences for solving the problem of
reference which, under the present circumstances, does not arise at all
from an analytic point of view, although Habermas keeps a distinction
between 'reference' and 'description', which may be a starting point for
further analysis.

No credit goes for the black cloth used as cover - it may color your hands
accordingly; therefore either keep the outer backcover (a green glossy
paper, handsomly designed) when reading, or wait for the paperback -- yet,
by all means, read the book if you are interested in issues of truth,
reference, discourse, moral theory, political theory, and globalization!

REFERENCES

Brandom, W. (1994) Making it Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and
Discursive Commitment. Cambridge Mass.

Davidson, D. (1984) Inquiries Into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford.

Dummett, M. (1993) The Origins of Analytical Philosophy, London.

Dummett, M. (1993) Truth and Meaning. The Seas of Language, Oxford, pp.
147-165.

Habermas, J. (1984) Wahrheitstheorien. Vorstudien und Ergaenzungen zur
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, Frankfurt, pp. 127-183.

Habermas, J. (1984/1987) Theory of Communicative Action, trans. Thomas
McCarthy, 2 vols, Boston.

Hegel, G.W.F. (1949) Phaenomenologie des Geistes, Leipzig. Kant, I. (1996)
Critique of Pure Reason. trans. Werner S. Pluhar, Indianapolis.

Putnam, H. (1994) Dewey's Logic. Words and Life, Cambridge Mass., p. 214.

Putnam, H. (2001) Werte und Normen. Die Oeffentlichkheit der Vernunft und
die4 Vernunft der Oeffentlichkeit, Ed. Lutz Wingert and Klaus Guenther,
Frankfurt am Main, pp. 280- 313.

ABOUT THE REVIEWER

Magda Dumitru is mostly interested in representations and reference, in
the domains of Phonology and Semantics.

Gibt es eine Zukunft für die Sozialphilosophie?

here

Habermas' letter to "Cicero"

Sehr geehrter Herr Weimer,
ich bitte um den Abdruck der folgenden Stellungnahme:
Jürgen Busche betätigt sich als Denunziant, indem er auf der Grundlage von längst widerlegten Gerüchten Unwahrheiten insinuiert. Wenn man sich den Kreis derer vergegenwärtigt, von denen man weiß, dass sie das Gerücht kolportiert haben – Fest, Lübbe, Koselleck, und (nun erst?) Busche – erkennt man die erneute Denunziation als das, was sie ist: als Fortsetzung einer politischen Hetze, der ich vonseiten der FAZ insbesondere in den 70er und 80er Jahren ausgesetzt war. Fest hat mir offenbar die Kritik an jenen Vordenkern des NS-Regimes übelgenommen, die er in seinem Blatt rehabilitieren ließ.

Wie wehrt man sich gegen eine Denunziation, die das durchsichtige Ziel verfolgt, zusammen mit Grass eine unbequeme Generation von Intellektuellen abzuräumen, die sich für die selbstkritische Vergewisserung des Traditionshintergrundes der – auch und vor allem – in akademischen Schichten verbreiteten Zustimmung zur NS-Herrschaft eingesetzt hat? Ich begnüge mich mit Feststellungen, die bisher nicht nötig waren.

Ich hatte schon aufgrund meiner Behinderung keine Chance, mich als jugendlicher mit der herrschenden Weltanschauung zu identifizieren. Ich habe auch nicht, wie die Redaktion behauptet, „an den Endsieg geglaubt“. Da ich Arzt werden wollte, bin ich in der Hitlerjugend, einer Organisation, der damals jeder angehören musste, „Feldscher“ geworden und habe selbst Ausbildungskurse abgehalten, für die man Freiwillige gewinnen musste.

An einem dieser Kurse hatte auch Hans-Ulrich Wehler teilgenommen. Er hat mich daran, als wir uns in den 60er Jahren näher kennen lernten, erinnert. Damals schickte er mir das nun zu Ruhm gelangte „Dokument“: es handelt sich um eine der damals üblichen „Aufforderungen“, also um einen vorgedruckten Zettel, den ich damals verschickte, um meine Kursteilnehmer zusammenzuhalten. Sonst hätte ich meine Kurse einstellen müssen. Und dann hatte ich wieder zu dem verabscheuten regelmäßigen HJ-,,Dienst“, wie es damals hieß, erscheinen müssen.

Das Verschicken eines solchen Vordrucks war ein normaler Vorgang – ich selbst hatte früher solche Aufforderungen bekommen, wenn ich mehrere Male nicht „angetreten“ war. In den 70er Jahren hat mich deshalb die Erinnerung an diesen Vorgang so wenig berührt, dass ich den historischen Rang, den das Dokument inzwischen erlangt hat, unverzeihlicherweise nicht erkannt habe. Wo anders als im Papierkorb sollte es gelandet sein? Meine Frau muss das auch so wahrgenommen haben, denn sie gab auf Ulis Nachfrage – während eines gemeinsamen Sommerurlaubes am felsigen Strand von Elba – die unverkennbar ironische Antwort: „Er hat‘s verschluckt“.

Wenn der Umstand, dass ich von Herrn Fest posthum – und von dessen ehemaligem Angestellten Busche genötigt werde, mich über diese Lappalien zu äußern, eines lehrt, dann etwas von der Ranküne, die das Klima der Bundesrepublik Jahrzehnte lang vergiftet hat.

Mit Empfehlungen,
Jürgen Habermas

via Habermas Forum

Defending Habermas (2)

"Andreas Zielcke sets the Habermas story straight, quoting historian Hans-Ulrich Wehler: "Habermas was no Hitler Youth leader. For reasons of his harelip alone, he could never have had a leadership function under the Nazis. In actual fact, at 14 he did give first-aid classes in the Hitler Youth, for which he'd been trained as an orderly. His tasks included reminding participants who missed classes to attend punctually with so-called 'call letters.' These were preprinted forms in which the instructor simply had to fill in with the participant's information and then sign his name." Wehler had received one such reminder from Habermas, Zielcke writes, but stories that Habermas literally swallowed the form when he was confronted with it years later are false."

from here

Verleumdung wider besseres Wissen

Defending Habermas (1)

"In his story for Cicero magazine, journalist Jürgen Busche has obviously rekindled an old legend – that Jürgen Habermas swallowed an incriminating piece of paper from his Hitler Youth days that a colleague of his from the time, Hans-Ulrich Wehler, handed back to him after the war. It's pure fabrication, writes Christian Geyer, who having discussed the issue with Habermas and Wehler personally, describes the Cicero article as "fatuous". "Is this some attempt to milk the Grass affair by creating a buzz around Habermas? How cheap, how vulgar, how historically misleading. Busche does not have a single fact to back up this rumour that could even approach verification. Instead, in an absurd application of logic he takes the denial of Habermas and Wehler as proof of the 'crux of the matter' and jumps to the conclusion that something else must have been written on the paper other than standard bureaucratic print, something comprising."

from here

full article here

Hat Habermas die Wahrheit verschluckt?

"In seiner gerade erschienenen Autobiografie „Ich nicht“ schildert Joachim Fest, wie „einer der führenden Köpfe des Landes“ einen ihn möglicherweise belastenden Zettel aus der Zeit als „HJ-Führer“ Jahre später vor ungläubigem Publikum verschluckt. Fest lässt keinen Zweifel daran, dass dieser „führende Kopf“ Jürgen Habermas gewesen sei. Gerücht oder Ungeheuerlichkeit? Eine Spurensuche"

full here

Habermas receives award from North Rhine-Westphalia

On November 7, 2006, Jürgen Habermas will receive an award from government of North Rhine-Westphalia – ”Staatspreis des deutschen Bundeslands Nordrhein-Westfalen”. The ceremony will take place at Bonner Petersberg.

From the press release:

”Ministerpräsident Jürgen Rüttgers (CDU) verleiht den Staatspreis 2006 an den Philosophen und Sozialwissenschaftler Professor Dr. Jürgen Habermas

Ministerpräsident Jürgen Rüttgers wird am 7. November den Staatspreis des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen für das Jahr 2006 an den Philosophen und Sozialwissenschaftler Professor Dr. Jürgen Habermas verleihen. Die höchste Auszeichnung des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen besteht seit 1986 und ist mit 25.000 Euro dotiert. Professor Dr. Jürgen Habermas ist der 42. Preisträger. Der Staatspreis wird im feierlichen Rahmen auf dem Petersberg bei Bonn verliehen. Die Laudationes werden gehalten vom ehemaligen Bundesminister und SPD-Vorsitzenden Dr. Hans-Jochen Vogel und von Professor Dr. Wolfram Hogrebe, Lehrstuhl für Theoretische Philosophie der Universität Bonn.

"Jürgen Habermas ist ein großer Denker europäischer Kultur und steht in der Tradition unseres Abendlandes und der Aufklärung", begründete Ministerpräsident Jürgen Rüttgers die Verleihung an den in Düsseldorf geborenen und in Gummersbach aufgewachsenen Wissenschaftler. Ein wichtiger Grund für die Verleihung des Staatspreises an Jürgen Habermas sei dessen viel beachtetes Gespräch mit dem damaligen Kardinal Joseph Ratzinger, dem heutigen Papst Benedikt XVI., gewesen. In diesem habe Habermas die Bedeutung von Religion und Glauben für die Integration moderner Gesellschaften hervorgehoben. "Die Betonung von Habermas, Naturwissenschaften und Technik seien keine höhere Wahrheit als weltanschauliche oder religiöse Auffassungen, ist für das Selbstverständnis unseres Landes von unschätzbarem Wert."

Der Ministerpräsident sagte, mit Habermas sei ein aufgeklärtes Verständnis von Wahrheit und Vernunft verbunden, ohne in postmoderne Beliebigkeit zu verfallen. Als Intellektueller, der für sich das Recht in Anspruch nehme, in die Speichen des Rades "Tagespolitik" einzugreifen, habe sich Habermas niemals von Parteipolitik vereinnahmen lassen. "Aber er hat stets Partei für die Sache des Humanismus und das Projekt der Aufklärung ergriffen." Und Habermas habe stets nach den Grundlagen gesucht, die unsere Gesellschaft zusammen halten. Als beeindruckend am Werk von Professor Dr. Jürgen Habermas bezeichnete der Ministerpräsident, dass der Philosoph bei aller Schärfe seiner Gesellschaftskritik nie dem Kulturpessimismus erlegen sei.”

courtesy Thomas Gregersen

The Divided West

"Description:
'Make no mistake, the normative authority of the United States of America lies in ruins': such is the judgement of the most influential thinker in Europe today reflecting on the political repercussions of the war in Iraq. The decision to go to war in Iraq, without the explicit backing of a Security Council resolution, opened up a deep fissure in the West which continues to divide erstwhile allies and to hinder the attempt to develop a coordinated response to the new threats posed by international terrorism.


In this timely and important volume Jürgen Habermas responds to the dramatic political events of the period since 9/11 and maps out a way to move the political agenda forward, beyond the acrimonious debates which have pitched opponents of the war against the Bush Administration and its 'coalition of the willing'. What is fundamentally at stake, argues Habermas, is the Kantian project of abolishing the state of nature between states. Habermas develops a detailed multidimensional model of transnational and supranational governance inspired by Kantian cosmopolitanism, situates it in the context of the evolution of international law towards a cosmopolitan constitutional order during the 19th and 20th centuries, and defends it against the new challenge posed by the 'hegemonic liberal' vision underlying the aggressive unilateralism of the current US administration.


The Divided West is a major intervention by one of the most highly regarded political thinkers of our time. It will be essential reading for students of sociology, politics, international relations and international law, and it will be of great interest to anyone concerned with the current and future course of European and international politics."

Contents:
Editor’s Preface
Author’s Foreword
Part I: After September 11
Chapter 1: Fundamentalism and Terror
Chapter 2: Interpreting the Fall of a Monument
Part II: The Voice of Europe in the Clamour of its Nations
Chapter 3: February 15, or: What Binds Europeans
Chapter 4: Core Europe as Counterpower? Follow-up Questions
Chapter 5: The State of German-Polish Relations
Chapter 6: Is the Development of a European Identity Necessary, and Is It Possible?
Part III: Views on a Chaotic World
Chapter 7: An Interview on War and Peace
Part IV: The Kantian Project and the Divided West
Chapter 8: Does the Constitutionalisation of International Law Still Have a Chance?
Index

via the publisher

Critique and Disclosure: Critical Theory between Past and Future

"In Critique and Disclosure, Nikolas Kompridis argues provocatively for a richer and more time-responsive critical theory. He calls for a shift in the normative and critical emphasis of critical theory from the narrow concern with rules and procedures of Jürgen Habermas's model to a change-enabling disclosure of possibility and the enlargement of meaning. Kompridis contrasts two visions of critical theory's role and purpose in the world: one that restricts itself to the normative clarification of the procedures by which moral and political questions should be settled and an alternative rendering that conceives of itself as a possibility-disclosing practice. At the center of this resituation of critical theory is a normatively reformulated interpretation of Martin Heidegger's idea of "disclosure" or "world disclosure." In this regard Kompridis reconnects critical theory to its normative and conceptual sources in the German philosophical tradition and sets it within a romantic tradition of philosophical critique.

Drawing not only on his sustained critical engagement with the thought of Habermas and Heidegger but also on the work of other philosophers including Wittgenstein, Cavell, Gadamer, and Benjamin, Kompridis argues that critical theory must, in light of modernity's time-consciousness, understand itself as fully situated in its time--in an ever-shifting and open-ended horizon of possibilities, to which it must respond by disclosing alternative ways of thinking and acting. His innovative and original argument will serve to move the debate over the future of critical studies forward--beyond simple antinomies to a consideration of, as he puts it, "what critical theory should be if it is to have a future worthy of its past.""

details here

Between deliberative and participatory democracy

"Deliberative democracy has assumed a central role in the debate about deepening democratic practices in complex contemporary societies. By acknowledging the citizens as the main actors in the political process, political deliberation entails a strong ideal of participation that has not, however, been properly clarified. The main purpose of this article is to discuss, through Jürgen Habermas’ analysis of modernity, reason and democracy, whether and to what extent deliberative democracy and participatory democracy are compatible and how they can, either separately or together, enhance democratic practices. Further exploration of this relationship will permit a better understanding of the possibilities and limits of institutionalizing both discourses, as well as of developing democracy in a more substantive dimension."

from here


Denise Vitale

'Between deliberative and participatory democracy: A contribution on Habermas'

Philosophy & Social Criticism, Vol. 32, No. 6, 739-766 (2006)

Philosophy Dissertations

here

link via LR

The Language Game of Responsible Agency and the Problem of Free Will

A new essay by Jürgen Habermas is available online:

”The Language Game of Responsible Agency and the Problem of Free Will: How Can Epistemic Dualism Be Reconciled with Ontological Monism?”

download from here

Thanks to Thomas Gregersen for the link