Mark has posed a great question for all Habermasians and Foucauldians. It would be great to hear from as many Habermas and Foucault students as possible. I will try to formulate my own response in due course:
"Because you have went in the depths of Habermas and Foucault more than me, i was wondering what your thoughts are on if the work of the two are compatible in any way? This idea has played on my mind for a few years, where the communicative action of Habermas is linked to a foucauldian form of discourse analysis in an anatagonistic relationship? this would mean the communicative action of Habermas allows people to speak 'freely' and a foucauldian discourse analysis aims to undercover the discourses occurring/forming the power/knowledge nexus. Or is it the case that Habermas's project is not radical enough for Foucault, and the radical democracy or LacLau and Mouffe would be more 'acceptable' for a foucauldian style of politics?"
(cross posted at Foucauldian Reflections)
Thursday, May 31, 2007
Habermas as a philosopher of the present
It will sound strange to many ears but Habermas like Foucault can be regarded as a philosopher of the present. Habermas’ aim is to:
• Understand the present reality in its diversity and in its multifacetedness.
• Analyse the reality (both factually and normatively) and try to understand what is wrong with our situation (and of course what is not wrong).
Moreover;
• The assessment must be based on principles (It cannot be arbitrary).
• However the principles are not eternal (they are things of this word). The principles must be tested by confronting them against the counter arguments and confronting them with the reality itself.
• By the above procedure the principles prove their worth and to the extent they prove their worth they are entitled to “objectivity” (and they attain cognitive status).
• The assessment must be both factual and normative.
• The factual and normative analysis should give us a map of the present possibilities in terms of (a) who are we? (b) what is right and what is intolerable in our situation (c) what are the possibilities, what are the alternatives that are factually possible and normatively desirable. (d) what can be done and what should be done.
• Our assessment of our present situation (both factually and normatively) must lead to a reconstitution of the present.
• Understand the present reality in its diversity and in its multifacetedness.
• Analyse the reality (both factually and normatively) and try to understand what is wrong with our situation (and of course what is not wrong).
Moreover;
• The assessment must be based on principles (It cannot be arbitrary).
• However the principles are not eternal (they are things of this word). The principles must be tested by confronting them against the counter arguments and confronting them with the reality itself.
• By the above procedure the principles prove their worth and to the extent they prove their worth they are entitled to “objectivity” (and they attain cognitive status).
• The assessment must be both factual and normative.
• The factual and normative analysis should give us a map of the present possibilities in terms of (a) who are we? (b) what is right and what is intolerable in our situation (c) what are the possibilities, what are the alternatives that are factually possible and normatively desirable. (d) what can be done and what should be done.
• Our assessment of our present situation (both factually and normatively) must lead to a reconstitution of the present.
Tuesday, May 29, 2007
Habermas and Kantian Idealism: conjunctions and disjunctions
Abstract
In the context of recent encounters on the question of free will and naturalism, Habermas has been described as compatibilist by some while incompatibilist by others. Abstracting from the debates on free will there is one issue on which Habermas is clearly an incompatibilist and that is the issue of the co-existence of what Sellars calls the “space of reasons” and the “space of law.” Habermas believes that the “space of reason” and “the space of law” are mutually exclusive. In this particular belief Habermas is a thorough going Kantian. However, if the story ended here it would not have been very interesting. What makes the story interesting is the way Habermas defends the Kantian incompatibilism about the “space of reason” and the “space of law.” Habermas aims to defend the Kantian incompatibilism about the two spaces without referring back to what Habermas takes to be the otherworldly realm of intelligible in Kant. In this paper I aim to show how Habermas defends the Kantian incompatibilism about the two spaces in wholly this-worldly terms without referring back to the Kantian realm of intelligible. Concentrating on Habermas’ concept of “communicative action” I construct a Habermasian argument for showing how the space of reasons emerges within this- worldly practices of communication without referring to any otherworldly entities. I understand the conditions of the creation of a space of reasons in terms of the conditions of the possibility of communicative action. I discuss in relative detail these conditions and relate them to the possibility of creating and sustaining the space of reasons without falling back on any otherworldly realms. In the concluding section I argue that although Habermas is successful in showing a way to maintain incompatibilism about the two spaces, his account is in danger of being engulfed by linguistic idealism of which he accuses Heidegger. It is in response to this danger, I argue, that Habermas has recently turned towards what he, following Putnam, sometimes calls “internal realism.” One of the functions of the proposed internal realism and weak naturalism is to ward off the suspicion of the aforementioned idealism. Although I would not be able to discuss this recent turn in this paper, I briefly describe how this turn gels with Habermas’ account of the incompatibilism of the two spaces offered in this paper. I also briefly describe the challenges faced by any such account.
--
(I am in the process of writing the above paper, any comments welcome)
In the context of recent encounters on the question of free will and naturalism, Habermas has been described as compatibilist by some while incompatibilist by others. Abstracting from the debates on free will there is one issue on which Habermas is clearly an incompatibilist and that is the issue of the co-existence of what Sellars calls the “space of reasons” and the “space of law.” Habermas believes that the “space of reason” and “the space of law” are mutually exclusive. In this particular belief Habermas is a thorough going Kantian. However, if the story ended here it would not have been very interesting. What makes the story interesting is the way Habermas defends the Kantian incompatibilism about the “space of reason” and the “space of law.” Habermas aims to defend the Kantian incompatibilism about the two spaces without referring back to what Habermas takes to be the otherworldly realm of intelligible in Kant. In this paper I aim to show how Habermas defends the Kantian incompatibilism about the two spaces in wholly this-worldly terms without referring back to the Kantian realm of intelligible. Concentrating on Habermas’ concept of “communicative action” I construct a Habermasian argument for showing how the space of reasons emerges within this- worldly practices of communication without referring to any otherworldly entities. I understand the conditions of the creation of a space of reasons in terms of the conditions of the possibility of communicative action. I discuss in relative detail these conditions and relate them to the possibility of creating and sustaining the space of reasons without falling back on any otherworldly realms. In the concluding section I argue that although Habermas is successful in showing a way to maintain incompatibilism about the two spaces, his account is in danger of being engulfed by linguistic idealism of which he accuses Heidegger. It is in response to this danger, I argue, that Habermas has recently turned towards what he, following Putnam, sometimes calls “internal realism.” One of the functions of the proposed internal realism and weak naturalism is to ward off the suspicion of the aforementioned idealism. Although I would not be able to discuss this recent turn in this paper, I briefly describe how this turn gels with Habermas’ account of the incompatibilism of the two spaces offered in this paper. I also briefly describe the challenges faced by any such account.
--
(I am in the process of writing the above paper, any comments welcome)
Tuesday, May 22, 2007
Jürgen Habermas: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Much awaited entry on Habermas has been published!
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Read entry in full here
Thanks to Gary E Davis for the pointer.
"Jürgen Habermas currently ranks as one of the most influential philosophers in the world. Bridging continental and Anglo-American traditions of thought, he has engaged in debates with thinkers as diverse as Gadamer and Putnam, Foucault and Rawls, Derrida and Brandom. His extensive written work addresses topics stretching from social-political theory to aesthetics, epistemology and language to philosophy of religion, and his ideas have significantly influenced not only philosophy but also political-legal thought, sociology, communication studies, argumentation theory and rhetoric, developmental psychology and theology. Moreover, he has figured prominently in Germany as a public intellectual, commenting on controversial issues of the day in German newspapers such as Die Zeit.
However, if one looks back over his corpus of work, one can discern two broad lines of enduring interest, one having to do with the political domain, the other with issues of rationality, communication, and knowledge. (In what follows, unnamed citations refer to works by Habermas; quotations are from the English editions, where available.)"
--
Read entry in full here
Thanks to Gary E Davis for the pointer.
What Europe needs now
On the eve of EU's 50th anniversary, German philosopher Jürgen Habermas sets out what he believes are the most pressing items on the European agenda
Read What Europe needs now
Read What Europe needs now
The press is a public resource
An new Habermas essay on the crisis of the quality newspapers is available online in an English translation.
See "The press is a public resource"
The article originally appeared in German in the Süddeutsche Zeitung on May 16, 2007 under the title: "Keine Demokratie kann sich das leisten".
Courtesy: Thomas Gregersen
See "The press is a public resource"
The article originally appeared in German in the Süddeutsche Zeitung on May 16, 2007 under the title: "Keine Demokratie kann sich das leisten".
Courtesy: Thomas Gregersen
Monday, May 07, 2007
Habermas and compatibilism
Habermas criticises the version of compatibilism that is based on the idea of a “non-aggression pact between neuroscience and common sense.”* This seems to me a brilliant and accurate formulation. If by compatibilism we imply an uneasy co existence of two ultimately incompatible paradigms or visions then this is not what Habermas is aiming at. Habermas aims rather at “a genuine reconciliation of Kant and Darwin.” Kant here stands for “freedom” while Darwin stands for “limits.” Habermas in other words is not just content to show the “compatibility” of freedom and “limits,” he is rather aiming at something more positive, a genuine reconciliation of what is thought of as the realm of freedom and what is normally thought of as the realm of non freedom or even un-freedom.
The difference between the two approaches is roughly this: the compatibilist approach sees the relation between the realm of freedom and that of non freedom as that of negativity; the reconciliation approach on the other hand sees the relation in positive terms. As I have argued previously this involves abandoning a notion of freedom that sees freedom as essentially transgression of the “limits.” The second approach on the other hand sees the "limits" as the conditions of the possibility of freedom and not merely a transgression of the "limits."
Joel Anderson says that Habermas’ critique of compatibilism is not that the cost of accepting its truth is too high. Similarly Habermas’ critique is not that the truth of determinism is inconceivable. Habermas’ basic claims are rather a Kantian one: We can understand the “first person perspective” only performatively and that “not everything can be treated as object.” Moreover, the first person perspective or subjectivity is the necessary conditions “for engaging in the sort of activity that supports our sense of having free agency.”
This shows that Habermas’ main concern is rather different from the traditional concern of compatibilism. Habermas is not really concerned about the existence or non existence of freedom or with the question whether freedom can co exist with non freedom or even unfreedom. These are only secondary concerns for Habermas. Habermas’ main concern is how the Kantian notion of subjectivity can be genuinely reconciled and defended within an overall naturalistic (in the sense of weak naturalism)
framework.
---
* Joel Anderson, "Free will, neuroscience, and the participant perspective." All quotations in this post are from this paper.
The difference between the two approaches is roughly this: the compatibilist approach sees the relation between the realm of freedom and that of non freedom as that of negativity; the reconciliation approach on the other hand sees the relation in positive terms. As I have argued previously this involves abandoning a notion of freedom that sees freedom as essentially transgression of the “limits.” The second approach on the other hand sees the "limits" as the conditions of the possibility of freedom and not merely a transgression of the "limits."
Joel Anderson says that Habermas’ critique of compatibilism is not that the cost of accepting its truth is too high. Similarly Habermas’ critique is not that the truth of determinism is inconceivable. Habermas’ basic claims are rather a Kantian one: We can understand the “first person perspective” only performatively and that “not everything can be treated as object.” Moreover, the first person perspective or subjectivity is the necessary conditions “for engaging in the sort of activity that supports our sense of having free agency.”
This shows that Habermas’ main concern is rather different from the traditional concern of compatibilism. Habermas is not really concerned about the existence or non existence of freedom or with the question whether freedom can co exist with non freedom or even unfreedom. These are only secondary concerns for Habermas. Habermas’ main concern is how the Kantian notion of subjectivity can be genuinely reconciled and defended within an overall naturalistic (in the sense of weak naturalism)
framework.
---
* Joel Anderson, "Free will, neuroscience, and the participant perspective." All quotations in this post are from this paper.
Wednesday, April 11, 2007
Habermas and McDowell (again!)
First, I want to refer the readers to Carl sach’s illuminating comments (as usual) on my previous post. Second, this great quote by Joel Anderson which puts the whole issue in a nutshell:
“For many free will theorists . . . the problem of mental causation is clearly at the heart of the free will debate. If actions are not ultimately explicable as merely the causal effects of brain events, it is suggested, it is hard to avoid the dualistic implications of saying that it was ‘the agent himself’ (as distinct force) who generated the actions. Habermas’ strategy to avoid this dilemma involves treating mental causation as essentially an interface between our brains (as a cognitive apparatus that has evolved to do just this) and our environment. Importantly, however, the environment is also cultural-symbolic, and this is what Habermas calls ‘objective mind’ [objectiver Gesit] . . . which includes the culture, language, intuitions, practices, norms, and so on that structure and facilitate our thinking and acting. Mental causation, for Habermas, turns out to be a matter of our brains interfacing with this cultural domain. The important thing for this argument about the objective mind is that it is not expressible in a physicalist vocabulary and can be described only from the perspective of those who have been socialized into it, and yet it is also something which itself has developed and has its own natural history. In this respect, as well as in his defense of a ‘weak naturalism,’ Habermas’ view shares some central tenets with McDowell’s view.” (Joel Anderson, Free will, neuroscience, and the participant perspective, p. 8, italics in the original).
I am not sure about the word “interface.” Apart from it. I would stand for everything in it.
“For many free will theorists . . . the problem of mental causation is clearly at the heart of the free will debate. If actions are not ultimately explicable as merely the causal effects of brain events, it is suggested, it is hard to avoid the dualistic implications of saying that it was ‘the agent himself’ (as distinct force) who generated the actions. Habermas’ strategy to avoid this dilemma involves treating mental causation as essentially an interface between our brains (as a cognitive apparatus that has evolved to do just this) and our environment. Importantly, however, the environment is also cultural-symbolic, and this is what Habermas calls ‘objective mind’ [objectiver Gesit] . . . which includes the culture, language, intuitions, practices, norms, and so on that structure and facilitate our thinking and acting. Mental causation, for Habermas, turns out to be a matter of our brains interfacing with this cultural domain. The important thing for this argument about the objective mind is that it is not expressible in a physicalist vocabulary and can be described only from the perspective of those who have been socialized into it, and yet it is also something which itself has developed and has its own natural history. In this respect, as well as in his defense of a ‘weak naturalism,’ Habermas’ view shares some central tenets with McDowell’s view.” (Joel Anderson, Free will, neuroscience, and the participant perspective, p. 8, italics in the original).
I am not sure about the word “interface.” Apart from it. I would stand for everything in it.
Tuesday, April 10, 2007
Is Habermas a compatibilist?
Here is the answer in Habermas’ own words.
“ . . . I am also a ‘compatibilit’ of sorts. The human mind, with its complimentary, interlocking epistemic perspective, is part of the universe of nature. Where I depart from the compatibilist mainstream, however, is in rejecting scientistic thesis that this universe is adequately characterized as the object domain of the established nomological sciences (on the model of contemporary physics).”
The text is a footnote to Habermas’ recent piece on free will.
“ . . . I am also a ‘compatibilit’ of sorts. The human mind, with its complimentary, interlocking epistemic perspective, is part of the universe of nature. Where I depart from the compatibilist mainstream, however, is in rejecting scientistic thesis that this universe is adequately characterized as the object domain of the established nomological sciences (on the model of contemporary physics).”
The text is a footnote to Habermas’ recent piece on free will.
Friday, March 23, 2007
Habermas for Nobel prize in Philosophy?
Professor Leiter on his blog has put a following hypothetical query to his readers:
"if there were a Nobel Prize in philosophy, who among living philosophers should get it and why? Feel free, of course, to nominate Charles Taylor! Some obvious figures from the post-War era--like Quine, Rawls, Sartre, and Foucault--are, alas, deceased."
I thought Habermasians can participate in the survey by nominating Habermas!
"if there were a Nobel Prize in philosophy, who among living philosophers should get it and why? Feel free, of course, to nominate Charles Taylor! Some obvious figures from the post-War era--like Quine, Rawls, Sartre, and Foucault--are, alas, deceased."
I thought Habermasians can participate in the survey by nominating Habermas!
Friday, February 23, 2007
Notes on Habermas and Fundamentalism
These are some notes (with occasional comments) I took while reading "The Divided West." Eventually I will like to write a short paper on the theme. Comments or any suggestions welcome.
Difference between Orthodoxy and fundamentalism
•Orthodoxy becomes fundamentalism when: a) it ignores the epistemic conditions of a pluralistic society. b) It claims universal validity for its doctrine at the point of violence c) and it tries to impose its political ambitions on others (even at the point of having to recourse to violence).
•What are the epistemic conditions of a pluralistic society? Myth of pluralism?
•Habermas also evokes “the fact of complexity.” Habermas uses this principle in various contexts without really justifying it.
•Exclusive claim to truth: something shared by fundamentalist and orthodox believers (but see the related note above).
Origins of the idea of “tolerance.”
•Realisation of the existence of other religions.
• The scientific revolution weakened religious claims and their viability. Religions became less confident.
•According to Habermas in Europe the above two lead to the emergence of the idea and practice of “tolerance,” and separation of Church and State.
•Does Habermas really believe that people in medieval ages didn’t really know about “other” religions and denominations? Related question, does he really believe that medieval societies were monolithic societies?
•What does scientific revolution entails? Does it really weaken religious claims?
The Example of Iran
•Iran, according to Habermas, refuses to accept the separation of State and Church and hence can be legitimately dubbed as a fundamentalist regime.
• The Islamic movements that want to re-establish theocracy are also termed as fundamentalist, because they want to impose their political ideals on others.
•Habermas calls such fundamentalism, “obdurate fanaticism.” (The Divided West, p. 11).
Diagnosis
•Habermas ventures few remarks as to the causes of fundamentalism.
•Repression of Cognitive dissonances. Fundamentalist do not take into account (repress) the fact of pluralism and scientific revolution.
•The medieval religious views were based on epistemological innocence. [Were they?].
•The reasons for the lost of this epistemological innocence are two: a) Cognitive conditions of Scientific Knowledge. b) Conditions of religious pluralism, what Rawls calls “the fact of pluralism.”
Habermas’ position
•Strict universalism, which Habermas construes as “equal respect” for all, be they Hindus, or Muslims or Christians. Equal respect in this context presumably means equal moral worth.
•What does strict universalism means? All inclsivity – non one is excluded based on their faith or other particularistic traits. [But a believer is?].
•What is “strict” about this universalism? And what is universal about this universalism?
Possible Critique
• “Religion” what does it mean? Habermas uses the term “religion” in generic and undifferentiated sense.
•Myth of pluralism.
•Habermas’ genealogy of the emergence of toleration is a Rawlsian one and does not take into account alternative readings of history (for example this one).
•What are the epistemic conditions of science and what do they entail?
•Do the so called Muslim fundamentalists want to impose Islam on others?
• Separation of Church and State. Ignores the fact that the separation was in a sense already present in the early Christianity but not in the early Islam.
•“Tolerance” what is it? How much we tolerate?
Difference between Orthodoxy and fundamentalism
•Orthodoxy becomes fundamentalism when: a) it ignores the epistemic conditions of a pluralistic society. b) It claims universal validity for its doctrine at the point of violence c) and it tries to impose its political ambitions on others (even at the point of having to recourse to violence).
•What are the epistemic conditions of a pluralistic society? Myth of pluralism?
•Habermas also evokes “the fact of complexity.” Habermas uses this principle in various contexts without really justifying it.
•Exclusive claim to truth: something shared by fundamentalist and orthodox believers (but see the related note above).
Origins of the idea of “tolerance.”
•Realisation of the existence of other religions.
• The scientific revolution weakened religious claims and their viability. Religions became less confident.
•According to Habermas in Europe the above two lead to the emergence of the idea and practice of “tolerance,” and separation of Church and State.
•Does Habermas really believe that people in medieval ages didn’t really know about “other” religions and denominations? Related question, does he really believe that medieval societies were monolithic societies?
•What does scientific revolution entails? Does it really weaken religious claims?
The Example of Iran
•Iran, according to Habermas, refuses to accept the separation of State and Church and hence can be legitimately dubbed as a fundamentalist regime.
• The Islamic movements that want to re-establish theocracy are also termed as fundamentalist, because they want to impose their political ideals on others.
•Habermas calls such fundamentalism, “obdurate fanaticism.” (The Divided West, p. 11).
Diagnosis
•Habermas ventures few remarks as to the causes of fundamentalism.
•Repression of Cognitive dissonances. Fundamentalist do not take into account (repress) the fact of pluralism and scientific revolution.
•The medieval religious views were based on epistemological innocence. [Were they?].
•The reasons for the lost of this epistemological innocence are two: a) Cognitive conditions of Scientific Knowledge. b) Conditions of religious pluralism, what Rawls calls “the fact of pluralism.”
Habermas’ position
•Strict universalism, which Habermas construes as “equal respect” for all, be they Hindus, or Muslims or Christians. Equal respect in this context presumably means equal moral worth.
•What does strict universalism means? All inclsivity – non one is excluded based on their faith or other particularistic traits. [But a believer is?].
•What is “strict” about this universalism? And what is universal about this universalism?
Possible Critique
• “Religion” what does it mean? Habermas uses the term “religion” in generic and undifferentiated sense.
•Myth of pluralism.
•Habermas’ genealogy of the emergence of toleration is a Rawlsian one and does not take into account alternative readings of history (for example this one).
•What are the epistemic conditions of science and what do they entail?
•Do the so called Muslim fundamentalists want to impose Islam on others?
• Separation of Church and State. Ignores the fact that the separation was in a sense already present in the early Christianity but not in the early Islam.
•“Tolerance” what is it? How much we tolerate?
Friday, December 29, 2006
Free Will as Part of Nature: Habermas and His Critics
a special issue of Philosophical Explorations: An International Journal of the Philosophy of Mind and Action 10:1 (March 2007), edited by Joel Anderson
Includes:
Joel Anderson, "Introduction"
Lead Article:
Jürgen Habermas, “The Language Game of Responsible Agency and the Problem of Free Will: How Can Epistemic Dualism Be Reconciled with Ontological Monism?” (trans. Joel Anderson)
Commentaries on Habermas's essay:
Randolph Clarke, "The Appearance of Freedom"
Michael Quante, "Habermas on Compatibilism and Ontological Monism: Some problems"
John Searle, "Neuroscience, Intentionality and Free Will: Reply to Habermas"
Timothy Schroeder, "Reflection, Reason, and Free Will"
Rejoinder:
Jürgen Habermas, “Reply to Schroeder, Clarke, Searle, and Quante” (trans. Joel Anderson)
[posting here due to its extreme importance, will eventually move to Habermasian resources]
Includes:
Joel Anderson, "Introduction"
Lead Article:
Jürgen Habermas, “The Language Game of Responsible Agency and the Problem of Free Will: How Can Epistemic Dualism Be Reconciled with Ontological Monism?” (trans. Joel Anderson)
Commentaries on Habermas's essay:
Randolph Clarke, "The Appearance of Freedom"
Michael Quante, "Habermas on Compatibilism and Ontological Monism: Some problems"
John Searle, "Neuroscience, Intentionality and Free Will: Reply to Habermas"
Timothy Schroeder, "Reflection, Reason, and Free Will"
Rejoinder:
Jürgen Habermas, “Reply to Schroeder, Clarke, Searle, and Quante” (trans. Joel Anderson)
[posting here due to its extreme importance, will eventually move to Habermasian resources]
Habermasian Resources blog
I have created a separate blog (entitled, "Habermasian Resources") for Habermas related resources. From now on this blog will be reserved for more substantial discussion of Habermas' work and for important quotes from Hab's work. In due time, I shall move, all non substantial posts to the new blog. Needless to say, posting on this blog from now on would be less frequent.
Thursday, December 28, 2006
Truth and justification - the essential link
“Argumentation remains the only available medium of ascertaining truth since truth claims that have been problematized cannot be tested in any other way. There is no unmediated, discursively unfiltered access to the truth conditions of empirical beliefs. There is no unmediated, discursively unfiltered access to the truth conditions of empirical beliefs. After all, only the truth of unsettled beliefs is subject to question – beliefs that have been roused from the unquestioned mode of functioning practical certainties. Although we cannot sever the connection of truth and justification, this epistemically unavoidable connection must not be turned into a conceptually inseparable connection in the form of an epistemic concept of truth.” (TJ: italics in the original).
This is without doubt a very crucial passage for understanding Habermas’ transition from an epistemic conception of truth to a more ontologically tuned conception of truth. However, I shall mention one key problem with this passage. The passage implies that if we had unmediated access to the truth conditions of empirical beliefs we could have been able circumvent argumentation. However, this is misleading. The reason for argumentation being the sole medium of ascertaining is not just epistemic; it is also “discursive.” The latter follows from Habermas’ rejection of the notion of truth as ‘evidence’ (see his critique of Husserl in OPSI). The game of truth cannot circumvent the game of argumentation because the “truth conditions” of beliefs can support beliefs only by being converted into “reasons.” Truth game is squarely located within the space of reason and since the space of reason is sustained by the game of argumentation even if we had unmediated access to the truth conditions we could not have avoided the game of argumentation. That’s why the problem of bringing “propositions/statements” face to face with the world itself is such an issue for Habermas.
This is without doubt a very crucial passage for understanding Habermas’ transition from an epistemic conception of truth to a more ontologically tuned conception of truth. However, I shall mention one key problem with this passage. The passage implies that if we had unmediated access to the truth conditions of empirical beliefs we could have been able circumvent argumentation. However, this is misleading. The reason for argumentation being the sole medium of ascertaining is not just epistemic; it is also “discursive.” The latter follows from Habermas’ rejection of the notion of truth as ‘evidence’ (see his critique of Husserl in OPSI). The game of truth cannot circumvent the game of argumentation because the “truth conditions” of beliefs can support beliefs only by being converted into “reasons.” Truth game is squarely located within the space of reason and since the space of reason is sustained by the game of argumentation even if we had unmediated access to the truth conditions we could not have avoided the game of argumentation. That’s why the problem of bringing “propositions/statements” face to face with the world itself is such an issue for Habermas.
Handley paper for free download!
I have just noticed that Steven Hendley's paper on Habermas (the abstract of which was posted earlier) is available for free download from here
A brief note on relation between "epistemic" and "discursive" in Habermas
“The epistemic conception of truth transforms the (two-place) validity (Gültigkeit) of the proposition p into the (three-place) validity (Geltung) “for us” or acceptance “by us” . . . .” (TJ: 37). Habermas’ epistemic "turn" is part of his rejection of objectivism and should be understood as part of his adherence to the phenomenological tradition (see for example TCA I: 11 for this). Habermas’ epistemic turn is conceptually distinct from his discursive "turn" whereby “reasons” are conceptualised with reference to the practice of giving and defending reasons and not monologically. Although Habermas’ epistemic turn and his discursive turn are conceptually distinct, in practice they are intertwined. This amounts to saying that although in Habermas epistemic and discursive are intertwined they need not be in general [Kant’s theory, for example, is epistemic but not discursive in Habermas’ sense]. Habermas’ discourse theory of truth was both epistemic and discursive. The move away from the discursive theory of truth to a more ontologically tuned theory of truth in part results from the realisation that “although we cannot sever the connection of truth and justification, this epistimically unavoidable connection must not be turned into a conceptually inseparable connection in the form of an epistemic concept of truth.” (TJ: 38, emphasis in the original).
Habermas's realism and his epistemic concption of truth
I want to bring together two important comments posted on this topic. The comments were response to the abstract of "Habermas between Metaphysical and Natural Realism." I hope to write a more substantial post on this topic in the coming days: Here are the two comments:
"This is bullshit, in the typical publish-or-perish sense of rhetoric for the C.V. If a conception of truth is relative to conditions of rationality, then it's a discursive conception, not an "epistemic conception". There's no "decisive rejection" of his epistemic conception of truth, because realism requires an epistemic conception of truth. To claim that Habermas "severs any conceptual link between truth and justification" shows that the author hasn't really read the "truth and justification" section of "Further Clarifications on Communicative Action" in On the Pragmatics of Communication, nor Truth and Justification. Besides, one can't logically "respect[] the epistemic relevance of justification for ascertaining the truth" without a conceptual link between truth and justification. Furthermore, it's implausible to acknowledge Habermas' appreciation for fallibilism in justification while also claiming he "veers too close to a form of metaphysical realism." To say that Hilary Putnam is more successful is only to say that the author doesn't understand Habermas, because Habermas clearly understands Putnam ("Some Further Clarifications"), while Putnam doesn't understand Habermas (Collapse of the fact / value dichotomy)."
Dr. Spinoza replied:
"If an "epistemic conception of truth" is taken to mean that truth is indistinguisable from idealized warrant -- what would be warranted under ideal conditions -- then I cannot see how realism requires such a conception.
On the contrary, I would tend to think that it is a commitment to such a conception, as found in "middle" Putnam and also in Rorty -- is crucial for the rejection of realism.
More generally, I tend to think that realism -- however "natural," "direct," "metaphysical," etc. -- requires a distinction between truth and justification. Where Rorty is usually regarded as having gone off the rails is where he follows James, or a certain strand in James, in thinking that there's nothing to be said about the difference between truth and justification. As he puts it, the phrase "justified but perhaps not true" only means "justified to us, but perhaps not justified to our descendents." Here the distinction between truth and justification collapses.
In more recent work, it should be noted, Rorty makes a distinction between a concept of truth that is identical with justification and a concept of truth that is expressed in disquotation. And that clearly cannot be an epistemic conception of truth, but it is a conception of truth that can play no idealizing or regulatory work for us at all. Hence, as Rorty puts it, truth cannot be "a goal of inquiry."
That aside, I do wonder at how sophisticated a reading could be which identifies Habermas' new-found respect for "weak naturalism" as veering too close to "metaphysical realism." The real bugbear for Habermas, it strikes me, is the danger of lapsing into idealism. The Frankfurters tried to keep their idealist tendencies in check through an eclectic borrowing from Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud -- which gave their work an emphasis on materiality, historicity, embodiment, and desire. But the giants of "German Materialism" (as Brian Leiter calls it) have been abandoned by Habermas.
On the other hand, if idealism is a manifestation of metaphysical realism (as Kant himself suggested, empirical idealism is transcendental realism), then perhaps there's something to the worry after all."
I think there is much to learn from both comments and I shall write on some of the issues raised in these comments in the coming days. However, here I wish to retract my earlier hasty agreement with the first comments. I am reading the paper more carefully now and though the author misunderstands Habermas at points the paper is worth reading and raises important questions about Habermas' conception of truth. More on the paper in the coming days...
"This is bullshit, in the typical publish-or-perish sense of rhetoric for the C.V. If a conception of truth is relative to conditions of rationality, then it's a discursive conception, not an "epistemic conception". There's no "decisive rejection" of his epistemic conception of truth, because realism requires an epistemic conception of truth. To claim that Habermas "severs any conceptual link between truth and justification" shows that the author hasn't really read the "truth and justification" section of "Further Clarifications on Communicative Action" in On the Pragmatics of Communication, nor Truth and Justification. Besides, one can't logically "respect[] the epistemic relevance of justification for ascertaining the truth" without a conceptual link between truth and justification. Furthermore, it's implausible to acknowledge Habermas' appreciation for fallibilism in justification while also claiming he "veers too close to a form of metaphysical realism." To say that Hilary Putnam is more successful is only to say that the author doesn't understand Habermas, because Habermas clearly understands Putnam ("Some Further Clarifications"), while Putnam doesn't understand Habermas (Collapse of the fact / value dichotomy)."
Dr. Spinoza replied:
"If an "epistemic conception of truth" is taken to mean that truth is indistinguisable from idealized warrant -- what would be warranted under ideal conditions -- then I cannot see how realism requires such a conception.
On the contrary, I would tend to think that it is a commitment to such a conception, as found in "middle" Putnam and also in Rorty -- is crucial for the rejection of realism.
More generally, I tend to think that realism -- however "natural," "direct," "metaphysical," etc. -- requires a distinction between truth and justification. Where Rorty is usually regarded as having gone off the rails is where he follows James, or a certain strand in James, in thinking that there's nothing to be said about the difference between truth and justification. As he puts it, the phrase "justified but perhaps not true" only means "justified to us, but perhaps not justified to our descendents." Here the distinction between truth and justification collapses.
In more recent work, it should be noted, Rorty makes a distinction between a concept of truth that is identical with justification and a concept of truth that is expressed in disquotation. And that clearly cannot be an epistemic conception of truth, but it is a conception of truth that can play no idealizing or regulatory work for us at all. Hence, as Rorty puts it, truth cannot be "a goal of inquiry."
That aside, I do wonder at how sophisticated a reading could be which identifies Habermas' new-found respect for "weak naturalism" as veering too close to "metaphysical realism." The real bugbear for Habermas, it strikes me, is the danger of lapsing into idealism. The Frankfurters tried to keep their idealist tendencies in check through an eclectic borrowing from Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud -- which gave their work an emphasis on materiality, historicity, embodiment, and desire. But the giants of "German Materialism" (as Brian Leiter calls it) have been abandoned by Habermas.
On the other hand, if idealism is a manifestation of metaphysical realism (as Kant himself suggested, empirical idealism is transcendental realism), then perhaps there's something to the worry after all."
I think there is much to learn from both comments and I shall write on some of the issues raised in these comments in the coming days. However, here I wish to retract my earlier hasty agreement with the first comments. I am reading the paper more carefully now and though the author misunderstands Habermas at points the paper is worth reading and raises important questions about Habermas' conception of truth. More on the paper in the coming days...
Whom to thank?
German philosopher (and Habermas' important interlocutor) Ernst Tugendhat on religion as a need and the difficulty of satisfying it
"Faust avoided Gretchen's question "Do you believe in God?" But what should someone say who refuses to avoid the question and yet isn't naive? I believe that on the one hand the need to believe in God is not only a cultural, but also an anthropological phenomenon, founded in the structure of human being. Today, however, people can't give in to this need without fooling themselves. What we have here is a contradiction between need and feasibility. Seen logically, such contradictions are harmless, and relatively normal in human life.
Let me clarify this with an example. People – at least in general – have a need to go on living. That too is anthropologically founded. Yet this need stands in contradiction to reality: all individual life ceases to exist after a time. However the need to go on living is so deeply rooted that people in all cultures have attempted in one way or another, with or without religion, to construct a life after death."
Full here
"Faust avoided Gretchen's question "Do you believe in God?" But what should someone say who refuses to avoid the question and yet isn't naive? I believe that on the one hand the need to believe in God is not only a cultural, but also an anthropological phenomenon, founded in the structure of human being. Today, however, people can't give in to this need without fooling themselves. What we have here is a contradiction between need and feasibility. Seen logically, such contradictions are harmless, and relatively normal in human life.
Let me clarify this with an example. People – at least in general – have a need to go on living. That too is anthropologically founded. Yet this need stands in contradiction to reality: all individual life ceases to exist after a time. However the need to go on living is so deeply rooted that people in all cultures have attempted in one way or another, with or without religion, to construct a life after death."
Full here
Habermas, Fest und die "Rehabilitierung von Nazi-Denkern"
Habermas, Fest und die "Rehabilitierung von Nazi-Denkern"
Eine Stellungnahme von Ernst Nolte
Von Arno Orzessek
Ein Gerücht lässt die alten Fronten im Historikerstreit erneut sichtbar werden. Der Philosoph Jürgen Habermas sei in seiner Jugend ein strammer Nazi gewesen, so behauptete der im September verstorbene Publizist Joachim Fest in seinen Memoiren. Und er gründete diese These auf Spekulationen um ein angeblich belastendes Schriftstück, das Habermas von seinem Freund, dem Historiker Hans- Ulrich Wehler, zurückbekommen und aufgegessen haben soll. Wehler und Habermas sagen, hier habe ein Gerücht um eine harmlose Mahnung, weil Wehler einen Erste-Hilfe-Kurs geschwänzt habe, im Laufe der Jahre immer weitere Blüten getrieben. Und Joachim Fest habe das ganze wider besseres Wissen öffentlich gemacht, weil er Habermas die Kritik an seinem Verhalten im Historikerstreit nicht verziehen habe. Damals hatte Fest als Herausgeber der FAZ dem Historiker Ernst Nolte ein Forum gegeben. Und Habermas hatte Nolte vorgeworfen, die Nazi-Verbrechen zu verharmlosen. Nun hat sich auch Ernst Nolte geäußert.
full here
Eine Stellungnahme von Ernst Nolte
Von Arno Orzessek
Ein Gerücht lässt die alten Fronten im Historikerstreit erneut sichtbar werden. Der Philosoph Jürgen Habermas sei in seiner Jugend ein strammer Nazi gewesen, so behauptete der im September verstorbene Publizist Joachim Fest in seinen Memoiren. Und er gründete diese These auf Spekulationen um ein angeblich belastendes Schriftstück, das Habermas von seinem Freund, dem Historiker Hans- Ulrich Wehler, zurückbekommen und aufgegessen haben soll. Wehler und Habermas sagen, hier habe ein Gerücht um eine harmlose Mahnung, weil Wehler einen Erste-Hilfe-Kurs geschwänzt habe, im Laufe der Jahre immer weitere Blüten getrieben. Und Joachim Fest habe das ganze wider besseres Wissen öffentlich gemacht, weil er Habermas die Kritik an seinem Verhalten im Historikerstreit nicht verziehen habe. Damals hatte Fest als Herausgeber der FAZ dem Historiker Ernst Nolte ein Forum gegeben. Und Habermas hatte Nolte vorgeworfen, die Nazi-Verbrechen zu verharmlosen. Nun hat sich auch Ernst Nolte geäußert.
full here
Habermasian reflections has a co-blogger
Habermasian Reflections has a co-blogger from Russia. Konstantin Kokarev is a postgraduate student with interests in "political science, theory of political legitimacy, literature from Scandinavia."
If there are any other Habermasians out there willing to join us as co-bloggers, please let us know.
If there are any other Habermasians out there willing to join us as co-bloggers, please let us know.
Laudatio for Ronald Dworkin
"On December 15, 2006, professor Ronald Dworkin received the Bielefeld Science Award in Bielefeld, Germany. Dworkin is professor at the New York University School of Law and at the University College London. The award is set up in memory of the German sociologist Niklas Luhmann.
The laudatio for Ronald Dworkin was held by professor Jürgen Habermas.
"Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung" has published Habermas' speech in its issue Monday December 18:
"Wer kann wen umarmen? Konsensussuche im Streit: Lobrede auf Ronald Dworkin, den Philosophen, Polemiker und Bürger".
From the speech:
(....) Dworkin "ist ein Solitär sowohl im Kreise der Rechtsgelehrten wie der Philosophen, er genießt große Reputation unter den öffentlichen Intellektuellen seines Landes, er ist ein begnadeter politischer Redner. Mit etwas weniger Brillanz, Widerspruchsgeist und Genialität wäre er längst Richter am Supreme Court in Washington geworden." (....)
"Er kämpft nicht nur gegen Rechtspositivisten, die die moralischen Gehalte des Recht neutralisieren, sondern auch gegen Rechtsrealisten, die das Recht an die Politik angleichen und es als ein weiteres Instrument zur Gestaltung der Zukunft gebrauchen. Dworkin verteidigt den normativen Eigensinn des Rechtsmediums gegenüber dem Versuch, das Recht in seiner Rolle als Organisationsmittel der staatlichen Macht aufgehen zu lassen. Wer Rechte ernst nimmt, darf sie nicht gegen unerwünschte Konsequenzen abwägen und die Konditionalprogramme, wie Luhmann sagen würde, den Zielprogrammen einfach unterordnen." (....)
"Dworkin wollte von vornherein die Politik- und Rechtsphilosophie auf ein breiteres Fundament stellen. Er entfaltet die Grundbegriffe und Verfahren des demokratischen Rechtsstaates aus der Substanz und dem kämpferischen Geist eines ethischen Liberalismus. Dieser steht und fällt mit einer bevorzugten Konzeption des richtigen Lebens und einer spezifischen Lebensform.Der Aristoteliker in Ronald Dworkin scheut vor einer anthropologischen Begründung der gerechten politischen Ordnung nicht zurück. Das richtige Bild vom Menschen trägt die ästhetisch-expressiven Züge der schöpferischen Person, die die Verpflichtung spürt, aus ihrem Leben etwas Produktives zu machen. Am Anfang steht die Einsicht, daß wir für die Gestaltung unseres eigenen Lebens verantwortlich sind. Kant behält nicht das letzte Wort. Am Jüngsten Tage müssen wir Rechenschaft ablegen, aber nicht in erster Linie über die Wunden, die wir anderen zugefügt haben, sondern über die verspielten Möglichkeiten des eigenen, falsch genutzten Lebens. Die Achtung gegenüber anderen gründet in der Generalisierung dieser Pflicht sich selbst gegenüber. Dieser Vorrang der ethischen Freiheit des einzelnen Gesellschaftsbürgers vor der moralisch-politischen Freiheit des Staatsbürgers erklärt auch den zwischen Rawls' und Dworkins Konzeptionen der Verteilungsgerechtigkeit." (.....)
"Dworkin läßt kein heißes Eisen aus. Er verhandelt uneingeschüchtert Guantánamo und die Verweigerung von Justizgrundrechten, die terroristischen Gefahren und jene Folterpraktiken, die als coercive interrogation verniedlicht werden; er diskutiert über staatliche Sicherheitsinteressen und die Eingriffe in individuelle Bürgerfreiheiten, über die Todesstrafe und die utilitaristische Aushöhlung des Strafrechts; er spricht über den religiösen Fundamentalismus und die weltanschauliche Neutralität des Staates, über die Homosexuellenehe und das Verhältnis des biblischen Glaubens zur Autorität der Wissenschaften; er erörtert die neoliberale Wirtschaftspolitik und die Frage der sozialen Gerechtigkeit, den Sozialstaat als Legitimitätsbedingung der Demokratie und die Zerstörung der politischen Öffentlichkeit durch die Medienmacht der privaten Konzerne. Aber dieses Mal zeichnet sich seine Argumentation dadurch aus, daß er als Patriot über sehr tiefe Gräben hinweg die Grundlagen der gemeinsamen politischen Kultur beschwört. Hier appelliert einer im Tenor von "We Americans" an die Gegenseite, den besseren Teil der nationalen Werte nicht zu vergessen.
Weil ich weiß, wie sehr mich selbst die Polemik in ähnlich angespannten Situationen reizt, verhehle ich nicht meine Bewunderung für die demokratische Geistesart dieser um Konsens werbenden Intervention, die den Faden der diskursiven Auseinandersetzung auch mit extremen Gegnern nicht abreißen lassen will. Blindes Vertrauen in die Zerreißfestigkeit der eigenen politischen Kultur ist gewiß nicht ungefährlich; aber in begründeten Fällen ist es Ausdruck der reiferen demokratischen Tradition.""
from Habermas Forum
The laudatio for Ronald Dworkin was held by professor Jürgen Habermas.
"Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung" has published Habermas' speech in its issue Monday December 18:
"Wer kann wen umarmen? Konsensussuche im Streit: Lobrede auf Ronald Dworkin, den Philosophen, Polemiker und Bürger".
From the speech:
(....) Dworkin "ist ein Solitär sowohl im Kreise der Rechtsgelehrten wie der Philosophen, er genießt große Reputation unter den öffentlichen Intellektuellen seines Landes, er ist ein begnadeter politischer Redner. Mit etwas weniger Brillanz, Widerspruchsgeist und Genialität wäre er längst Richter am Supreme Court in Washington geworden." (....)
"Er kämpft nicht nur gegen Rechtspositivisten, die die moralischen Gehalte des Recht neutralisieren, sondern auch gegen Rechtsrealisten, die das Recht an die Politik angleichen und es als ein weiteres Instrument zur Gestaltung der Zukunft gebrauchen. Dworkin verteidigt den normativen Eigensinn des Rechtsmediums gegenüber dem Versuch, das Recht in seiner Rolle als Organisationsmittel der staatlichen Macht aufgehen zu lassen. Wer Rechte ernst nimmt, darf sie nicht gegen unerwünschte Konsequenzen abwägen und die Konditionalprogramme, wie Luhmann sagen würde, den Zielprogrammen einfach unterordnen." (....)
"Dworkin wollte von vornherein die Politik- und Rechtsphilosophie auf ein breiteres Fundament stellen. Er entfaltet die Grundbegriffe und Verfahren des demokratischen Rechtsstaates aus der Substanz und dem kämpferischen Geist eines ethischen Liberalismus. Dieser steht und fällt mit einer bevorzugten Konzeption des richtigen Lebens und einer spezifischen Lebensform.Der Aristoteliker in Ronald Dworkin scheut vor einer anthropologischen Begründung der gerechten politischen Ordnung nicht zurück. Das richtige Bild vom Menschen trägt die ästhetisch-expressiven Züge der schöpferischen Person, die die Verpflichtung spürt, aus ihrem Leben etwas Produktives zu machen. Am Anfang steht die Einsicht, daß wir für die Gestaltung unseres eigenen Lebens verantwortlich sind. Kant behält nicht das letzte Wort. Am Jüngsten Tage müssen wir Rechenschaft ablegen, aber nicht in erster Linie über die Wunden, die wir anderen zugefügt haben, sondern über die verspielten Möglichkeiten des eigenen, falsch genutzten Lebens. Die Achtung gegenüber anderen gründet in der Generalisierung dieser Pflicht sich selbst gegenüber. Dieser Vorrang der ethischen Freiheit des einzelnen Gesellschaftsbürgers vor der moralisch-politischen Freiheit des Staatsbürgers erklärt auch den zwischen Rawls' und Dworkins Konzeptionen der Verteilungsgerechtigkeit." (.....)
"Dworkin läßt kein heißes Eisen aus. Er verhandelt uneingeschüchtert Guantánamo und die Verweigerung von Justizgrundrechten, die terroristischen Gefahren und jene Folterpraktiken, die als coercive interrogation verniedlicht werden; er diskutiert über staatliche Sicherheitsinteressen und die Eingriffe in individuelle Bürgerfreiheiten, über die Todesstrafe und die utilitaristische Aushöhlung des Strafrechts; er spricht über den religiösen Fundamentalismus und die weltanschauliche Neutralität des Staates, über die Homosexuellenehe und das Verhältnis des biblischen Glaubens zur Autorität der Wissenschaften; er erörtert die neoliberale Wirtschaftspolitik und die Frage der sozialen Gerechtigkeit, den Sozialstaat als Legitimitätsbedingung der Demokratie und die Zerstörung der politischen Öffentlichkeit durch die Medienmacht der privaten Konzerne. Aber dieses Mal zeichnet sich seine Argumentation dadurch aus, daß er als Patriot über sehr tiefe Gräben hinweg die Grundlagen der gemeinsamen politischen Kultur beschwört. Hier appelliert einer im Tenor von "We Americans" an die Gegenseite, den besseren Teil der nationalen Werte nicht zu vergessen.
Weil ich weiß, wie sehr mich selbst die Polemik in ähnlich angespannten Situationen reizt, verhehle ich nicht meine Bewunderung für die demokratische Geistesart dieser um Konsens werbenden Intervention, die den Faden der diskursiven Auseinandersetzung auch mit extremen Gegnern nicht abreißen lassen will. Blindes Vertrauen in die Zerreißfestigkeit der eigenen politischen Kultur ist gewiß nicht ungefährlich; aber in begründeten Fällen ist es Ausdruck der reiferen demokratischen Tradition.""
from Habermas Forum
New book on Habermas and religion
"A new book is now available on Jürgen Habermas and religion in the modern society:
Rudolf Langthaler & Herta Nagl-Docekal (eds.)- Glauben und Wissen. Ein Symposium mit Jürgen Habermas (Akademie Verlag, 2006)
The book has contributions from Maeve Cooke, Christian Danz, Reinhold Esterbauer, Rudolf Langthaler, Wilhelm Lütterfelds, Klaus Müller, Ludwig Nagl, Herta Nagl-Docekal, Walter Raberger, Johann Reikersdorfer, Thomas M. Schmidt, Hans Julius Schneider und Magnus Striet.
And a reply from Jürgen Habermas: ”Replik auf Einwände, Reaktion auf Anregungen”."
from Habermas Forum
Rudolf Langthaler & Herta Nagl-Docekal (eds.)- Glauben und Wissen. Ein Symposium mit Jürgen Habermas (Akademie Verlag, 2006)
The book has contributions from Maeve Cooke, Christian Danz, Reinhold Esterbauer, Rudolf Langthaler, Wilhelm Lütterfelds, Klaus Müller, Ludwig Nagl, Herta Nagl-Docekal, Walter Raberger, Johann Reikersdorfer, Thomas M. Schmidt, Hans Julius Schneider und Magnus Striet.
And a reply from Jürgen Habermas: ”Replik auf Einwände, Reaktion auf Anregungen”."
from Habermas Forum
Monday, December 25, 2006
Theoretical paradise – empirically lost? Arguing with Habermas
Jürgen Habermas' thinking gained influence within the German International Relations (IR) community in the early 1990s. At the core of the so-called ‘ZIB-debate’ was the controversy whether rationalist theory can explain interstate cooperation. Constructivists accused rationalists of ignoring communication, language and reason, thereby leaving a logical gap in their analyses of interstate cooperation. This gap exists between the plausible motivation for states to cooperate and their actual achievement of cooperation. Rationalist approaches assume that actors face problematic, interdependent situations, in which they can only optimise their preferences by collaboration. Such situations involve a plausible motivation for actors to cooperate but they are not a sufficient condition to ensure that cooperation will actually happen. What is missing is a theoretical link between a general motivation to cooperate and its realisation, given that rationalist theory, following realism, regularly assumes a dangerous anarchical environment with its daunting security dilemma. These circumstances make cooperation risky and should normally work as a show-stopper for nation-states to collaborate.
Review of International Studies (2005), 31: 167-179 Cambridge University Press
Review of International Studies (2005), 31: 167-179 Cambridge University Press
A review of "The Future of Human Nature"
Germany—even when contrasted with other European countries—has taken a very conservative attitude toward anything that smacks of eugenics (for clear historical reasons), and Habermas has been one of the most prominent voices reminding his countrymen that they cannot and dare not forget the errors of their past. In the three lectures compiled in this recent book he speaks out on some issues that are of great interest to contemporary bioethics, which he sees as related to the history of eugenics. Habermas questions the ethical justification for genetic interventions, embryo research and preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD).
This book consists of a translation of a German essay first published in 2001 by Suhrkamp Verlag in Germany, plus two sections not included in the original German text. A clarifying postscript to the first two chapters was written after presenting the original text to a skeptical audience at a New York University law school colloquium in 2002, and the author also includes his address on the occasion of receiving the Peace Prize of the German Book Trade in 2001. The collection constitutes an important contribution to national and international controversy on current and proposed scientific and medical advances in biomedical research, and will be of interest to any reader of Buchanan, Brock, Daniels and Wickler’s From Chance to Choice or Kass’ Life, Liberty and the Defense of Dignity."
Read the review in full
This book consists of a translation of a German essay first published in 2001 by Suhrkamp Verlag in Germany, plus two sections not included in the original German text. A clarifying postscript to the first two chapters was written after presenting the original text to a skeptical audience at a New York University law school colloquium in 2002, and the author also includes his address on the occasion of receiving the Peace Prize of the German Book Trade in 2001. The collection constitutes an important contribution to national and international controversy on current and proposed scientific and medical advances in biomedical research, and will be of interest to any reader of Buchanan, Brock, Daniels and Wickler’s From Chance to Choice or Kass’ Life, Liberty and the Defense of Dignity."
Read the review in full
Another review of Truth and Justification
Truth and Justification, Jürgen Habermas, edited and with translation by Barbara Fultner, MIT Press, 2003, 349pp, $40.00 (hbk) ISBN 0262083183.
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Richard Rorty tells us “most Anglophone philosophers still do not take Hegel seriously.” He continues, “… the rise of what Brandom and McDowell refer to as their ‘Pittsburg School of neo-Hegelians’ may force them. For this school must still pass over from its Kantian to its Hegelian moment.” Habermas’s Truth and Justification is a not so gentle challenge to the spirit of Pittsburg neo-Hegelianism. Habermas is especially uneasy with its emphasis on discursive practices and, its sequela, an epistemic conception of truth. It is well known that Habermas himself defended a discursive view, and the implications he here identifies, until the late 1990s. Qualifying his own transformation, Habermas traces his philosophical development, noting with some restrained approbation, the publication of Rorty’s seminal, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Habermas writes:
When I responded to critiques of Knowledge and Human Interests in the appendix to the paperback addition in 1973, the turn toward a postempiricist philosophy of science had already been initiated by Thomas Kuhn. However, I had not yet fully realized the philosophical implications of a consistent contextualism. Only six years later Richard Rorty precipitated a pragmatic turn in epistemology, in which, despite all our differences, I was able to discern some of my own intentions (p. 9).
Habermas thinks that the pragmatic turn transformed Kant’s transcendental problematic. Much of this book is a serious rethinking of the so-called transcendental problem after pragmatism. Kant, Habermas writes, “ensured the status of the unavoidable conditions of the possibility of cognition as rational and atemporal” (p. 9). Neo-Hegelianism attacks the idealist background set aside to guarantee objectivity; without the self-transcendent guarantees, only an “anthropocentrically contingent and perspectivally curtailed view of the world” is spared. Defending his Kantian intuitions, Habermas thinks “… the difference between the world and what is innerwordly, which is crucial for the architectonic of his [Kant’s] theory, is blurred” (p. 9). Sympathetic to aspects of the pragmatic turn, Habermas sets out to defend both (a) an ontological assumption about a mind-independent world and (b) a nonepistemic conception of truth. However, Habermas wishes to preserve an epistemic conception of normative rightness in the space of moral and legal theory. Much of the book is confined to an analysis of detranscentalized Kantian position; in the last Chapter, “The Relationship between Theory and Practice Revisited,” Habermas discusses the constitutive nature of our moral orientation and how we determine the conditions for rational judgment formation and the reasonableness of moral action. Habermas wonders at the fate of our realist intuitions against the linguistic turn. Noting the appeal behind the move from a Kantian to Hegelian moment, he thinks that our ontology faces a “contextualist challenge.” We are left wondering “whether any sense of context-independent validity can be salvaged from the concept of truth” (249).
We are treated to eight essays in this volume. Each can be read as a stand-alone piece, but taken together they reveal a forceful defense of a “justification-transcendent standard for orienting ourselves by context-independent truth-claims” (254). “Realism after the Linguistic Turn,” the first essay, sets the tone; taken with the second essay, “Hermeneutic and Analytic Philosophy: Two Complementary Versions of the Linguistic Turn,” one gets a compelling appraisal of how language went public, and how, historically, the so-called analytic-continental divide came to characterize twentieth century philosophy. Demonstrating grace and mastery, Habermas is able to move about the divide without difficulty. The other essays include: “From Kant’s ‘Ideas’ of Pure reason to the ‘Idealizing’ Presuppositions of Communicative Action: Reflections on the Detranscendentalized ‘Use of Reason’,” “From Kant to Hegel: On Robert Brandom’s Pragmatic Philosophy of Language,” “From Kant to Hegel and Back Again: The Move Toward Detranscendentalization,” “Norms and Values: On Hilary Putnam’s Kantian Pragmatism,” “Rightness versus Truth: On the Sense of Normative Validity in Moral Judgments and Norms,” and “The Relationship Between Theory and Practice Revisited.”
Habermas, in this volume, is a philosopher of record. His discussions of Brandom’s very important Making it Explicit and of Putnam, of Humboldt’s central place along side Frege in the rise of our linguistic orientation, capture nicely the new divide; we are no longer analytical and continental philosophers—though, of course, we are. Rather, if Habermas is correct, our divisions are preserved by whether our affinities are Kantian or Hegelian.
Karim Dharamsi
The University of Winnipeg
----
Previously posted reviews of TJ:
A reveiw of Habermas' Truth and Justification
A review of "Truth and Justification"
Truth and Justification, Reviewed by Richard Rorty , Stanford University
====
Richard Rorty tells us “most Anglophone philosophers still do not take Hegel seriously.” He continues, “… the rise of what Brandom and McDowell refer to as their ‘Pittsburg School of neo-Hegelians’ may force them. For this school must still pass over from its Kantian to its Hegelian moment.” Habermas’s Truth and Justification is a not so gentle challenge to the spirit of Pittsburg neo-Hegelianism. Habermas is especially uneasy with its emphasis on discursive practices and, its sequela, an epistemic conception of truth. It is well known that Habermas himself defended a discursive view, and the implications he here identifies, until the late 1990s. Qualifying his own transformation, Habermas traces his philosophical development, noting with some restrained approbation, the publication of Rorty’s seminal, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Habermas writes:
When I responded to critiques of Knowledge and Human Interests in the appendix to the paperback addition in 1973, the turn toward a postempiricist philosophy of science had already been initiated by Thomas Kuhn. However, I had not yet fully realized the philosophical implications of a consistent contextualism. Only six years later Richard Rorty precipitated a pragmatic turn in epistemology, in which, despite all our differences, I was able to discern some of my own intentions (p. 9).
Habermas thinks that the pragmatic turn transformed Kant’s transcendental problematic. Much of this book is a serious rethinking of the so-called transcendental problem after pragmatism. Kant, Habermas writes, “ensured the status of the unavoidable conditions of the possibility of cognition as rational and atemporal” (p. 9). Neo-Hegelianism attacks the idealist background set aside to guarantee objectivity; without the self-transcendent guarantees, only an “anthropocentrically contingent and perspectivally curtailed view of the world” is spared. Defending his Kantian intuitions, Habermas thinks “… the difference between the world and what is innerwordly, which is crucial for the architectonic of his [Kant’s] theory, is blurred” (p. 9). Sympathetic to aspects of the pragmatic turn, Habermas sets out to defend both (a) an ontological assumption about a mind-independent world and (b) a nonepistemic conception of truth. However, Habermas wishes to preserve an epistemic conception of normative rightness in the space of moral and legal theory. Much of the book is confined to an analysis of detranscentalized Kantian position; in the last Chapter, “The Relationship between Theory and Practice Revisited,” Habermas discusses the constitutive nature of our moral orientation and how we determine the conditions for rational judgment formation and the reasonableness of moral action. Habermas wonders at the fate of our realist intuitions against the linguistic turn. Noting the appeal behind the move from a Kantian to Hegelian moment, he thinks that our ontology faces a “contextualist challenge.” We are left wondering “whether any sense of context-independent validity can be salvaged from the concept of truth” (249).
We are treated to eight essays in this volume. Each can be read as a stand-alone piece, but taken together they reveal a forceful defense of a “justification-transcendent standard for orienting ourselves by context-independent truth-claims” (254). “Realism after the Linguistic Turn,” the first essay, sets the tone; taken with the second essay, “Hermeneutic and Analytic Philosophy: Two Complementary Versions of the Linguistic Turn,” one gets a compelling appraisal of how language went public, and how, historically, the so-called analytic-continental divide came to characterize twentieth century philosophy. Demonstrating grace and mastery, Habermas is able to move about the divide without difficulty. The other essays include: “From Kant’s ‘Ideas’ of Pure reason to the ‘Idealizing’ Presuppositions of Communicative Action: Reflections on the Detranscendentalized ‘Use of Reason’,” “From Kant to Hegel: On Robert Brandom’s Pragmatic Philosophy of Language,” “From Kant to Hegel and Back Again: The Move Toward Detranscendentalization,” “Norms and Values: On Hilary Putnam’s Kantian Pragmatism,” “Rightness versus Truth: On the Sense of Normative Validity in Moral Judgments and Norms,” and “The Relationship Between Theory and Practice Revisited.”
Habermas, in this volume, is a philosopher of record. His discussions of Brandom’s very important Making it Explicit and of Putnam, of Humboldt’s central place along side Frege in the rise of our linguistic orientation, capture nicely the new divide; we are no longer analytical and continental philosophers—though, of course, we are. Rather, if Habermas is correct, our divisions are preserved by whether our affinities are Kantian or Hegelian.
Karim Dharamsi
The University of Winnipeg
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Previously posted reviews of TJ:
A reveiw of Habermas' Truth and Justification
A review of "Truth and Justification"
Truth and Justification, Reviewed by Richard Rorty , Stanford University
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