Tolerance Makes Great Demands. Jürgen Habermas Shows What Is Involved

"Jürgen Habermas, one of the most important contemporary philosophers and social theoreticians, is someone who intervenes in public discourse - but as an analyst not a moralist.

Far from merely publishing for other inhabitants of the celebrated ivory tower of scholarly research, his philosophizing is characterized by an attempt at systematic mediation of thinking and political action. He thereby adheres to the view that rationality is implemented in verbal understanding. That is also the background to his lecture on June the 29th, 2002, at the Berlin-Brandenburg Academy of Sciences, devoted to the question "When Must We Be Tolerant? On Rivalry between Views of the World, Values, and Theories". His speech shows what contradictions we must endure in order to be tolerant, and also that tolerance can only be practiced on the basis of a democratic state founded on the rule of law.

Cognitive Rejection without Practical Consequences

We generally understand tolerance as meaning putting up with divergent convictions. The concept thus contains an element of rejection since we can in fact only demonstrate tolerance towards convictions that we have renounced for good subjective reasons. As soon as we are either indifferent about an alien view or even appreciate the "value" of this other conviction, we do not need to be tolerant. The rejection inherent in tolerance is thus radical. Tolerance is located where non-negotiable fundamental convictions meet and no agreement can be expected. What is expected of a tolerant person is not some unresolvable contradiction between competing convictions. That must be accepted. "At issue is the neutralizing bracketing of specific practical consequences arising out of unresolved interpersonal contradiction" (J. Habermas). In other words, the demand is that no action should be allowed to follow from the collision of competing views.

Potential for Conflict: The Good Takes Precedence over the Just

Anyone who is not "metaphysically restricted" has an easier time with the demand that contradictions between competing views of the world should simply be left open. That becomes problematic for someone who derives an ethos, i.e. personal moral convictions, from a religion. After all every religion lays claim to total structuring of a way of life, orienting itself on an infallible doctrine of salvation which lays down what is good and what bad. A religion thus prescribes how a good life must be led. What is good takes precedence over what is just. For someone who derives his or her personal ethos from religious truths laying claim to universal validity, the burden of tolerance is particularly difficult to bear. As soon as his own ideas about right living are determined by generally binding models of the good or of salvation, there arises a perspective where other ways of life seem not only different but also mistaken. The ethos of the other appears as a question of truth or untruth rather than an assessment of values. That explains the potential for conflict implicit in disputes between religions.

Peaceful Co-Existence: The Just Takes Precedence over the Good

Following that model, religious tolerance does not signify that the adherents of some belief should relativize let alone renounce their own claims to truth and certainty. Instead tolerance calls for limitation of the practical impact of one’s own claims to truth and certainty. The demand is that the way of life prescribed by one’s own religion can only be implemented on condition that the same rights are accorded to all others. What is just takes precedence over what is good, and that precedence manifests itself positively in inter-subjective and supra-confessional recognition of the rules of liberal co-existence - as provided for in democracy and human rights as normative foundations of the constitutional state. So for the individual believer that means he can only implement his own ethos within the boundaries set by civic norms of equality. He recognizes the other as a fellow citizen with equal rights, no matter what his or her religious convictions might be.

Pluralist Societies

The expanded concept of tolerance does not remain restricted to the sphere of religion but can be generally extended to tolerance of others who think differently in any way. Within today’s pluralist societies where the traditions of various linguistic and cultural communities come together, tolerance is always necessary "where ways of life challenge judgements in terms of both existential relevance and claims to truth and rightness" (J. Habermas)"

from here

The "Third Generation" of the Frankfurt School

A piece by Joel Anderson can be read here

Confusion between internal and immanent criticism

Dr Gordon Finlayson, the author of Habermas, A very short introduction has an interesting project he is working on about the nature of immanent criticism. The project is entitled "What is immanent criticism/critique? Why should social criticism be immanent?" In his book he has the following comments concerning Habermas and immanent criticism:

". . . like Horkheimer and Adorno before him, Habermas employs the method of immanent criticism. One can also call it internal, as opposed to external criticism. The critical theorists think this approach derives from Hegel and Marx. In some respects it is closer to the Socratic mode of argumentation, which assumes the position of the interlocutor, for the sake of argument, without actually endorsing it, in order to point out its incoherence and untruth. Whatever its origins, the critical theorists aim to criticize an object - a conception of society or a work of philosophy - on its own terms, and not on the basis of values or standards that transcend it, in order to bring its untruth to light." (Haberams, AVS, p. 9, emphasis retained).

I believe Finlayson here confuses immanent criticism with internal criticism and considers them synonyms. In fact they are not synonyms. Immanent criticism can include both internal and external criticism and is opposed not to external criticism but to transcendent criticism. Habermas' approach is not an internal criticism it is rather an immanent criticism and does not exclude external criticism. This is crucial difference between Habermas' approach and Gadamer's approach (for example). Immanent criticism in Habermasian context means that the basis of critique must be inthe actual rational practices and is not to be derived from any other source which is located beyond these practices. However for Habermas these immanent practices provide us resources to go beyond them from "within" without appealing to any transcendent. Thus immanent criticism is very closed linked to Habermas' project of ‘transcendence from within.’

Call for Papers: Philosophical Writings

Call for Papers

Philosophical Writings, the journal for advanced postgraduates and new
academics, is currently accepting essays for the next issue.
Submissions
are invited on any area of Philosophy so long as they are treated in an
analytic
style.

Founded in 1996, Philosophical Writings is an international journal
published tri-annually in the University of Durham's Philosophy
Department.

Submission guidelines are available on our webpage

Submissions should be sent to:

The Editors
Philosophical Writings
Department of Philosophy
50 Old Elvet
Durham
DH1 3HN

Tel: 0191 334 6550
Fax: 0191 334 6551
Email: Philosophical.Writings@durham.ac.uk

ISSN 1361-9365


--
Editor
Philosophical Writings
Department of Philosophy
University of Durham
50 Old Elvet
Durham DH1 3HN
UNITED KINGDOM

Tel: 0191 374 7641
Fax: 0191 374 7635
Email: Philosophical.Writings@durham.ac.uk
http://www.dur.ac.uk/Philosophical.Writings/

Freedom and Nature

Relational Creativity and the Symmetry of Freedom and Nature
Philip Michael Rose

Abstract

"One of the more important and persistent of problems in speculative philosophy is reconciling the relation between freedom and nature. This is often referred to as the problem of freedom and determinism, but this way of formulating the problem assumes, uncritically, that nature is and must necessarily be a purely deterministic framework. As I hope to show, the so-called problem of freedom and determinism lies precisely in this deterministic assumption. By reorienting the question in terms of the relation between freedom and nature, rather than freedom and determinism, we can better see how the problem of their tension or ‘contradiction’ only arises if nature itself is defined and characterized in a very limited, purely deterministic way. Once we step outside the deterministic assumption and entertain alternative views of nature, the problem of freedom and determinism does not arise."

full here

Related Resources:
Habermas' Ontological conception of Freedom: Some preliminary Reflections(doc)

Habermas and validity claims

Habermas and validity claims

Jari I. Niemi
Purdue University, W. Lafayette, Indiana, USA

"Abstract:

At the heart of Jürgen Habermas’s explication of communicative rationality is the contention that all speech acts oriented to understanding raise three different kinds of validity claims simultaneously: claims to truth, truthfulness, and normative rightness. This paper argues that Habermas presents exactly three distinct, logically independent arguments for his simultaneity thesis: an argument from structure; an argument from criticizability/rejectability; and an argument from understanding/reaching understanding. It is further maintained that the simultaneity thesis receives cogent support only from the Argument from understanding/reaching understanding, and only if the notion of ‘understanding’ is expanded to that of ‘agreement’."

from here

Related Resources:

The first issue of Cosmos and History

Cosmos and History has just published their first issue. Go here to read the issu.

Observation and Understanding/Normativity and Explanation

"There is an influential view of the human mind according to which the way we understand people is radically different from the way we understand the rest of nature. One popular metaphor frequently used to articulate this view is that of a 'logical space of reasons', inhabited by thinking subjects who are both subject to, and able to reflectively appreciate, normative constraints that classify thoughts and actions as reasonable or unreasonable in various ways. On this view, personal understanding is essentially normative in a way that empirical understanding of the rest of nature is not. It is therefore impossible to conceive of a fully naturalised science of the human mind insofar as the human mind is understood as the mind of a fully developed person. It is a view of this kind that Alan Millar defends in this book. Millar's argument draws upon a wide range of recent work in philosophy of mind, epistemology and moral philosophy. It is one of the virtues of the book that it brings together a number of related questions from different areas of philosophy that the academic division of labour increasingly forces professional philosophers to address in artificial (and often unhappy) isolation.

The metaphor of a logical space of reasons can be traced back to Wilfrid Sellars's seminal 1956 paper 'Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind', but has more recently come to be associated with the work of Robert Brandom and John McDowell. Elsewhere, the claim that certain aspects of personal understanding are essentially normative has been defended by Donald Davidson in the context of his argument that the attribution of propositional attitudes like belief and desire is constrained by the assumption that people are rational believers of the true and lovers of the good. Millar situates his book in this 'long and honourable' tradition of philosophical argument, in particular in the strand of that tradition distinguished by the anti-scientism and explanatory modesty associated with Brandom and McDowell's work. Its main distinctive virtue as such is the patient and meticulous attention shown by Millar in his exploration of the details and complexities of this well-trodden territory."

Keep reading

Habermas' seminar on "Naturalism"

It is exciting to know that in the Fall semester at Northwestern University, Habermas in his graduate seminar is taking the issue of naturalism further. It is also interesting to know that he is taking up McDowell's work in his seminar (perhaps for the first time).

Here is the description of the seminar:

"SEMINAR: SPECIAL TOPICS

Progress in biogenetics, neurology and robotics has
sparked a wider reaching discussion on what it means
to conceive of human beings as an integral part of
nature. In this context the kind of naturalism for
which science counts as “the measure of all things”
deserves second thoughts. Whereas Winfrid Sellars
wrote still in the wake of the Unified Science
movement, Quine is the main source for a scientism
that informed the orthodox view in Anglo-Saxon
philosophy. With reference to this background I
propose a discussion of the deviating views of Putnam,
Rorty, Davidson, Mc Dowell and others. With regard to
recent voices in psychology and neurology in favour of
a naturalist self-objectivation of persons, I am
moreover interested in the long standing problem of
Freedom and Determinism: Is our intuitive
understanding of agency and of the practice of
reason-giving up for revision?"

from here

Thanks to Gary E. Davis for the pointer.

Australasian Postgraduate Philosophy Conference

Wednesday 28 September - Friday 30 September 2005
at the University of Melbourne Graduate Centre

Co-hosted by La Trobe University and the University of Melbourne

Papers on all areas of philosophy and related disciplines are invited from both postgraduate and Honours students. There is no central theme, although we anticipate at least one stream will be dedicated to applied philosophy. Papers should be about 20-25 minutes long, with about the same time for discussion.

Expressions of interest requested by 30 July.
Abstracts required by 30 August.
Registration is free, but please advise by 23 September if you would like to attend.

Postgraduates from related disciplines, e.g. linguistics, mathematics, and the history and philosophy of science are also very welcome indeed; ideas under construction are encouraged.

Keynote speakers include John Armstrong, Justin Oakely and Robert Farrell

Some travel subsidies will be available for interstate travellers and we also hope to offer some billetted accommodation and are still seeking offers from Victorians.

Submit expressions of interest, abstracts, requests for billets and any other queries to Conference Organisers: Cameron Fraser or Clare McCausland

Generously supported by the Philosophy Departments at La Trobe University and the University of Melbourne, and by the Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics.

Timetables and abstracts will be published here soon

full here

Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy

An interesting initiative!

"Cosmos and History is a peer-reviewed, open-access journal of natural and social philosophy. It serves those who see philosophy’s vocation in questioning and challenging prevailing assumptions about ourselves and our place in the world, developing new ways of thinking about physical existence, life, humanity and society, so helping to create the future insofar as thought affects the issue. Philosophy so conceived is not identified with the work of professional philosophers, and the journal welcomes contributions from philosophically oriented thinkers from all disciplines.

Call for Papers
Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy
Inaugural Issue: Deadline 15th May 2005
Second Issue: Deadline 1st September 2005.

more here

Contemporary Pragmatism

An interesting new Journal on the theme of contemporary pragmatism

Rodopi is temporarily offering free online access to an issue -- Access this title now.

"Contemporary Pragmatism is an interdisciplinary, international journal for discussions of applying pragmatism, broadly understood, to today's issues. CP will consider articles about pragmatism written from the standpoint of any tradition and perspective. CP especially seeks original explorations and critiques of pragmatism, and also of pragmatism's relations with humanism, naturalism, and analytic philosophy. CP cannot consider submissions that principally interpret or critique historical figures of American philosophy, although applications of past thought to contemporary issues are sought. CP welcomes contributions dealing with current issues in any field of philosophical inquiry, from epistemology, philosophy of language, metaphysics and philosophy of science, and philosophy of mind and action, to the areas of theoretical and applied ethics, aesthetics, social & political philosophy, philosophy of religion, and philosophy of the social sciences. CP encourages work having an interdisciplinary orientation, establishing bridges between pragmatic philosophy and, for example, theology, psychology, pedagogy, sociology, economics, medicine, political science, or international relations. Two issues each year will be published, in the summer and winter seasons."

from here

The Future of Critical Theory

THE ASHWORTH PROGRAM IN SOCIAL THEORY

& THE SOCIAL THEORY POSTGRADUATE ASSOCIATION

UNIVERSITY OF MELBOURNE present -


The Future of Critical Theory

(A Postgraduate Conference)

17-18 November 2005

The Ashworth Program in Social Theory and The Social Theory Postgraduate Association (University of Melbourne) are organising a conference for Australian postgraduates researching in what may broadly be regarded as the tradition of "Critical Theory" entitled "The Future of Critical Theory" The conference will be held on the 17th to 18th of November 2005. We are inviting papers from Melbourne (and interstate) based postgraduate students in any discipline and asking them to reflect on the state of Critical Theory: its past, its present and its future.

Possible topics for discussion include:

1) The "criticalness" of Critical Theory.

2) The legacy of the Frankfurt School (from Horkheimer, Adorno to Habermas and Honneth): Generational interconnections, contemporary resonances.

3) Subjectivity and Intersubjectivity: what place does the 'subject' have in critical theory?

4) Developments in French critical theory -- Adumbrations of a French-German dialogue

5) Philosophy and Critical Theory

6) The politics and/or ethics of Critical Theory

7) The roots of Critical Theory: Marxism, Romanticism, Literature.

8) Dialogues with fields outside of Critical Theory that may be seen to provoke, supplement it or directly challenge it.

9) We also intend to devote sessions specific to these thinkers: Niklas Luhmann, Axel Honneth, T. Adorno, Manfred Frank, Agnes Heller, and Cornelius Castoriadis.

Confirmed Keynote Speakers: John Rundell (Director of the Ashworth Program in Social Theory), More Names to Follow

(Check updates on website: http://www.ashworth-program.unimelb.edu.au/)

Submission details:

Title and 250-300 word abstract for papers of 20 mins reading time.

Submissions should also include the following information:

Speaker's Name, Phone Number, Postal address, Email address, University Affiliation.

Submissions can be sent by e-mail to stpa-postgrad@unimelb.edu.au

by 30th September 2005. For enquiries, email stpa-postgrad@unimelb.edu.au

What is tenable and what is not, in the myth of the Given

McDowell’s account of the myth of the given is derived from Sellars. Moreover this account makes sense only in the context of Seller’s normative conception of knowledge (intro. xiv). McDowell extends this to include not only knowledge but to the very notion of having contact with reality: normative context is necessary for being in touch with the world at all, whether knowledgeable or not.” (Intro. to Mind and World, xiv).

Sellers attack on the myth of the given is an attack on the notion of ‘immediacy,” which is at the heart of the whole empiricist tradition as well as at the heart of the Cartesian tradition in general).

Habermas agrees with the basic thrust of this thinking by not only explicitly rejecting the myth of the given but also through his background in Hegel he is aware of the Hegel’s critique of the immediacy. Furthermore with his linguistic turn it become clear that reality is linguistically constituted and that there is no Gods eye view from which we can access naked reality. With the linguistic turn the whole notion of “purified experience’ or immediate contact with experiential reality becomes suspect [Cf. Habermas’ rejection of Husserl’s notion of evidence in Gauss lectures].

The rejection of ‘immediacy’ is the rejection of two important factors:

1) The Lockean myth of the pure passivity of subject vis a vis external experience is rejected. There is no purely ‘passive’ experience as such because even in the purest of all pure experiences the active side of human subject is already implicated.

2) Locke’s confusion of explanation and justification is rejected. The thought that the bare experience can on its own act as reason is rejected. The thought behind this is that ‘reason’ involves actors and subjects who are responsible for not only making claims but also responsible for defending or rejecting and consequences ensuing form those claims. The idea is that ‘reasons’ presuppose the existence of social space in which claims can be made and defended. The idea already presupposes the idea of responsible actors.

Thus the idea is incompatible with the myth of the given as far as the idea consists in the fact that bare perceptions in their givenness can stand as reasons. The myth of the given turns out to be a contradictory idea in this vein as the idea of reason presupposes the idea of an active subject while the myth is founded on the idea of purely passive subject while the very idea of reason requires at least two active subjects.

Sellers’ and Brandom’ idea of the priority of inference is built on the above insight. The same is the idea behind Habermas’ radicalisation of Dummett’s epistemic turn in the theory of meaning. The space of reason presupposes actors who can make claims and defend them. This is the basis of the rejection of the myth of the given by Sellers, Brandom, Davidson, Habermas.

Now McDowell recognises the force of argument against the myth of the given. What he objects to however is the alternative provided by Sellers and Davidson, the alternative he calls coherentism. We will see McDowell’s reason for rejecting the solution and his alternative in due course but before we go into that it is important that we understand the reasons which lead McDowell to reject the Seller’ and Davidson’ solution is his realisation that even if the myth of the Given is untenable there is an insight behind the myth which must not be forfeited even if reject the myth. The way the empiricists formulated the myth of the given was untenable but the insight behind it is correct and must be preserved.

The insight behind the myth of the given is that our thinking is a) constraint by reality which to use Habemras’ terminology is truly recalcitrant reality. This part of the Locke’s image that we are ‘helpless’ and hence passive in the face of reality over which we have (ultimately) no control is restored.

b) The related idea is the idea of ‘answerability’ to the world or alternatively the idea of the ‘empirical tribunal.’ The crux of the matter is that our thought has to be constraint by reality (rationally and not just causally) in order to avoid the danger of idealism. If our thought is not answerable to the world in rational terms then it is hard to see how the bridge between rationality and world is overcome.

Now though Habermas would reject McDowell’s solution he stands on the side of McDowell in recognising the positive insight behind the myth of the given. Parallel with Habermas are striking. There are parallels at least in three aspects:

1) Despite his discursive notion of rationality Habermas does not blur the distinction between language and action. Even if the lifeworld is linguistically constituted this is not interpreted as meaning that it is linguistic. Habermas considers language as half-transcendence through which we acquire certain distance vis a vis reality, however through our need for action we are always embedded in reality. This crucial distinction between language and action, between linguistically constituted and linguistic sustains the unbridgeable gap between discursivity and non discursivity. In this manner Habermas’ thinking is immune from sort of idealism that is the fate of coherentism. [on differentiation between language and action, TJ: 154 “Naturally what agents experience is itself linguistically constituted . . .” also see Gauss lectures].

2) Habermas through his notion of recalcitrant reality with which we are in direct contact retains the empiricist insight of the ultimate passivity (helplessness) of the subject in the face of the resisting reality. Habermas is able to bring in the in the notion of recalcitrant reality through several crucial moves: a) Primacy of practice over theory (of know how) over explicit knowledge. b) Pragmatic conception of knowledge that abandons the intellectualised version of knowledge and experience presupposed in both empiricist and rationalist tradition.

3) Despite his epistemic turn Habermas remains committed to a version of answerability to the world and he definitely would acquiesce to the notion of experience as some sort of ultimate tribunal against which our claims should make good. Habermas’ accepts the notion of experience as the ultimate tribunal even if he would reject McDowell’s conception of experience as still caught up in the empiricist/Kantian tradition of over intellectualised version of knowledge.

Foucault Habermas Debate

The Critique of Impure Reason:
The Debate between Michel Foucault and Jürgen Habermas on
The Enlightenment, Power, and Rationality

Habermas Rawls Debate

Habermas's Democratic Balance Between Rights and Popular Sovereignty: A Response to Charles Larmore by John Davenport

Rampant vs Naturalized platonism

Rampant platonism is defined by McDowell as a position that construes:

“picturing the space of reasons as an autonomous structure – autonomous in that it is constituted independently of anything specifically human, since what is specifically human is surely natural” (Mind and World, p. 77).

“Naturalized platonism is quite distinct from rampant platonism. In rampant platonism, the rational structure within which meaning comes into view is independent of anything merely human, so that capacity of our minds to resonate to it looks occult or magical. Naturalized platonism is platonistic in that the structure of the space of reasons has a sort of autonomy; it is not derivative from, or reflective of, truths about human beings that are capturable independently of having that structure in view. But this platonism is not rampant: the structure of the space of reasons is not constituted in splendid isolation from anything merely human. The demands of reason are essentially such that a human bringing can open a human being’s eyes to them.” (Mind and World, p. 92).

Apel and Habermas: Some further thoughts. . .

Note: Moving forward this post due to recent comments.

Note:Read a previous related post here and important comments on the post by Andrew Montin here.

Herbert Schnädelbach masterfully brings out the key difference between Apel and Habermas in the following:

“Irrespective of how one may judge the details of the project Habermas develops, I do not in principle see in what way a reconstructive philosophy with merely hypothetical claims is supposed to be suited to generating the ‘moment of unconditionality’ without which ‘normative foundations’ are simply not to be had. The alternative would be hermeneutics as a practical philosophy free of any claim to unconditionality, and all the relativist consequences this entails. It may indeed be the case that communicative action always involves unconditional claims being made, but this does not qualify it to provide the foundations for Critical Theory. To do so, it would itself have to be open to critical assessment. In other words, the theorist would have unconditionally to provide the unconditional standards for critique from the outset and s/he will never be able to derive these form the subject matter via hypothetical reconstruction. It is no coincidence that Karl Otto Apel staunchly retains his transcendental philosophy. Critical unconditionality, without foundationalism – this is the aim Habermas has set himself; doubts are in order whether he has reached it.” (Herbert Schnädelbach, “The transformation of Critical Theory,” in Communicative action : essays on Jürgen Habermas's The theory of communicative action, 7-22, here 22, italics in the original.).

This is an extremely important passage. Schnädelbach alludes to two important distinctions in the above passage. He differentiates between two different conceptions of ‘unconditionality’: a) One conception of unconditionality refers to the ‘unconditionality’ of the claims as claims (within communicative action or discourse). Such claims are raised within communicative action or discourse and are always (in principle) open to criticism. b) On the other hand we have a conception of unconditionality that is the property of certain ‘rules’ or ‘standards’ themselves and not of the claims about standards or rules. This second sort of unconditionality cannot be situated within discourse for the reasons Schnädelbach mentions and hence cannot be open to criticism and reassessment.

As I argue in the thesis Habermas only adheres to the first conception of unconditionality and deems the second conception of unconditionality incompatible with a thoroughgoing detranscendentalisation and with a postmetaphysical notion of rationality. To defend the conception of unconditionality one would have to exclude these conditions from the all encompassing ambit of detranscendentalisation and this is according to Schnädelbach what Apel does.

Thus it is clear from the above that the real difference between Habermas and Apel is about the extent and status of detranscendentalisation. We can make this more clear and specific by focusing on the concrete problem which Apel highlights in his critique of Habermas, i.e. their different conceptions of what the principle of fallibilism is and what it requires in terms of presuppositions. According to Apel the principle of fallibilism is not liable to empirical testing because it is what makes empirical testing possible in the first place:

“. . . whether it makes sense to expect those philosophical statements spelling out fallibilism and its call for ongoing attempts at falsification will themselves one day will prove fallible. The decisive, meaning-critical argument against this possibility runs as follows: If, or the extent to which, this would occur, one could no longer understand what “fallible” or “falsification” mean at all, since the statement at issue here explicate the principle of fallibilism, that is, the presuppositions necessarily implied by it (which are precisely the necessary presuppositions of argumentation that Habermas himself has explicated in the postulates of discourse and consensus). To be sure, these statements can, as explications of meaning, be corrected under the presupposition that they are true. But they are infallible precisely insofar as they state necessary presuppositions of the principle of fallibilism.” (“Normative grounding of “Critical theory”,” 164 n. 9, italics in the original.)

Habermas’ reply is terse and (in my opinion) devastating:

“We understand the term ‘justify’ when we know the rules for an argumentation game within which validity claims can be redeemed discursively. Now, we can make these rules the object of theory of argumentation or truth – or, if we have to do with special discourse, we can make it the object of a moral theory or a philosophy of science. Yet, justifying these theories – as is the case with justifying a theory per se – must itself fit into the framework of an argumentation game to the same extent as must the justification of harmless, e.g. practical everyday utterances. Certainly, the claims made of justification vary according to the argumentation form and context. Yet, which reason counts as a good or indeed as the better reason for what object in what context has to be assessed in terms of standards which under certain conditions become problematical and in turn require justification. Justifications must always be provided in one and the same place – there are no meta-discourses in the sense that a higher discourse is able to prescribe rules for a subordinate discourse. Argumentation games do not form a hierarchy. Discourses regulate themselves. Discourses are in principle open. And it is impossible to predict the outcome of discourses, that is, except from the perspective of an observer who is not a party to the discourse, yet who has to enter into another discourse in order to be able to justify his/her prognosis.” (Jürgen Habermas, “ A reply,” in Communicative action : essays on Jürgen Habermas's The theory of communicative action; 214-264, here 231.)

Habermas starts his argument against Apel through clarification of his understanding of justification. It clearly excludes any notion of ultimate justification as that would require going back to the conception of “transcendental” that is incompatible with detranscendentalisation. When Habermas says that his understanding of justification is ‘grammatical matter’ it is only so within the context of his understanding of Modernity which includes commitment to a thoroughgoing detranscendentalisation. His understanding of Modernity as committed to a thoroughgoing detranscendentalisation excludes conception of ‘ultimate justification’ to which Apel is still committed. It is this same understanding of Modernity which bars acceptance of any hierarchy among discourses as there is no space outside “this world” where to anchor the ultimate or higher discourse. Reflections and distance are possible but they themselves are in turn situated within “this very same world” in which the discourse which is being reflected upon is situated. In this sense there is in principle no hierarchy possible between discourse of reflection and a discourse which is being reflected upon. To still believe that we can step out would be to still clinging to the notion of subjectivity having anchored in a realm beyond this world and hence in fact that would be not carrying out detranscendentalisation thoroughly enough. In fact this is what has happened with Apel.

That Apel still believes in some such notion is evident form the fact that from his Cartesian conception of reflection (on this more later).

Ending Ph.D. related blogging

because there is not much to blog on the topic anymore. I am in the process of finishing the first draft and then drafting and redrafting (a never ending game it seems)...

I would like to thank all those who commented and gave me advice here or via emails. Sorry to those I have been unable to get back to. Special thanks to Carl Sachs for making me realise the importance of the work of John McDowell for my project.

I do not know what I will do with this blog in the future. For now I will just post occasionally on anything interesting related to Habermas.

European Journal of Philosophy Annual Lecture 2005 : Given by Jürgen Habermas

European Journal of Philosophy Annual Lecture 2005

Given by Jürgen Habermas

Religion in the Public Sphere



Date: 1 July 2005
Time: 5pm
Location: Beveridge Hall, ground floor of University of London Senate House, Malet Street

All are welcome to attend

Synopsis of the paper

The paper will address the debate that has arisen in the wake of John Rawls' political theory, in particular his concept of the "public use of reason". How does the constitutional separation of state and church influence the role which religious traditions, communities and organizations are allowed to play in the political public sphere and in the state in general, but above all in the political opinion and will formation of citizens themselves? Where should the dividing line be in the opinion of those who wish to challenge the view of these matters that has arisen since the Enlightenment?

"The Public Role of Religion in Secular Context"

"Among ethical philosophers, Jurgen Habermas is a star. Which means he is not quite as famous as Paris Hilton's dog, Tinkerbell.

You won't find him in People or on "Entertainment Tonight." But you will find courses on his thoughts and theories in the philosophy departments of U.S. and European universities. While Habermas, 75, still writes and teaches, his work has acquired a life of its own. There's an entire cottage industry of philosophers who seek to defend or contradict the Habermasian worldview.

That may be why his speech tomorrow at the University of San Diego has already drawn a standing-room-only crowd.

"We have close to 1,400 registered for professor Habermas' presentation," said Stephanie Kellems, who is helping to organize this week's Kyoto Laureate Symposium events. "The Web site has stopped taking reservations."

For 20 years Kazuo Inamori, the founder of Kyocera, has bestowed the Kyoto Prize on international trailblazers in advanced technology, basic science and arts and philosophy.

This is the fourth consecutive year the laureates have visited San Diego, home of Kyocera's North American headquarters.

Among this week's events:

This morning's advanced technology presentation by Alan Curtis Kay, 9:30 to 11, Smith Recital Hall, San Diego State University;

This afternoon's basic science presentation by Dr. Alfred George Knudson, 4:30 to 6 p.m., Price Center Theatre, University of California San Diego; and

Habermas' speech tomorrow, which will be followed by comments from Robert Bellah, professor emeritus at the University of California Berkeley and an old friend.

While Habermas resists talking about himself – "the life of philosophers is rather poor in notable outside occurrences" – the white-haired academic has lived in extraordinary and tragic times. Born in 1929, Habermas grew up in Nazi-ruled Germany. His father was a supporter of the regime and Jurgen himself a Hitler Youth.

The Nuremburg Trials were a revelation to the teen, and he began to ask questions about civil rights, democracy and open discourse.

We had a few questions ourselves. While in Germany preparing tomorrow's speech, Habermas took time off to respond to our queries."

from here

Habermas and Religion: An Interview with Habermas

Spotlight on public role of religion

QUESTION: The title of your speech, "The Public Role of Religion in Secular Context," might puzzle some Americans. As Robert Bellah notes, the Religious Right's strong political role in recent elections has many echoes in American history. Religious figures, for instance, were in the forefront of the abolitionist movement and the struggles for civil rights. Is this a dangerous tradition?

ANSWER: No, the U.S. is the great example for a liberal political culture with roots in an active civil society which is shaped, from the very beginning, by the vital pluralism of churches and religious associations. And the civil rights movement indeed provides striking evidence for the welcome influence of religious leaders and communities who inspire the fight for a more inclusive implementation of human rights. The research of professor Bellah and others stresses the social capital and the civic engagement of religious people. In (the United States), religious organizations do play an important role for the political socialization of citizens and the integration of society at large. At present, the Religious Right is a rather mixed phenomenon, however.

All political programs and legally binding decisions are implemented with the backing of state power. This is why they must be (at) any time justifiable in a language that is equally accessible to all citizens. The state could no longer remain impartial vis-à-vis competing worldviews and different subcultures, once a religious majority, be it in court or parliament, or within the administration, would appeal to its doctrine instead of providing secular reasons. Imposing just its own will on people of different faith or on secular citizens, such a majority could no longer claim democratic legitimacy.

You've written that "religious communities are entitled to be called 'reasonable' only if they renounce the use of violence as a means of propagating the truths of their faith." How, then, should civilization respond to the radical Islamists of al-Qaeda?

Obviously not by going to war with a regime that, albeit being bad enough anyway, had no connection with al-Qaeda. What we must do is clearly to pursue terrorists with all available means of legal repression. We must reach and hit their logistics, we must persecute, find and prosecute them. But we must not let our own society become infected by the enemy's mentality. The virus of ideological fervor must not encroach upon our liberal institutions and practices.

In one of your essays, you encouraged secular society to "retain a feeling for the articulative power of religious discourse." Would you give us some examples of this "articulative power" and its uses in a secular society?

In the past, many of our most powerful conceptions derived from religious sources. That God created man in his own image is a wording of lasting influence. The modern idea of human dignity, which is claimed equally for all and everybody, is inspired by this image of all human beings created "in the likeness of God." A similar connection exists (for example) between the individuating force of a life history, for which each person is responsible, and the expectation of the Last Judgment. In our culture the loaded meaning of an "individual," that is of a unique and irreplaceable person, has Biblical origins. Why should this rich semantic potential not continue to inform our secular culture in the future, too?

You've lived in both the United States and Germany. How would you compare the role of religion in both societies?

The religious life in our countries is shaped by contrasting traditions. While we in Germany have the Lutheran tradition of state church, you enjoy a flourishing plurality of more or less autonomous religious associations. Quite a few of them originate from dissenting sects. Even the Catholics seem to have acquired in this country some of the mental features typical of a religious minority, whereas Catholicism in Europe radiates the aura of an imperial power. The most striking difference today is, of course, the rapid spread of secularism in Europe, especially since after World War II, whereas in this country an incredibly high proportion of believers has remained at the same level throughout the last 60 years.

Don't ask me why. Sociologists discuss several hypotheses. I am not an expert in this field. My American colleague (University of Michigan philosopher) Ronald Inglehart defends the more conventional idea that secularization goes hand-in-hand with an increased existential security in economic and social living conditions; according to this expectation, more developed countries provide more secure life patterns and have a greater proportion of secularized people. This hypothesis is combined with the view that demographic changes in developed countries prevent secularization sweeping the world.

From this perspective, the surprising persistence of a comparatively large religious population in the United States is explained by two facts: first, by a higher level of risk-taking and personal vulnerability in an environment of increasing pressures for competition and increasing inequalities in distribution; and second, by an immigration from more traditional countries with higher fertility rates.

Does that difference help explain why the United States and Germany – and most of Europe, for that matter – have experienced so many fundamental disagreements on how to respond to terrorism?

From a European point of view, there is a much more trivial explanation. Allow me to put it in a nutshell: The horrible event of 9/11 has caused a well understandable shock in the population. It appears as if a clever government had exploited this condition for pursuing a strategy under false pretences, while the media failed to fulfill their critical function. If 75 percent of the Bush voters at election day still believed that Saddam Hussein had a link to al-Qaeda and was somehow responsible for the attack on the Twin Towers, something must have gone wrong.

Habermas, Quine and Heidegger - some more contrasts

Recall that in weak naturalism Habermas’ aim is to explain the transcending power of reason without reverting to the Kantian dichotomy between reason and nature and without reverting to the Kantian two realm dichotomy. In other words the aim of weak naturalism is to explain the transcending powers of reason within overall naturalistic framework. Quine and Heidegger fail in this although on different grounds.

Quine’s strong naturalism cannot account for the transcending powers of reason and consequently the ability of subjects capable of speech and actions to accomplish things rationally. Quine’s theory fails because it does not take seriously the Kantian insight about the normativity and uniqueness of human reason seriously. It does not feel any need to differentiate between the space of reason and the space of causality. However this cannot explain our ability to learn form mistakes as learning is closely related to grounds (reasons). Causality cannot explain the learning process (as well as unlearning process).

On the other hand Heidegger’s fault is that he ignores two important facts: a) on the one hand he ignores causality altogether. Causality is devoured by the all consuming powers of linguistic world disclosure. b) The linguistic world disclosure also devours the ability of subjects capable of speech and act to rationally assess and revise the given meaning. These revisionary powers have two aspects: a) on the one hand given meaning is the condition for subjects to understand and raise validity claims in the first place. In this sense it is an enabling power. b) Thus it is impossible for subjects to transcend their linguistic background in to to. In fact it would be undesirable given this background is the condition of the possibility for anything subjects are capable of doing and saying. Thus the conditions of possibility of understanding and meaning are not only limiting conditions they are also enabling conditions. They enable the formation of subjects that are capable of initiation, accomplishment and revision. Thus though the lifeworld and linguistic background is immune from objectification the process within disclosed world can lead to the indirect revision of the very conditions of possibility sometime partially sometime radically. Thus the revisions are the indirect result of accomplishments of subjects capable of speech and action but they are not the direct subjects of these processes for two reasons: a) Changes in lifeworld are affected by the plurality of subjects and their interactions. So we cannot reduce changes in lifeworld to the intentions of subjects even if their attitudes play a role in the change. b) Even with a) there is no total change as lifeworld and language cannot be objectified in to to. There can be radical changes but there is no overall subject of these changes.

Heidegger though emphasises the disclosive power of language he does not emphasise with equal force the enabling possibilities within the world disclosed and does not in turn relate the disclosive function of language with these enabling possibilities.

Finally both Heidegger and Quine ignore our non linguistic non conceptual non causal contact with the reality. The recalcitrant reality with which we are in direct contact resist both the disclosing function and our accomplishments within it. Both have to prove themselves in the face of this pro-active reality.

Habermas, Quine and Heidegger

While Habermas accuses Quine of levelling the distinction between lifeworld and objective world in the favour of the objective world he faults Heidegger for levelling it in the favour of the lifeworld. Heidegger, according to Habermas, gives so much prominence to the disclosive function of language and lifeworld that the inneroworldly phenomena go into oblivion.

Though the levelling of the distinction between lifeworld and objective world occurs form two different angles in Quine and Heidegger, the result is albeit the same. The transcending power or reason as well as the initiating and accomplishing powers of subjects capable of speech and acts are sacrificed on the one hand on the alter of the objective world and on the other hand on the alter of language and lifeworld.

The above might seem strange on the first impression but should fall in place once we understand that weak naturalism depends on dialectical relationship between lifeworld and objective world on the one hand and disclosed world and innerworldly on the other hand, a dialectical relation which is mediated through the ‘yes’ and ‘no’ of subjects capable of speech and action.

While Quine is lambasted for ignoring the world disclosive function of language, Heidegger for ignoring innerworldly learning processes that have power to revise the disclosed meaning we start with. The linguistic meaning we start with has to prove itself in the tribunal of the exchange of reasons (exchange of the yes and no’s of the participants) as well as against the recalcitrant reality. However such a “revisionory” conception of meaning is impossible either if we consider meaning in causal terms, or if we consider meaning as linguistically given.

Apel, Habermas and 'Weak" Naturalism

In a foot note to his introduction to TJ Habermas attributes his difference with Apel to the theme of 'weak' naturalism. Here is the original note:

"K.-O. Apel has pursued [epistemological project] more consistently since his program of a 'transformation of philosophy" to this day continue to align itself with a Kantian transcendental philosophy. The deeper source of our difference . . . I attribute to my opting for a "weak" naturalism." (TJ: 294 n. 10.).