"transcendent / transcendental" and Derrida

A couple of posts back Andrew Montin made the following comments about the transcendent/transcendental distinction in Derrida. I thought the comments were illuminating even though lacking any specialised knowledge of Derrida I cannot add much to them. I thought others with more Derrida knowledge might benefit from them and might have something to add (hope Andrew does not mind us putting them here).

"I just wanted to say something about the transcendent / transcendental issue in Derrida.

In "Introduction to Husserl's Origin of Geometry" (English trans.), Derrida on p.146, n.177 writes after quoting Husserl:

"If the Idea is thought here to have a transcendental sense and, as we shall see in a moment, is "beyond" only compared with the constituted moment of transcendental subjectivity, we can observe that Husserl profoundly recuperates the original scholastic sense of the transcendental (unum, verum, bonum, etc., as the transcategorial of Aristotelian logic) over and above its Kantian meaning, but also in a development of the Kantian enterprise."

So it seems that Derrida attributes the "confusion" between the transcendent and transcendental, or more precisely between the Scholastic and Kantian senses, to Husserl. At any rate, Derrida doesn't consider them mutually exclusive. The issue crops up again in "The Supplement of Copula" (Margins, p. 195):

"Here we are taking the word 'transcendental' in its most rigorous accepted sense, in its most avowed 'technicalness,' precisely as it was fixed in the course of the development of the Aristotelian problematic of the categories, including whatever remains beyond the categories. Transcendental means transcategorical. Literally, 'that which transcends every genre.' (Despite the contextual differences, this definition of the word undoubtedly invented by the Chancellor Philip, 1128, also suits the Kantian and Husserlian concepts of the transcendental.)"

In a passage in "Of Grammatology" Derrida restricts his notion of the transcendental (as he does above, but given what he says about Husserl and Kant, how restrictive is this restriction?) to the Scholastic sense when dealing with the transcendental signified:

"[T]he 'transcendental' signified ('transcendental' in a certain sense, as in the Middle Ages the transcendental - ens,unum, verum, bonum - was said to be the 'primum cognitum')..." (p. 20)

If in Derrida this doesn't lead to a "naturalization of the transcendental" or a "collapsing into a psychologization of transcendence" it is because he originally found justification for this convergence in the phenomenological tradition."

Nietzsche, Habermas and factual validity distinction . . .

Following comments by Carl Sachs were in my opinion too important to be buried in the comments section. I hope Carl does not mind me putting them here. I will comment on some of the issues raised in here later, but let me say that on the whole I am in basic agreement with Carl:

"I've been thinking about Habermas' critique of Nietzsche, in KHI. Habermas also wrote an essay on Nietzsche's epistemology in 1968, but I haven't looked at it yet.

I'd like to use Sellars' distinction, which has become important to Brandom, between sentience and sapience. Let "sentience" refer to reliable differential responses to stimuli. Let "sapience" refer to conceptually structured relations of material inference. (One of the many reasons I like this contrast is that it forces into the open that by "Nature" we do not mean inert matter (hyle, res extensa) but animal embodiment. And one of Nietzsche's great achievements, I think, was to put the question of our own animal embodiment back on the agenda.

In these terms, Habermas' critique is this: Nietzsche reduces sapience to sentience. That is, Nietzsche refuses to acknowledge the distinction between "the game of asking for and giving reasons" (Sellars) and patterns of activity and reactivity that characterize all living things. This is what is at stake when Habermas argues, in KHI, that Nietzsche psychologizes transcendence. For Nietzsche does not only psychologize transcendence, but does so in terms of a psychological theory that makes no distinction of kinds between humans and other animals. It's "will to power" all the way down.

Following that revolution in our self-understanding that is called "Darwin," Habermas acknowledges that the distinction between sapience and sentience must be a "natural" distinction. (Does this mean that we should expect cognitive science to tell us how it happened?) But Habermas wants to resist the "strong naturalism" of Quine that would level out the sapeience/sentience distinction.

On Habermas' reading, is Nietzsche a "strong naturalist" in the same camp as Quine? Reading KHI alongside TJ produces that impression. Is that fair to Nietzsche?

Ali, you wrote that the "factual' can produce what is not only sharply distinct from it but also in some sense antithesis of it." What bothers me about this way of framing the issue is this: is the opposition between sapience ("Reason") and sentience ("Nature") constitutive of the distinction? Or is rather that we moderns have inherited a certain tradition, given inflection and expression by Plato, Descartes, and Kant, that construes this distinction as an opposition? If the latter (as I suspect) then the very notion of an opposition between Nature and Reason might itself be part of the philosophy of the subject that we need to overcome.

Overcoming opposition in the name of difference? There might be a way, here, to re-frame the one-sided debate between Habermas and Nietzsche. But in order to do so one would need to show, it seems to me, that Nietzsche's acocunt of "spiritualization" is an account of the emergence of sapience from sentience. And I don't know if the notion of spiritualization is really worked out well enough, in Nietzsche, to do the work that a defender of Nietzsche would need it to do."

Running two themes together

There are two themes that run parallel in Habermas.

On the one hand:

1) There is what I call “transcendental theme” in the context of which Habemras forcefully argue for:

a) A sharp distinction between facticty and validity.
b) A sharp distinction between nature and human (social and cultural) world.
c) What following Allison we can term as absolute spontaneity of reason.
d) Spontaneity of human subjectivity and agency.
e) Typically Kantian notions of Reflection, thought and critique.

On the other hand:

2)there is a parallel “detranscendentalization theme” in Habermas as well where he equally forcefully argues for:

a) detranscendentalization of reason.
b) Embeddedness of human agency.
c) Our status as “Being in the world”
d) Critique of transcendental subjectivity and consciousness.
e) Critique of all types of metaphysics that locates reason beyond this world.

Habermas commentators tend to emphasize one theme at the expense of the other depending on their own preferences. However what needs to be done is to understand how we can systematically synthesise these two themes in one coherent “theory” without down plying one theme at the expense of the other.

If we want to do justice two both themes in Habermas then in my opinion the only way out is to emphasise and highlight the theme of “transcendence from within”. This is the only way to go in my opinion.

If we want to say on the one hand that there is a sharp distinction between ‘facticity’ and ‘validity’ while on the other hand we also want to emphasise that ultimate ‘detranscendentalsied’ character of the ‘validity’, the only way out possible is to show how a sharp distinction between facticity and validity can emerge from within, i.e. to show how ‘factual' can produce what is not only sharply distinct from it but also in some sense antithesis of it.

Read more

scientific conceptions of nature and reconciliation between "nature" and "reason"

Let us begin by a thesis that:

Concept of “nature” as provided by natural sciences is the hindrance in the way of any reconciliation between “nature” and “reason”.

Now there are, many possible ways out, but first a “caution”:

“The reconciliation is to be done without blurring distinction between “reason” and “nature”. In another words there is a distinction which should not be blurred but there is no legetimation for turning that distinction into a dichotomy.

Now here is one possible way out (on this occasion only from the perspective of “nature’ though similar should be done from the side of “reason”):

1) Reconceptualise the concept of “nature” as dealt within natural science.

1a) But the above is ambiguous: It can either mean re-conceptualizing the concept of “nature” as it is used in sciences. It would be argued that unless we arrive at a new conception of science which is qualitatively different form current physicalist reductionist conception of science we cannot effect any reconciliation between nature and reason. Marcuse and his disciples argued for such a position. Habermas is vehemently opposed to such ideas. He sees in them germs of anti modernism.

1b) or it can mean re-conceptualizing the concept of nature as a whole in such a way that the concept of nature as found in sciences would be part of an overall conception of nature (an abstraction albeit a legitimate one) and would not be regarded as equal to nature as such. Then we would have an ample room for experimenting with our idea of reconciliation between nature and reason without abandoning current notions of what science is apart from denying reductionist philosophies based on an appeal to sciences.

2) Obviously Habermas would favour (1b).

The distinction between "transcendental" and "empirical" in KHI

Note: Moving to the front due to recent comments

Even in KHI Habermas is working with a notion of "transcendental" which is also "natural":

The “knowledge-constitutive interests mediate the natural history of the human species with the logic of its self-formative process” (KHI: 196). Thus they are the conditions of the possibility of experience in the sense that they constitute the object domain of possible experience (and hence they are transcendental) but they are also the product of the process of natural evolution of human species which is ultimately “contingent” (KHI: 34). Hence the term “quasi transcendental” for these interests (TP: 8).

Habermas credits Nietzsche for doing the same; however he censures him for psychologising those interests. The following summarises Habermas’ verdict on Nietzsche regarding Knowledge and interest: “Nietzsche . . . saw the connection of knowledge and interest, but psychologised it, thus making it the basis of a metacritical dissolution of knowledge as such. Nietzsche carried to its end the self abolition of epistemology inaugurated by Hegel and continued by Marx, arriving at the self denial of reflection” (KHI: 290).

By psychologising "transcendental interests" Nietzsche collapses the distinction between "transcendental" and "empirical". In TJ the same charge would be levelled against Quine and Davidson (albeit in different terms and different tone).

detranscendentalisation . . .

Habermas’ use of the term detranscendentalisation is coupled with his critique of the transcendental subjectivity. The whole notion of detranscendentalisation presupposes the Kantian grounding of the distinction between “transcendental” and “empirical” in the two realm distinction (the realm of pure intelligibility and the phenomenal realm). It is only if this Kantian notion is presupposed that the notion of ‘detranscendentalisation’ makes any sense. Habermas says this in his discussion on Quine quite explicitly:

“The heirs of Hume are less affected than the heirs of Kant by the two problems to which the detranscendentalising move gives rise. The unsettling questions regarding the objectivity of knowledge and the difference between the world and what is innerworldly do not even arise unless we start with the assumptions of the transcendental approach in the first place.”

Habermas takes the term “detranscendentalisation” quite literally:

“Detranscendentalisation alters the very concept of the transcendental. Transcendental consciousness loses the connotation of an “otherworldly” dimension rooted in the realm of intelligible. It has come down to Earth in the form of everyday communicative practice, which is no longer sublime. Thus, the profane lifeworld has usurped the transmundane place of the noumenal. Although pragmatism retains the transcendental framing of the issue, it defuses the tension between the transcendental and empirical. To be sure, communicative language still commits participants to strong idealizations. By orienting themselves to unconditional validity claims and presupposing each other’s accountability, interlocutors aim beyond contingent and merely local contexts. But these counterfactual presuppositions are rooted in the facticity of everyday practices.”

Habermas goes on to say that:

“Deflating our original understanding of the transcendental has significant consequences. If transcendental rules are no longer something rational outside the world, they mutate into expressions of cultural forms of life and have a beginning in time. As a consequence, we may no longer without qualification claim “universality” and “necessity,” that is, objectivity for empirical cognition the possibility of which has been established transcendentally. And the transcendental conditions under which we have epistemic access to the world themselves must be conceived as something in the world.”

Six theses on Habermas, Naturalism and anti-Naturalism

Note: Moving to the front (from March 7) due to recent comments

1) In the course of the 19th century within the history of Philosophy we witness a challenge emerging to the naturalism prevailing since the early modern times. In the Kantian philosophy we find an assertion of the Platonic and rationalist belief in the “otherworldly” character of the key modern concepts like reason, freedom and reflection. For sure, Kant gave crucial concessions to the naturalism in general. He accepted its overall detranscendentalising thrust. However he insisted on preserving something crucial from this overall detranscendentalising project. The concepts of freedom and reason cannot be sustained within a thoroughgoing detranscendentalising trust of the modern philosophy. One needs to make room for a transcendental/intelligible realm where ‘reason’ and ‘freedom’ can be located. This resulted in two crucial premises on which Kantian idealism is based.

1a) Reason is not a thing of ‘this world.’ It cannot be reduced to or emerge from within it. There is a crucial distinction between empirical/natural and rational realm. It is manifested in Kant’s distinction between freedom and nature in a binary way. In sum, for Kant empirical and rational orders are exclusive.

1b) Reason requires a subject, a subject with a possibility of freedom. A subject is not only part of the ‘natural’ order but also a member of the rational order. It is through this ‘dual’ character of the subject that the natural order and rational orders are interrelated.

3) Habermas’ unique synthesis is Not unlike Kant, who at the time, had tried to combine the opposing tendencies of empiricism and rationalism, Habermas also aims to combine naturalism/empiricism and idealism/anti-naturalism.

4) On the one hand Habermas fully agrees with naturalism/empiricism in general on the issue of the ‘desublimation’ and ‘detranscendentalisation’ of the reason, freedom and our understanding of the world in general. He critiques idealism and anti-naturalism on this account throughout his writings. In this regard Habermas’ critiques the notion of the transcendental subject among other notions.

5) On the other hand Habermas also holds fast to the key idealist assumption that ‘reason’ cannot be reduced to the ‘empirical’ and it is important to maintain the transcending powers of reason. He also insists that reason and freedom are closely related and he insists on that in order to preserve the transcending power of reason. We need to hold to the notion of subject capable of accomplishments a subject that is not merely a ‘cultural dope.’ Thus Habermas aims to preserve the conception of a subject capable of accomplishments even when he accepts the critique of subject aimed at the Kantian tradition.

6) Habermas maintains that the naturalist project of desublimation and detranscendentalisation of reason can be combined with the Kantian project of preserving the transcending powers of reason. Habermas’ crucial, central and unique insight is that the Kantian distinction between empirical and transcendental can be preserved without ascribing to the Kantian distinction between empirical and intelligible world/order. This would result, claims Habermas, in a new synthesis where we would be able to combine the best of empiricism and idealism, naturalism, and anti-naturalism without however ascribing to their shortcomings. Habermas calls this position a weak naturalism in his most recent writings.

Henrich on Habermas: some observations

Note: Moving to the front (from Feb 24) due to recent comments

“. . . the capacity for language can only develop along with the spontaneous emergence of a self relation. This emergence in turn requires explanation. And this world require us to speak of an implicit self-relation, which already appears or function at the most elementary level of language acquisition. For it is clear that the capacity to use the grammatical first-person singular (the pronoun ‘I’) is acquired only at late stage in the process of language acquisition. If the existence of a self-relation were dependent on, and determined by, the acquisition of this capacity, then the thesis of the priority of interaction would be unproblematic; it would be a trivial and obvious truth.” (Dieter Henrich, "What is Metaphysics - What is Modernity? Twelve Theses against Jürgen Habermas" in Habermas: A Critical Reader, p. 311).

Consdier however the following:

•Habermas does not deny the biological/physiological/neurological bases of human spontaneity (freedom). Evidently language use and capacity for it presupposes certain degree of freedom and capacity for it. However such capacity is intermeshed, from the start with and ultimately undifferentiated from the capacity to use language. [As Habermas notes: "By no means does (linguistic analysis of the development of consciousness) exclude prelinguistic roots of cognitive development for early childhood: even with primitive rule consciousness, a rudimentary relation-to-self must already develop itself. Such ontogenetic assumptions do not, however, prejudice the description of the functioning of metacognitive abilites at the developmental stage of the mastered mother tongue, where achievements of intelligence are already linguistically organized." (Postmetaphysical Thinking, p. 27 n 18).].

•What Habermas is saying is that human spontaneity (freedom) cannot be explained in terms of biological/physiological/neurological capacity alone. A fuller explanation must involve understanding of the processes individuation through socialization (which obviously involves language use).

• In a sense for Habermas, in a quite contrast with Henrich, the proposition that there is a biological/physiological/neurological basis of human freedom is “unproblematic,” in fact it is “trivial and obvious truth.” What needs explanation is how this capacity grows into a full fledged capability in the face of a thorough going socialization which every individual under goes during his lifetime.

•In order to explain the existence of spontaneity in the fullest sense one needs to understand it in the context of our being in the world and our being with the others.

The above is borne out by what Habermas says here:

“I see the . . . far – reaching contribution of Mead in his having taken up themes that can be found in Humboldt and Kierkegaard: individuation is pictured not as the self.-realization of an independently acting subject carried out in isolation and freedom but as a linguistically mediated process of socialization and the simultaneous constitution of a life history that is conscious of itself. The identity of socialized individuals forms itself simultaneously in the medium of coming to an understanding with others in language and in the medium of coming to a life-historical and intersubjective understanding with oneself. Individuality forms itself in relations of intersubjective acknowledgement and of intersubjectively mediated self-understanding.” (Postmetaphysical Thinking, pp. 152-153).

H-H-H tradition and Habermas

Cristina Lafont describes the two founding insights of the German tradition of language which she following Charles Taylor calls Hamann-Herder-Humboldt tradition, in the following way:

“1. The view of language presupposed by the philosophy of consciousness is subjected to a critique. On this view, the role of language is relegated to that of a tool mediating the subject-object relation; consequently, language becomes a medium for the mere expression of prelinguistic thoughts. The critique of this standpoint arises by regarding language as constitutive of thought, and by recognizing accordingly the double status of language as both empirical and transcendental. In virtue of this status, language claims to the constitutive role traditionally attributed to consciousness, to a transcendental subject.

2. Furthermore, this transformation amounts to a detranscendentalization of reason. Reason comes to be unavoidably situated in the midst of a plurality of natural languages, which cannot guarantee the unity of reason in the same way as could the extraworldly strandpoint of a transcendental subject.” (The linguistic turn in Hermeneutic tradition, p. 3).

Habermas basically accepts both insights of the tradition however emphasises the need of ‘transcendence form within’ in the wake of the above by stressing an equal importance of innerworldly learning processes which have capability of altering (in part) the language which is the condition of the possibility of these innerworldy process. This is not possible without a thoroughgoing ‘naturalism’ of Habermas which bars him from accepting a static view of language as the condition of world disclosure.

continuity between language and the world

Joachim Renn’s following comments (in his extremely insightful review of TJ which I have discovered only a month or so ago) on how to ground Habermas’ methodological distinction between understanding and observation in his ontology of weak naturalism seems to me quite fascinating:

“Habermas stresses – again in accord with Putnam – primarily the normative status of rationality to avoid naturalistic interpretations of the relation between the biological history of humanity and the history of a reconstructive (internal) perspective with an (external) observational point of view, i.e. the continuity between nature and culture, on a ‘meta-theoretical’ level (TJ: pp. 38-9). The strategic value of this argument lies both in avoiding the reduction of inner-worldly learning to the evolutionary adaptation of the human species to its environment, and in maintaining the connection between rational justification (as an emergent level in comparison to a natural history of adaptation) and the problems in the real world.” (One world is Enough, p. 490).

Thus, the unique Habermasian synthesis depends on the realisation of continuities (and discontinuities) between language and action on the one and language and the world on the other hand.

Reconciliation with Nature: Habermas and Adorno

I have been arguing that Habermas’ weak naturalism can be interrelated as an attempt at reconciliation with nature. Here is a counter claim and my response.

Axel Honneth claims that:

“[Adorno’s] critique of instrumental rationality ultimately presupposes that only a condition of profound liberation in society can qualify as a medium for a reified common sense, i.e; as an Eindenken der Natur. Only on aesthetic cooperation with nature would allow the domination-free interpretation of inner nature. Thus, the key to Adorno’s philosophy of history is the theme of “reconciliation with nature.” Habermas, however, distrusts the idea of reconciliation. He suspects that an aesthetic communication with nature extends the model of social interaction to natural contexts, and thus overtaxes it. If the idea of reconciliation relies for its viability only on an earlier, originally theological, and theoretically no longer tenable notion, then, of course, Adorno’s criteria for a truly rational society, as introduced into his philosophy of history, also becomes impractical.” (Axel Honneth, “Communication and reconciliation Habermas’ critique of Adorno,” Telos (Spring, 1979), 45-61, here 50, emphasis retained.).

The roots of Habermas’ distrust with the idea of reconciliation as Honneth claims can be found in the way the conception of ‘reconciliation with nature’ is defined and not with the concept a such. After claiming that Adorno’s central project is reconciliation with nature and that Habermas distrusts the very notion of reconciliation, Honneth defines reconciliation as “an aesthetic communication with nature”. Obviously Habermas is not going to like this notion of reconciliation because it is not only goes back to a mythic conception of nature as some sort of proto subjectivity, it also confuses between a 'distinction' and 'dichotomy'.

Habermas’ conception of reconciliation is an ontological conception (not a moral conception) and does not require ‘communication’ with nature. It only requires us to show the ‘co-belonging’ of human beings and nature and to construe the ‘origins’ of human beings and their reason and their way of life as natural in a fairly broad sense without, however, blurring the distinction between humans and objective nature. Habermas’ thrusts for reconciliation comes form the context of attempts to overcome cartesianism which creates dichotomy between thought and being. Kant’s attempt at reconceptualsing the relation between thought and being does not only create its own dichotomies but also rests on a conception of transcendental subjectivity which is incompatible with the detranscendentalising tendencies of modern life forms. This provides the immediate context of Habermas’ attempts at reconciliation with nature.

Habermas’ share this project with post Kantians (including Romantics) such as Schelling and Hegel but sides with Hegel. Andrew Bowie in his excellent review of McDowell’ book Mind and World writes:

“Being familiar with our own spontaneity must, as Fichte insisted, be prior to any sense in which we can talk of the world in such terms, otherwise it is impossible to explain how one would experience the resistance of the object world in intuition as resistance in the first place. At the same time, though, as Novalis will suggest, the spontaneity must also – precisely because we are part of the world – be an aspect of the world: a world of nature which does not involve more than causal relations could ever give rise to the spontaneity of the space of reasons. The alternative to this insistence on the irreducibility of spontaneity is to make the Hegelian claim that subjectivity and objectivity ground each other, so that I gain my awareness of my spontaneity solely from cognitive engagement with the world.” (Andrew Bowie, “ John McDowell’s “Mind and World” and early Romantic Epistemology,” Revue Internationale de Philosophie 50(197), 515-554, here 535.)

Habermas would accept Novalis’ contention that “a world of nature which does not involve more than causal relations could never give rise to spontaneity of the space of reason.”. He will side with Hegel against Fichte in insisting that spontaneity’s ground is nature. Habermas would reject any attempt to locate proto subjectivity in nature in the manner of Romantics and Schelling although he would agree with Schelling that in order to explain spontaneity nature must be construed as more than “sum of “conditioned conditions””(ibid.). However, Habermas explains this fact in non metaphysical terms by adopting a relational and functional approach rather than succumbing to objective idealism (or objective materialism).

Rawls, Habermas and Bobbio in an Age of War

There is an important article on Habermas and Rawls here and some interesting discussion here

If I get some spare time I would throw few comments, however that is it for now.

Habermas' critique of empiricism and idealism in KHI

The purpose of this post is to briefly review Habermas’ simultaneous critique of both empiricism and idealism in his early work KHI. I shall do this by first indicating elements of his critique of both empiricism and idealism and then point towards elements that relate to Habermas' concern in this works of going beyond empiricism idealism divides.

1.1 KHI has been rightly regarded as a critique of positivism. Habermas here makes his famous pronouncement that to allow positivism is to deny the possibility of reflection. In a sense KHI can be positively read as Habermas’ extended plea for the reinstatement of 'reflection' in mainstream philosophy and social sciences.

Furthermore, Habermas’ conception of 'reflection' in KHI implies certain vintage point, certain distance vis a vis the object of the critique (and the possibility of any such distance).

1.2 On the other hand, and at the same time, KHI is also an attempt at 'naturalising' (in a broad sense) transcendental philosophy. Habermas’ chapters on Hegel and Marx are meant to "situate" Kant (or the transcendental empirical distinction in other words)within "this world". In this context Habermas famously mentions Hegel’s dictum against Kant that doing epistemology in the Kantian sense is to claim to know before knowing (KHI: 7).

1.3 Naturally the dual aim of Habermas to try to establish on the one hand the notion of reflection and self reflection that allows for the possibility of distance between not only subject and object but also subject towards itself and other subjects, on the other hand, he wants this to be done in a way that is compatible with the overall naturalism of his position. This evidently requires something Habermas later called “transcendence from within.” Though the name does not exist yet, the vision is already present in KHI.

1.4 A crucial move is to try to relate interest and knowledge, reason and interest. If reason and interest are not exclusive then it might be that the relation of reason to nature can be established. On the other hand Habermas also points towards the fact that there are interests, which are transcendental and not just particularistic. Habermas’ strategy is to try to establish the transcendental character of certain interests is aimed two ways: on the one hand interests relate reason to nature, on the other hand there are certain transcendental interest that cannot be equated with particular interests, hence paving the way for establishing a distinction between empirical and transcendental within an overall naturalism.

1.5 In other words if knowledge can been shown to be related to interests and if knowledge can be considered as something which emerges out of interests and if the power of critical reflection can be shown to be one of the ‘natural’ interests, then it would go long way in overcoming the dichotomy between nature and reason, interest and knowledge.

Though Habermas’ project in KHI fails it does not result in his abandonment of the overall aim of overcoming the dichotomy between nature and reason. In other words in Habermas’ failure in KHI does not deter him in his effort to go beyond empiricism and idealism.

Rousseau and Habermas

Henrich in his critique of Habermas regards him as a Philosopher of harmony who does not face the discordant character of modern forms of life and through his conception of lifeworld avoids the question of how to overcome these inevitable discords that characterise modern life. “Lifeworld” according to Henrich is a term “which has this avoidance written into its profile.” (Dieter Henrich, "What is Metaphysics - What is Modernity? Twelve Theses against Jürgen Habermas" in Habermas: A Critical Reader, p. 298).

Habermas in his reply however characterises lifeworld as a “naturelike wellspring for problematizations of (the) familiar background to the world as a whole. . . .” (Postmetaphysical Thinking, p.16 ). Thus lifeworld has dual character, on the one hand it is a taken for granted background without which no argumentation, agreement or dissention is possible (ibid; p. 38), on the other hand it is also a wellspring for unceasing problematization (this would vary from lifeworld to lifeworld of course).

Henrich, however, takes only one side of lifeworld and accuses Habermas’ of avoiding the problem of incessant and inherent discords by presupposing false complacencies. In this regard Henrich urge us to recall the “way in which the metaphysical projects of modernity are constructed”:

“It is clear that all the subsequent theories which derived from Kant’s thought aimed to serve the spontaneously emerging thinking, and resolve the conflicts, of a form of life oriented by reason, and that they acknowledged the task of justification . . . . What made them so impressive, and gave them their superiority, was not an abstract notion of the Absolute as a supersynthesis. It was rather the way in which they were able to disclose the dynamics of conscious life and to render it more transparent to itself – a life which has to begin amidst conflicts which are irresolvable at the first level. Although they took their inspiration from Kant, they also incorporated impulses deriving from Rousseau, the theorist of conflict par excellence.” (pp. 300-301).

Here Henrich seems to be counterpoising Habermas the thinker of harmony and avoidance of conflicts to Rousseau the "theorist of conflict par excellence". It is interesting to note that while some of the vast literature on Rousseau in the English language has emphasised the ‘theorist of conflict’ side of Rousseau most literature rather characterises Rousseau as a thinker not of conflict but a thinker who suppresses plurality and dissent and tries to impose monolithic concepts to forge harmony.

Many people have compared this homogenising Rousseau with Habermas whose conception of consensus as the aim of mutual understanding has been interpreted as aimed at a similar sort of homogenisation.

Patchen Markell in his excellent article “Contesting Consensus: Rereading Habermas on the public sphere,” Constellations Volume 3, No 3, 1997: 377-400, goes a long way to dispel this stereotype of Habermas as the thinker of consensus (as against conflict and dissent). Markell in this respect stresses the importance of focusing on the process of communication and not just on the end product (agreement). He also emphasises the importance of ‘unpredictability’ and ‘openness’ in Habermas’ account of communicative action. Markell also stresses the reflexive and fallible character of communicative action in Habermas. The whole essay is worth reading. I will try to comment on portions of the essay in future posts.

Habermas’ weak naturalism is an ontological thesis

•Habermas’ weak naturalism is an ontological thesis (i.e. it presupposes a certain conception of ‘what is the case’). However it is not ontological in the sense that it does not aim to describe immutable and universal essences of things.

The above requires two things:

1)It requires an explanation of how the “realm of causality” and the “space of reason” (freedom) are related, in a determinate way. Or in other words, its viability hinges on an explanation of the possibility of the emergence of spontaneity (freedom) and consequently ‘space of reason’ without recourse to supernaturalism of any kind. Thus it requires the rejection of both the Christian transcendent God (for example) and Kant’s two-world solution. This is the consequence of the commitment to naturalism understood in a broad sense as a thesis that rejects all kinds of supernaturalisms.

2) It needs to be shown how the ‘realm of causality’ and the ‘realm of reason’ despite being primordially related and situated on the same natural plain are mutually exclusive. This is another way of saying that we need to maintain Kant’s distinction between nature and reason however without espousing his ontological dualism. This is Habermas’ preservation of the ‘essence’ of idealistic insights about reason within an overall naturalism/materalism.

Hence:

1a) The above (1), requires developing a concept of freedom that does not treat ‘limits’ as opposite of freedom but rather as the conditions of the possibility of freedom, this entails rejection of a merely negative conception of freedom as the absence of limitations. This is important because if we keep working with a concept of spontaneity defined as “unconditioned condition” there is no way we can avoid either reverting back to Kantian dualism (by positing the realm of pure intelligibility) or alternatively opting for what McDowell has called ‘bald naturalism’.

1b) Evidently the above (1a) presupposes detranscendentalisation of the Kantian subject.

1c) The above (1a) only shows the possibility of freedom (space of freedom) emerging from within ‘nature’ it does not show its actuality.

1d) A conception of freedom explained (1a) is an ontological/descriptive conception of freedom.

2a) The (2) requires adopting methodological dualism between the participant perspective and the observer’s perspective: “As soon as we act out of . . . “with an orientation to reaching mutual understanding,” we cannot at the same time act from the objectivating perspective of an observer.” (TJ: 97).

2b) From within the participant perspective by analysing the process of reaching understanding about something in the world with the alter, it can be shown that:

2c) There exists a causality quite unlike natural causality which may be termed as causality of reason (following Kant) and which does not partake in the causality of nature. The participants in communicative action are affected by this force without force and are immune from natural causality as long as they are with bound within the participant perspective.

2d) From within the participant perspective it can also be shown how transcendence from within and into this world is possible.

The above analysis requires further presupposition that:

3)“the biological endowment and the cultural way of life Homo sapiens have a “natural” origin and can in principle be explained in terms of evolutionary theory.” (TJ: 28).

3a)Thus it presupposes continuity between culture and nature without obliterating distinction between them (ibid.).

4) Habermas’ weak naturalism as described above is an ontological/descriptive conception and though is the precondition of Habermas’ justification of modernity it is not in itself a prescriptive conception. It is in principle compatible with views quite different in their prescriptive agendas.

Reconciliation and Consensus

Dieter Henrich in his critique of Habermas points among other things to the fact that one of the fundamental experiences of modernity has been awareness of conflicts. Modern philosophy according to Henrich in part emerges to meet the challenge of resolving these conflicts:

“Philosophy did not miss as mere illusion or confusion the discovery that the self understanding of human beings leads to conflicts between equally convincing self-descriptions. These self-descriptions apply to a being who – either by way of unavoidable presuppositions or through spontaneous self reflection – arrives at concepts which can be applied to himself.” (Dieter Henrich, "What is Metaphysics - What is Modernity? Twelve Theses against Jürgen Habermas" in Habermas: A Critical Reader, p. 297).

Modern philosophy endeavours to overcome and resolve these conflicts by arriving at “some more comprehensive dimension in which these conflicts finally be resolved, one which would make possible a self description which reconciled the primary self descriptions.” (p. 298).

Habermas, according to Henrich, rather than try to reconcile different inevitable self descriptions presupposes such reconciliation form the outset. Thus Henrich dubs Habermas’ strategy as one of ‘avoidance’. As a proof of it he points to Habermas’ conception of ‘lifeworld’:

“‘Lifeworld’ is a term which has this avoidance written into its profile. For it declares the essential point of departure for all speech acts to be a totality which is in principle harmonious.” (ibid.).

Is Henrich justified in his criticism? I would like to make only a basic contention at this point:

Habermas’ basic insight (which he has learnt from Heidegger and Gadamer) is that even the possibility of conflict presupposes some sort of consensus or shared background without which it even does not make sense to talk of conflict. The very idea of conflict (and conflict resolution) presupposes a minimum consensus. Thus in my view it is not that Habermas avoids conflicts by asserting the primacy of consensus or shared horizon but rather make explicit the necessary context which is presupposed by any attempt at conflict resolution and reconciliation.

irreducibility of the distinction between ‘causal’ and ‘rational’

Naturalism Habermas rejects is a reductive naturalism. Naturalism is reductive when it ultimately reduces a ‘rational explanation’ to a 'causal explanation'.

This does not necessarily mean that reductive naturalism does not recognize the distinction between ‘causal’ and ‘rational’ explanations. However it believes that, in principle, ‘rational’ can be explained in terms of a ‘causal’ one. Hence a reductive naturalism gives priority to ‘causal’ in the natural order (natural in a broad sense as opposed to supernatural order).

Habermas on the other hand refuses to accept the priority accorded to causal explanation and hence asserts that even in principle ‘rational’ cannot be explained in terms of ‘causal’. He believes in the ultimate irreducibility of the distinction between ‘causal’ and ‘rational’. In this Habermas sides with great idealists, particularly Kant, who reject the claim that ‘reason’ can be explained in terms of ‘causal’.

However Habermas unlike Kant does not posit two worlds or two realms to establish this irreducibility of ‘rational’ to ‘causal’. By refusing to posit world of pure intelligence in order to prove the irreducibility of ‘rational’ Habermas remains within an overall naturalist position, where naturalist is understood in the broad sense.

According to this reading reductionist naturalism is the one which equates ‘natural’ with ‘causal’ and then aspires to explain everything else in terms of ‘causal’. Habermas on the other hand construes ‘natural’ in a broad sense and considers ‘causal’ only one facet of ‘natural’. Accordingly he can claim that ‘rational’ is natural but not ‘causal’. This I believe is the essence of Habermas’ so called ‘weak naturalism’.

Transcendental approach

“ . . . any transcendental approach, in the last analysis, precludes that there can be such thing as truthfulness to reality in the sense of postulated by philosophical realism. Correspondence theories of truth tend to hypostatise fact as entities in the world. It is the intention and inner logic of an epistemology reflecting upon the conditions of possible experience as such to uncover the objectivistic illusions of such a view” (Jürgen Habermas, A Postscript to Knowledge and Human Interests, Phil. Soc. Sci. 3(1973): 157-189, here, 180, emphasis retained).

comments to follow..

categorical meaning and the meaning of truth claims

In his posscript to Knowledge and Human Interests [Jürgen Habermas, A Postscript to Knowledge and Human Interests, Phil. Soc. Sci. 3(1973): 157-189] Habermas makes a crucial distinction between the problem of object constitution and validity (Geltung). Here Habermas first time connects the problem of the verification of truth with the meaning of validity claims. According to Habermas, “the meaning of truth and untruth of a statement does not consist in the conditions guaranteeing the objectivity of our experience but in the possibility of argumentative corroboration of a truth claim which is falsifiable in principle” (ibid: 166). Habermas goes on to further differentiate between and contrast the categorical meaning of proposition and the meaning of discursive truth claims: “the categorical meaning of proposition is connected with the species of objects of experience of which the predicate is something. By contrast, the meaning of a discursive truth claim embodied in statement is connected with the existence of states of affairs (Sachverhalte) which we render in those statements” (ibid.). Thus “in every speech act, categorical meaning is contained in the prepositional content, whereas the truth claim is contained in the performative part. For the categorical meaning always reflects the way in which we experience something in the world-as a thing or event, as a person or as that person’s utterance. The truth claim on the other hand, reflects the intersubjective validity, on the basis of which something may be predicated of objects of experience, i.e. that a state of affairs is indeed a fact” (ibid: 166-167, emphasis in italics by Habermas, emphasis in bold added).

Habermas returns to this distinction between experience and judgment in his recent work (particularly in Truth and Justification) on which more later.

Apel and Habermas

I am reading at the moment, among other things, Eduardo Mendieta's book on Apel entitled Adventures of Transcendental Philosophy: Karl-Otto Apel's Semiotics and Discourse Ethics. While reading the book the following caught my attention:

"In Jürgen Habermas' own words, " under the living philosophers no one has more lastingly determined the direction of my thinking that Karl-Otto Apel." This is a comment to a dedication that "explains itself": "To Karl-Otto Apel on completing the sixth decade of of teaching - with thanks for three decades of instruction (Belebrung)." These words of dedication and acknowledgment that Habermas' Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action carried on its original German edition were unfortunately omitted from the English translation." (p. 103).

Does anybody know why the dedication was omitted from the English translation?

Addendum: An interesting story of Mendieta's book told by Mendieta himself, can be found here. Incidentally it already provides a plausible answer to the question I had raised in the post. However, further information comments etc. are still welcome. Also see the following reviews of Mendieta's Apel book:

Problems and Prospects in Critical Theory: Eduardo Mendieta’s study of Karl-Otto Apel

Normative pragmatism and Naturalism

Brandom makes following distinctions between various types of pragmatism:

Methodological pragmatism:

“Pragmatism of this sort seems semantics as answering to pragmatics in the sense that pragmatic theory supplies the explanatory target of semantic theory – and hence is the ultimate source of the criteria of adequacy according to which the success of that theoretical enterprise is to be assessed.” (Robert Brandom, "Pragmatics and pragmatisms" in Hilary Putnam: Pragmatism and Realism, pp. 40-58 here p. 42).


Semantic pragmatism:

“A related, but I believe distinguishable, sot of pragmatism takes as its point of departure the plausible view that it is the way practitioners use expressions that makes them mean what they do.”

Fundamental pragmatism:

“It is characteristic of pragmatists in the broad sense to see knowing how as having a certain kind of explanatory priority over knowing that. This is one influential form taken by an insistence on the explanatory primacy of the practical over theoretical. Explicit theoretical beliefs can be made intelligible only against a background of implicit practical abilities.” (ibid. p. 46).

Normative pragmatism:

“any pragmatics whose concept of practice is a serious candidate for playing three roles [methodological, semantic and fundamental] must employ normative vocabulary.” (ibid. p. 48).

[Brandom takes Kant to be the greatest exponent of this kind of pragmatism].

Normative pragmatism and Naturalism:

However Brandom adds that normative pragmatism is compatible with naturalism:

“It should not be assumed that commitment to a normative pragmatics is incompatible with pursuing both one’s pragmatic theory and one’s semantic theory in a naturalistic spirit. Normative pragmatics is incompatible with naturalism only in the context of some sort of dualistic understanding of the relation between normative and the natural. One might accept that the discursive practice to which methodological, semantic and fundamental pragmatism are addressed must be susceptible to specification in normative terms . . . without giving up hope for an ultimately naturalistic account of the applicability of such normative assessments. (Of course, a great deal will turn on what one means by ‘naturalistic’. . . .)” [ibid. pp. 49-50].

Elsewhere when Brandom opposes naturalism to normative accounts it is clear he is using naturalism in a narrow sense (this is shown by his contrasting non naturalistic normative account to supernaturalism).

“I don’t think there is a natural scientific story to be told about this sort of conceptual normativity. But that is not to say that it is supernatural. I think it is an essentially social phenomenon . . . .” An interview with Brandom.

In what sense Habermas is a pragmatist?

Habermas’ enterprise has often been described as Kantian pragmatism in recent days. The Kantian side of the equation is pretty clear however there is not much agreement on “in what sense Habermas is a pragmatist”. We had posted earlier some thoughts on this here and here.

In a recent excellent article on Habermas’s “Kantian pragmatism” Kenneth Baynes concludes his argument in the following way:

“Habermas, like Brandom, locates normativity in the attitudes we suppose actors to take up towards one another – there is no normativity apart from the statuses instituted via these attitudes. For Habermas, these attitudes are importantly and irreducibly second personal in that to adopt the deliberative stance is to treat them as “coparticipants” in the “space of reasons.” In adopting the deliberative stance, we view others as at least virtual participants in the exchange of reasons that must convince us as well. So construed, the deliberative stance, generally – can be seen as a “pragmatic” rendering of Kant’s claim that, insofar as we view ourselves as capable of acting for reasons at all, we must view ourselves as acting under the idea of freedom.”("The transcendental turn: Habermas' "Kantian pragmatism" in The Cambridge Companion to Critical Theory, pp. 194-218, here p. 215).

The use of ‘pragmatic’ in above can be described as vague at best. However Robert Brandom has recently made a distinction between two senses of pragmatism which in my opinion can be very useful in understanding Habermas’ pragmatism. Brandom writes:

“Pragmatism can be thought of narrowly: as a philosophical school of thought centered on evaluating beliefs by their tendency to promote success at the satisfaction of wants, whose paradigmatic practioners were the classical American triumvirate of Charles Peirce, William James and John Dewey. But pragmatism can also be thought of more broadly: as a movement centered on the primacy of the practical, initiated already by Kant, whose twentieth-century avatars includes not only Peirce, James and Dewey, but also the early Heidegger, the later Wittgenstein and such figures as Quine, Sellars, Davidson and Rorty. I think the broader version of pragmatism is much more important and interesting than the narrower one.”("Pragmatics and pragmatisms" in Hilary Putnam: Pragmatism and Realism, pp. 40-58 here p. 41, emphasis added).

I think if pragmatism is defined as a movement that gives primacy to the practical then certainly Habermas is pragmatism. I believe this is the main sense in which Habermas is pragmatist.

Brandom goes on to further explicate the meaning of practical in the following way:

“It is characteristic of pragmatism in the broad sense to see knowing how as having a certain kind of explanatory priority of knowing that. This is one influential form taken by an insistence on the explanatory primacy of the practical over the theoretical. Explicit theoretical beliefs can be made intelligible only against a background of implicit practical abilities. Pragmatism in this sense – call it ‘fundamental pragmatism’ – is opposed to the kind of Platonistic intellectualism that seeks to explain practical abilities in terms of some sort of grasp of principles; some sort of knowing that behind each bit of know how.” (ibid; p. 46).

The above squares nicely with Habermas’ prioritization of know how on know that in developing his formal pragmatics.

Moreover Brandom considers the above to be the heart of Heidegger’s Being and Time:

“Opposing intellectualism by seeing the capacity to know or believe that something is the case as parasitic on more primitive kinds of know how – capacities to do something that is not yet saying, thinking or believing anything – is the basic thesis of the first part of Heidegger’s Being and Time.” (ibid.).

This is in tune with what we said earlier (here) about relation between Heidegger and Habermas and the primacy of action in both. This also explains Habermas’ insistence that Heidegger "Heidegger also praticipated in the anti-Pltantonic thrust of pragmatism".

A critique of Joel Whitebooks' critique of Habermas

Joel Whitebook argues in his seminal piece “The problem of Nature in Habermas” [ Joel Whitebook, “The Problem of Nature in Habermas” Telos (SUM 79); 41-69.] that “Habermas’ transcendentalism necessarily precludes any reconciliation with nature.” (ibid; p. 41). He asserts that Habermas’ transcendental justification of critical theory comes at the expense of the ideal of early critical theorists (particularly Marcuse) [Whitebook does not consider Adorno or Horkheimer as propagating such vision however Dews and Dallmayr do think so] of reconciliation with nature. In this context Whitebook calls for “a non-regressive reconciliation with nature.” (ibid, p. 42). Such reconciliation with nature would be non-regressive, claims Whitebook, to the extent that it would be able to treat nature in non-instrumental terms while avoiding slide back to what he terms as “pre-rational, e.; mythical, forms of thought.” (ibid.).

However in my view Habermas is precisely aiming at ‘a non-regressive reconciliation with nature.’ Whitebook thinks otherwise. He thinks that Habermas’ transcendentalism bars any such solution (even if Habermas’ have tried in this direction). His acceptance of transcendentalism involves him in the paradox “that the constituted constitute the constituter. An anthropology of knowledge, if it is to avoid a vicious circle, cannot simply be an empirical theory, but must contain a “reflective” moment as well.” (ibid; p. 48). However this criticism is based on a misconception that Habermas is working with a conception of freedom that is essentially Kantian and Hegelian a conception of freedom that pits limits against freedom (and the capacity for reflection). However, Habermas goes beyond a conception of freedom that pits limits against freedom and thus does not have to be involved in a paradox in which Kant and Hegel would have involved if they had tried to “situate” the constituted and constituting on the same plane.

Whitebook’s above formulation is based on an implicit assumption that “reflection” cannot emerge from what is “empirical”. However this is based on a purely Kantian assumption according to which reflection cannot emerge form an empirical reality and that is the reason why Kant had to look for spontaneity in the realm of pure intelligibility: “. . . the dimension of historical facts, the “constitution” of which is to be explained, is the very dimension in which the transcendental subject of this constitution is itself “constituted” empirically. That this, from the standpoint of a transcendental critique of knowledge, is a paradoxical statement, is certainly not a decisive counter-argument: it merely shows the limits of transcendental philosophy.” Albrecht Wellmer, “Communications and Emancipation: Reflections on the linguistic turn in critical theory” in John O'Neill ed. On critical theory (Lanham : University Press of America, c1989), 231-263, here 249, emphasis retained). What Wellmer says about historical sciences is also true about knowledge in general.

Moreover Habermas in his post KHI writings ascribes “constitution” not to an “individual” or “specie” subject but to language and lifeworld, which are anonymous to the extent that there is no ‘subject’ of lifeworld and language as a whole. This second move absolves Habermas’ of the charge that might still be levelled against Marx for example who though detranscendentalises the subject, nevertheless attributes to it powers which are incompatible with human finitude as we have come to know since then.

Combined with the above two theses Habermas’ is able to circumvent the dilemma or paradox to which Whitebook refers. It was a dilemma for Kant for example to conceive subject as both constituted and constituting precisely because for him limits are the contrary of freedom so a free (constituting) subject cannot be located at the same plane as that of constituted subject (empirical subject). Hence Kant had to locate his constituting subject in the world of pure intelligibility and hence create a two-world (two - realm) dualism, reconciliation of which and demonstrating connection between which consumed rest of Kant’s energies. However there is no such need for Habermas to locate a free subject in the world of pure intelligibility precisely because he does not see freedom and limits in dualistic terms Kant saw. Thus for Habermas it is not a paradox in itself if empirical is construed as transcendental or transcendental as empirical.

Thus empirical subject are constituted in the context of lifeworld and language, and as far as lifeworld and language form the background of the subjects thus constituted and are not available to them as manipulable and observable entities, they act as “transcendental(s)”. However lifeworld and language are empirical (natural) in the following senses: a) they are located in “this world” and not in the realm of intelligibility which is above the world of phenomenon. b) Subjects formed within language and lifeworld are in turn capable of affecting lifeworld and language to certain extent (this is what Habermas means when he refers to the interpretive accomplishments of subjects formed within language and lifeworld). c) Thus lifeworld and language provide both resources and constraints.

Hence, language and lifeworld are simultaneously empirical/natural and transcendental(s). As far as language and lifeworld act from behind the back of actors they provide the condition of the possibility of not only their actions but also the conditions of the possibility of their agency and remain beyond their intervention. However this agency in turn can affect both language and lifeworld to a certain extent in the sense that both lifeworld and language can be partially objectivsed and thus affected by the agency formed within them. Thus Habermas’ “transcendentalism” is not engulfed by the dilemmas typical of Kantian transcendentalism.

Whitebook’s objection is in part based on confusing two senses of empirical: empirical in a broad sense and empirical in a narrow sense. Empirical in a narrow sense is equated by Habermas with objective knowledge and in this sense empirical can not contain “reflective” moment. However in a broad sense empirical cannot be equated with objective knowledge. Language and lifeworld are empirical to the extent that they can be partially objectivsed however they are not empirical in the narrow sense because their objectivisation is always partial and never complete. Thus it is not a paradox for empirical in this broad sense to contain a ‘reflective’ moment.

Whitebook then goes on to assert that in order to avoid the above paradox Habermas posits the conception of nature in itself thus differentiating objectivised nature and subjective nature from nature in itself . This, however, does not overcome the dilemma mentioned above (“The Problem of Nature in Habermas,” 48-49.). However this positing of nature in itself is in turn open to further objections and dilemmas of its own. Whitebook formulates these further objections deriving on McCarthy’s well known grilling of Habermas’ conception of nature in itself. As Whitebook puts it:

“. . . a serious difficulty arises concerning pre-human nature. Does the “materialist” claim that pre-human nature produces subjective, as McCarthy asks, not throw Habermas back into pre-critical ontology that violates this transcendental posture? The question cannot, account for the transition from pre-human to human nature. In both cases, he wants to say more than can legitimately be said from within the confines of his position.”(ibid; p. 49).

Now this objection even if has some relevance in the context of Habermas’ early work (for example his account in KHI) has no relevance whatsoever in the context of Habermas’ later mature work including TCA and TJ. The reason is succulently put forth by James Swindal:

“Habermas argues that learning processes must be grounded, not in a metaphysical concept of nature, a position which the later Peirce adopted, but in actual argumetnation with others about practical conflict. Habermas claims that we cannot break out of the sphere of language and argumentation: “we can only establish the relation to reality, which is not equivalent to ‘existence,’ by projecting a ‘transcendnece from within’”.
“For Habermas this view of inner transcendence both respects the ‘objectivity’ of the intersubjectivity of understanding that has become reflexive and avoids the ontologization of reality.”(Reflection Revisited: Jürgen Habermas’s Discursive Theory of Truth, p. 97 emphasis in the original).

Thus Habermas’ positing of reality from within is not ontological in the traditional sense and is compatible with the Kantian claim that we do not have access to pre-mediated reality.

continued from here

Habermas' critique of traditonal ontology in KHI

In this inaugural lecture at Frankfurt University which was later published as the appendix of his KHI (“Knowledge and Human Interest: A General Perspective” KHI pp. 301-317). Habermas starts with stating what he terms as the fundamental assumption of the ‘traditional ontology’. The assumption is that “the only knowledge that can truly orient action is knowledge that frees itself from mere human interests and is based on ideas” (KHI p. 301). The traditional ontology according to this conception is supposed to be based on the assumption that knowledge consists of pure ideas (that depict reality as it is) without intervention from (or of) subject. This assumption, Habermas elaborates, is based on fundamental distinction and demarcation between “Being and time” (ibid.). Thus the concept of knowledge devoid of interest, as pure theory and contemplation and the notion of static universe (in essence) lies at the heart of Habermas’ understanding of what he calls ‘traditional’ ontology .

The second aspect of the Greek conception of theory, Habermas claims, pertains to the idea that theory is to guide the ‘conduct of life’: “Through the soul’s likening itself to the ordered motion of the cosmos, theory enters the conduct of life. In ethos theory moulds life to its form and is reflected in the conduct of those who subject themselves to its discipline” (p. 302, emphasis retained) . Through the conception of ethos theory is connected to practice or conduct of life. Similar observations recur in Habermas’ following remarks regarding Husserl’s idea of theory and crisis: “Like almost all philosophers before him, Husserl, without second thought took as the norm of his critique an idea of knowledge that preserves the platonic connection of pure theory with the conduct of life” (ibid., emphasis added).

Thus a particular conception of knowledge as pure theory and belief in the efficacy of pure theory to guide the conduct of life forms the basis of Habermas’ understanding of ontology. This is confirmed by Habermas’ further comments on relation between positivism and ontology on the one hand and on neo Kantianism on the other hand, although Habermas concedes that in positivism, and neo Kantianism original intention of classical theory to connect theory with practice is ultimately lost (ibid: 303-304).

Habermas sees “a real connection between the positivistic self understanding of the sciences and traditional ontology” (ibid: 302). The connection is stated in the following manner: “Both are committed to a theoretical attitude that frees those who take it from dogmatic association with the natural interests of life and their irritating influence; and both share the cosmological intention of describing the universe theoretically in its lawlike order, just as it is” (ibid: 303). According to this conception ontology is based on a particular conception of knowledge that dissociates knowledge from ‘natural interests’ and consequently sees knowledge as pure theory. Similarly ontology is based on conception of universe as a static (immutable) order that can be stated and understood in terms of ‘law’ and the assumption that knowledge can describe universe ‘as it is’, or ‘in itself’ independent of knower (ibid: 304).

Habermas mentions three aspects of this ‘unconditional commitment’ of modern sciences which ultimately boil down to the same thing or at least different aspects of the same thing: “psychologically an unconditional commitment to theory and epistemologically the severance of knowledge from interest . . . in logic . . . the distinction between descriptive and prescriptive statements, which makes grammatically obligatory the filtering out of merely emotive from cognitive contents” (ibid.). All three aspects have a commonality: purging knowledge of any shades of interest. The ‘theory’ does this by purging practice, epistemology through purging interest and logic through positing emotive as outside the realm of knowledge.

To summarise: According to Habermas’ conception following assumptions are involved in a particular notion of ontology he is rejecting:

a) The notion of pure knowledge devoid of interests, emotions etc. Knowledge, which depicts reality as it is and does not involve anything else, thus a conception of knowledge as pure depiction, the notion of knowledge independent of the knowing subject. Hence the rejection of knowledge as constitutive of reality.

b) The notion of universe or world as ordered cosmos behaving according to immutable laws. Thus the rejection of dynamic universe. Hence the rejection of the concept of world as constituted.

c) The notion of universe having structures, which are independent of the knowing subject. Hence the rejection of the notion of being in itself or facts independent of knower.

The above three aspects are in fact highly interrelated and can be discussed separately only with some abstraction.

Transcendnetal consciousness and Nature

“. . . Habermas’ attempt to quarantine the need for a ground in nature to the prehistory of transcendental consciousness is overwritten by three related factors. Firstly, there is the need to supplement our knowledge of nature with a reflection that is not necessarily subject to the technical interest of prediction and control. Secondly, in order to explain the immanent facticity of nature there is admission that nature is disclosed within language. And thirdly, there is the argument derived from Frank that it is the irreducibility of world-disclosure that institutes and maintains the movement towards intersubjective consensus within language. The combined force of these factors is to suggest that not only can an adequate understanding of nature not be confined to any single language practice, but also that nature is an irreducible, immanent, and productive presence within language. If this is the case, then the indefinite deferral of the need to address the issue of ultimate foundations, [which is supposedly required to enable a post-metaphysical quasi-transcendental philosophy such as Habermas’ to focus on issues that can be agreed upon], cannot be justified as these foundations in the form of nature permeate language in a way that disrupts the supposed internality of language. And if the internality of language cannot be maintained, then the question of ultimate foundations cannot be legitimately quarantined from rational discourse.”
"Habermas, Schelling and Nature" in Critical Theory After Habermas