Monday, February 21, 2005

irreducibility of the distinction between ‘causal’ and ‘rational’

Naturalism Habermas rejects is a reductive naturalism. Naturalism is reductive when it ultimately reduces a ‘rational explanation’ to a 'causal explanation'.

This does not necessarily mean that reductive naturalism does not recognize the distinction between ‘causal’ and ‘rational’ explanations. However it believes that, in principle, ‘rational’ can be explained in terms of a ‘causal’ one. Hence a reductive naturalism gives priority to ‘causal’ in the natural order (natural in a broad sense as opposed to supernatural order).

Habermas on the other hand refuses to accept the priority accorded to causal explanation and hence asserts that even in principle ‘rational’ cannot be explained in terms of ‘causal’. He believes in the ultimate irreducibility of the distinction between ‘causal’ and ‘rational’. In this Habermas sides with great idealists, particularly Kant, who reject the claim that ‘reason’ can be explained in terms of ‘causal’.

However Habermas unlike Kant does not posit two worlds or two realms to establish this irreducibility of ‘rational’ to ‘causal’. By refusing to posit world of pure intelligence in order to prove the irreducibility of ‘rational’ Habermas remains within an overall naturalist position, where naturalist is understood in the broad sense.

According to this reading reductionist naturalism is the one which equates ‘natural’ with ‘causal’ and then aspires to explain everything else in terms of ‘causal’. Habermas on the other hand construes ‘natural’ in a broad sense and considers ‘causal’ only one facet of ‘natural’. Accordingly he can claim that ‘rational’ is natural but not ‘causal’. This I believe is the essence of Habermas’ so called ‘weak naturalism’.

Sunday, February 20, 2005

Transcendental approach

“ . . . any transcendental approach, in the last analysis, precludes that there can be such thing as truthfulness to reality in the sense of postulated by philosophical realism. Correspondence theories of truth tend to hypostatise fact as entities in the world. It is the intention and inner logic of an epistemology reflecting upon the conditions of possible experience as such to uncover the objectivistic illusions of such a view” (Jürgen Habermas, A Postscript to Knowledge and Human Interests, Phil. Soc. Sci. 3(1973): 157-189, here, 180, emphasis retained).

comments to follow..

Saturday, February 19, 2005

categorical meaning and the meaning of truth claims

In his posscript to Knowledge and Human Interests [Jürgen Habermas, A Postscript to Knowledge and Human Interests, Phil. Soc. Sci. 3(1973): 157-189] Habermas makes a crucial distinction between the problem of object constitution and validity (Geltung). Here Habermas first time connects the problem of the verification of truth with the meaning of validity claims. According to Habermas, “the meaning of truth and untruth of a statement does not consist in the conditions guaranteeing the objectivity of our experience but in the possibility of argumentative corroboration of a truth claim which is falsifiable in principle” (ibid: 166). Habermas goes on to further differentiate between and contrast the categorical meaning of proposition and the meaning of discursive truth claims: “the categorical meaning of proposition is connected with the species of objects of experience of which the predicate is something. By contrast, the meaning of a discursive truth claim embodied in statement is connected with the existence of states of affairs (Sachverhalte) which we render in those statements” (ibid.). Thus “in every speech act, categorical meaning is contained in the prepositional content, whereas the truth claim is contained in the performative part. For the categorical meaning always reflects the way in which we experience something in the world-as a thing or event, as a person or as that person’s utterance. The truth claim on the other hand, reflects the intersubjective validity, on the basis of which something may be predicated of objects of experience, i.e. that a state of affairs is indeed a fact” (ibid: 166-167, emphasis in italics by Habermas, emphasis in bold added).

Habermas returns to this distinction between experience and judgment in his recent work (particularly in Truth and Justification) on which more later.

Wednesday, February 16, 2005

Apel and Habermas

I am reading at the moment, among other things, Eduardo Mendieta's book on Apel entitled Adventures of Transcendental Philosophy: Karl-Otto Apel's Semiotics and Discourse Ethics. While reading the book the following caught my attention:

"In Jürgen Habermas' own words, " under the living philosophers no one has more lastingly determined the direction of my thinking that Karl-Otto Apel." This is a comment to a dedication that "explains itself": "To Karl-Otto Apel on completing the sixth decade of of teaching - with thanks for three decades of instruction (Belebrung)." These words of dedication and acknowledgment that Habermas' Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action carried on its original German edition were unfortunately omitted from the English translation." (p. 103).

Does anybody know why the dedication was omitted from the English translation?

Addendum: An interesting story of Mendieta's book told by Mendieta himself, can be found here. Incidentally it already provides a plausible answer to the question I had raised in the post. However, further information comments etc. are still welcome. Also see the following reviews of Mendieta's Apel book:

Problems and Prospects in Critical Theory: Eduardo Mendieta’s study of Karl-Otto Apel

Monday, February 14, 2005

Normative pragmatism and Naturalism

Brandom makes following distinctions between various types of pragmatism:

Methodological pragmatism:

“Pragmatism of this sort seems semantics as answering to pragmatics in the sense that pragmatic theory supplies the explanatory target of semantic theory – and hence is the ultimate source of the criteria of adequacy according to which the success of that theoretical enterprise is to be assessed.” (Robert Brandom, "Pragmatics and pragmatisms" in Hilary Putnam: Pragmatism and Realism, pp. 40-58 here p. 42).


Semantic pragmatism:

“A related, but I believe distinguishable, sot of pragmatism takes as its point of departure the plausible view that it is the way practitioners use expressions that makes them mean what they do.”

Fundamental pragmatism:

“It is characteristic of pragmatists in the broad sense to see knowing how as having a certain kind of explanatory priority over knowing that. This is one influential form taken by an insistence on the explanatory primacy of the practical over theoretical. Explicit theoretical beliefs can be made intelligible only against a background of implicit practical abilities.” (ibid. p. 46).

Normative pragmatism:

“any pragmatics whose concept of practice is a serious candidate for playing three roles [methodological, semantic and fundamental] must employ normative vocabulary.” (ibid. p. 48).

[Brandom takes Kant to be the greatest exponent of this kind of pragmatism].

Normative pragmatism and Naturalism:

However Brandom adds that normative pragmatism is compatible with naturalism:

“It should not be assumed that commitment to a normative pragmatics is incompatible with pursuing both one’s pragmatic theory and one’s semantic theory in a naturalistic spirit. Normative pragmatics is incompatible with naturalism only in the context of some sort of dualistic understanding of the relation between normative and the natural. One might accept that the discursive practice to which methodological, semantic and fundamental pragmatism are addressed must be susceptible to specification in normative terms . . . without giving up hope for an ultimately naturalistic account of the applicability of such normative assessments. (Of course, a great deal will turn on what one means by ‘naturalistic’. . . .)” [ibid. pp. 49-50].

Elsewhere when Brandom opposes naturalism to normative accounts it is clear he is using naturalism in a narrow sense (this is shown by his contrasting non naturalistic normative account to supernaturalism).

“I don’t think there is a natural scientific story to be told about this sort of conceptual normativity. But that is not to say that it is supernatural. I think it is an essentially social phenomenon . . . .” An interview with Brandom.

Friday, February 11, 2005

In what sense Habermas is a pragmatist?

Habermas’ enterprise has often been described as Kantian pragmatism in recent days. The Kantian side of the equation is pretty clear however there is not much agreement on “in what sense Habermas is a pragmatist”. We had posted earlier some thoughts on this here and here.

In a recent excellent article on Habermas’s “Kantian pragmatism” Kenneth Baynes concludes his argument in the following way:

“Habermas, like Brandom, locates normativity in the attitudes we suppose actors to take up towards one another – there is no normativity apart from the statuses instituted via these attitudes. For Habermas, these attitudes are importantly and irreducibly second personal in that to adopt the deliberative stance is to treat them as “coparticipants” in the “space of reasons.” In adopting the deliberative stance, we view others as at least virtual participants in the exchange of reasons that must convince us as well. So construed, the deliberative stance, generally – can be seen as a “pragmatic” rendering of Kant’s claim that, insofar as we view ourselves as capable of acting for reasons at all, we must view ourselves as acting under the idea of freedom.”("The transcendental turn: Habermas' "Kantian pragmatism" in The Cambridge Companion to Critical Theory, pp. 194-218, here p. 215).

The use of ‘pragmatic’ in above can be described as vague at best. However Robert Brandom has recently made a distinction between two senses of pragmatism which in my opinion can be very useful in understanding Habermas’ pragmatism. Brandom writes:

“Pragmatism can be thought of narrowly: as a philosophical school of thought centered on evaluating beliefs by their tendency to promote success at the satisfaction of wants, whose paradigmatic practioners were the classical American triumvirate of Charles Peirce, William James and John Dewey. But pragmatism can also be thought of more broadly: as a movement centered on the primacy of the practical, initiated already by Kant, whose twentieth-century avatars includes not only Peirce, James and Dewey, but also the early Heidegger, the later Wittgenstein and such figures as Quine, Sellars, Davidson and Rorty. I think the broader version of pragmatism is much more important and interesting than the narrower one.”("Pragmatics and pragmatisms" in Hilary Putnam: Pragmatism and Realism, pp. 40-58 here p. 41, emphasis added).

I think if pragmatism is defined as a movement that gives primacy to the practical then certainly Habermas is pragmatism. I believe this is the main sense in which Habermas is pragmatist.

Brandom goes on to further explicate the meaning of practical in the following way:

“It is characteristic of pragmatism in the broad sense to see knowing how as having a certain kind of explanatory priority of knowing that. This is one influential form taken by an insistence on the explanatory primacy of the practical over the theoretical. Explicit theoretical beliefs can be made intelligible only against a background of implicit practical abilities. Pragmatism in this sense – call it ‘fundamental pragmatism’ – is opposed to the kind of Platonistic intellectualism that seeks to explain practical abilities in terms of some sort of grasp of principles; some sort of knowing that behind each bit of know how.” (ibid; p. 46).

The above squares nicely with Habermas’ prioritization of know how on know that in developing his formal pragmatics.

Moreover Brandom considers the above to be the heart of Heidegger’s Being and Time:

“Opposing intellectualism by seeing the capacity to know or believe that something is the case as parasitic on more primitive kinds of know how – capacities to do something that is not yet saying, thinking or believing anything – is the basic thesis of the first part of Heidegger’s Being and Time.” (ibid.).

This is in tune with what we said earlier (here) about relation between Heidegger and Habermas and the primacy of action in both. This also explains Habermas’ insistence that Heidegger "Heidegger also praticipated in the anti-Pltantonic thrust of pragmatism".

Tuesday, February 08, 2005

A critique of Joel Whitebooks' critique of Habermas

Joel Whitebook argues in his seminal piece “The problem of Nature in Habermas” [ Joel Whitebook, “The Problem of Nature in Habermas” Telos (SUM 79); 41-69.] that “Habermas’ transcendentalism necessarily precludes any reconciliation with nature.” (ibid; p. 41). He asserts that Habermas’ transcendental justification of critical theory comes at the expense of the ideal of early critical theorists (particularly Marcuse) [Whitebook does not consider Adorno or Horkheimer as propagating such vision however Dews and Dallmayr do think so] of reconciliation with nature. In this context Whitebook calls for “a non-regressive reconciliation with nature.” (ibid, p. 42). Such reconciliation with nature would be non-regressive, claims Whitebook, to the extent that it would be able to treat nature in non-instrumental terms while avoiding slide back to what he terms as “pre-rational, e.; mythical, forms of thought.” (ibid.).

However in my view Habermas is precisely aiming at ‘a non-regressive reconciliation with nature.’ Whitebook thinks otherwise. He thinks that Habermas’ transcendentalism bars any such solution (even if Habermas’ have tried in this direction). His acceptance of transcendentalism involves him in the paradox “that the constituted constitute the constituter. An anthropology of knowledge, if it is to avoid a vicious circle, cannot simply be an empirical theory, but must contain a “reflective” moment as well.” (ibid; p. 48). However this criticism is based on a misconception that Habermas is working with a conception of freedom that is essentially Kantian and Hegelian a conception of freedom that pits limits against freedom (and the capacity for reflection). However, Habermas goes beyond a conception of freedom that pits limits against freedom and thus does not have to be involved in a paradox in which Kant and Hegel would have involved if they had tried to “situate” the constituted and constituting on the same plane.

Whitebook’s above formulation is based on an implicit assumption that “reflection” cannot emerge from what is “empirical”. However this is based on a purely Kantian assumption according to which reflection cannot emerge form an empirical reality and that is the reason why Kant had to look for spontaneity in the realm of pure intelligibility: “. . . the dimension of historical facts, the “constitution” of which is to be explained, is the very dimension in which the transcendental subject of this constitution is itself “constituted” empirically. That this, from the standpoint of a transcendental critique of knowledge, is a paradoxical statement, is certainly not a decisive counter-argument: it merely shows the limits of transcendental philosophy.” Albrecht Wellmer, “Communications and Emancipation: Reflections on the linguistic turn in critical theory” in John O'Neill ed. On critical theory (Lanham : University Press of America, c1989), 231-263, here 249, emphasis retained). What Wellmer says about historical sciences is also true about knowledge in general.

Moreover Habermas in his post KHI writings ascribes “constitution” not to an “individual” or “specie” subject but to language and lifeworld, which are anonymous to the extent that there is no ‘subject’ of lifeworld and language as a whole. This second move absolves Habermas’ of the charge that might still be levelled against Marx for example who though detranscendentalises the subject, nevertheless attributes to it powers which are incompatible with human finitude as we have come to know since then.

Combined with the above two theses Habermas’ is able to circumvent the dilemma or paradox to which Whitebook refers. It was a dilemma for Kant for example to conceive subject as both constituted and constituting precisely because for him limits are the contrary of freedom so a free (constituting) subject cannot be located at the same plane as that of constituted subject (empirical subject). Hence Kant had to locate his constituting subject in the world of pure intelligibility and hence create a two-world (two - realm) dualism, reconciliation of which and demonstrating connection between which consumed rest of Kant’s energies. However there is no such need for Habermas to locate a free subject in the world of pure intelligibility precisely because he does not see freedom and limits in dualistic terms Kant saw. Thus for Habermas it is not a paradox in itself if empirical is construed as transcendental or transcendental as empirical.

Thus empirical subject are constituted in the context of lifeworld and language, and as far as lifeworld and language form the background of the subjects thus constituted and are not available to them as manipulable and observable entities, they act as “transcendental(s)”. However lifeworld and language are empirical (natural) in the following senses: a) they are located in “this world” and not in the realm of intelligibility which is above the world of phenomenon. b) Subjects formed within language and lifeworld are in turn capable of affecting lifeworld and language to certain extent (this is what Habermas means when he refers to the interpretive accomplishments of subjects formed within language and lifeworld). c) Thus lifeworld and language provide both resources and constraints.

Hence, language and lifeworld are simultaneously empirical/natural and transcendental(s). As far as language and lifeworld act from behind the back of actors they provide the condition of the possibility of not only their actions but also the conditions of the possibility of their agency and remain beyond their intervention. However this agency in turn can affect both language and lifeworld to a certain extent in the sense that both lifeworld and language can be partially objectivsed and thus affected by the agency formed within them. Thus Habermas’ “transcendentalism” is not engulfed by the dilemmas typical of Kantian transcendentalism.

Whitebook’s objection is in part based on confusing two senses of empirical: empirical in a broad sense and empirical in a narrow sense. Empirical in a narrow sense is equated by Habermas with objective knowledge and in this sense empirical can not contain “reflective” moment. However in a broad sense empirical cannot be equated with objective knowledge. Language and lifeworld are empirical to the extent that they can be partially objectivsed however they are not empirical in the narrow sense because their objectivisation is always partial and never complete. Thus it is not a paradox for empirical in this broad sense to contain a ‘reflective’ moment.

Whitebook then goes on to assert that in order to avoid the above paradox Habermas posits the conception of nature in itself thus differentiating objectivised nature and subjective nature from nature in itself . This, however, does not overcome the dilemma mentioned above (“The Problem of Nature in Habermas,” 48-49.). However this positing of nature in itself is in turn open to further objections and dilemmas of its own. Whitebook formulates these further objections deriving on McCarthy’s well known grilling of Habermas’ conception of nature in itself. As Whitebook puts it:

“. . . a serious difficulty arises concerning pre-human nature. Does the “materialist” claim that pre-human nature produces subjective, as McCarthy asks, not throw Habermas back into pre-critical ontology that violates this transcendental posture? The question cannot, account for the transition from pre-human to human nature. In both cases, he wants to say more than can legitimately be said from within the confines of his position.”(ibid; p. 49).

Now this objection even if has some relevance in the context of Habermas’ early work (for example his account in KHI) has no relevance whatsoever in the context of Habermas’ later mature work including TCA and TJ. The reason is succulently put forth by James Swindal:

“Habermas argues that learning processes must be grounded, not in a metaphysical concept of nature, a position which the later Peirce adopted, but in actual argumetnation with others about practical conflict. Habermas claims that we cannot break out of the sphere of language and argumentation: “we can only establish the relation to reality, which is not equivalent to ‘existence,’ by projecting a ‘transcendnece from within’”.
“For Habermas this view of inner transcendence both respects the ‘objectivity’ of the intersubjectivity of understanding that has become reflexive and avoids the ontologization of reality.”(Reflection Revisited: Jürgen Habermas’s Discursive Theory of Truth, p. 97 emphasis in the original).

Thus Habermas’ positing of reality from within is not ontological in the traditional sense and is compatible with the Kantian claim that we do not have access to pre-mediated reality.

continued from here

Habermas' critique of traditonal ontology in KHI

In this inaugural lecture at Frankfurt University which was later published as the appendix of his KHI (“Knowledge and Human Interest: A General Perspective” KHI pp. 301-317). Habermas starts with stating what he terms as the fundamental assumption of the ‘traditional ontology’. The assumption is that “the only knowledge that can truly orient action is knowledge that frees itself from mere human interests and is based on ideas” (KHI p. 301). The traditional ontology according to this conception is supposed to be based on the assumption that knowledge consists of pure ideas (that depict reality as it is) without intervention from (or of) subject. This assumption, Habermas elaborates, is based on fundamental distinction and demarcation between “Being and time” (ibid.). Thus the concept of knowledge devoid of interest, as pure theory and contemplation and the notion of static universe (in essence) lies at the heart of Habermas’ understanding of what he calls ‘traditional’ ontology .

The second aspect of the Greek conception of theory, Habermas claims, pertains to the idea that theory is to guide the ‘conduct of life’: “Through the soul’s likening itself to the ordered motion of the cosmos, theory enters the conduct of life. In ethos theory moulds life to its form and is reflected in the conduct of those who subject themselves to its discipline” (p. 302, emphasis retained) . Through the conception of ethos theory is connected to practice or conduct of life. Similar observations recur in Habermas’ following remarks regarding Husserl’s idea of theory and crisis: “Like almost all philosophers before him, Husserl, without second thought took as the norm of his critique an idea of knowledge that preserves the platonic connection of pure theory with the conduct of life” (ibid., emphasis added).

Thus a particular conception of knowledge as pure theory and belief in the efficacy of pure theory to guide the conduct of life forms the basis of Habermas’ understanding of ontology. This is confirmed by Habermas’ further comments on relation between positivism and ontology on the one hand and on neo Kantianism on the other hand, although Habermas concedes that in positivism, and neo Kantianism original intention of classical theory to connect theory with practice is ultimately lost (ibid: 303-304).

Habermas sees “a real connection between the positivistic self understanding of the sciences and traditional ontology” (ibid: 302). The connection is stated in the following manner: “Both are committed to a theoretical attitude that frees those who take it from dogmatic association with the natural interests of life and their irritating influence; and both share the cosmological intention of describing the universe theoretically in its lawlike order, just as it is” (ibid: 303). According to this conception ontology is based on a particular conception of knowledge that dissociates knowledge from ‘natural interests’ and consequently sees knowledge as pure theory. Similarly ontology is based on conception of universe as a static (immutable) order that can be stated and understood in terms of ‘law’ and the assumption that knowledge can describe universe ‘as it is’, or ‘in itself’ independent of knower (ibid: 304).

Habermas mentions three aspects of this ‘unconditional commitment’ of modern sciences which ultimately boil down to the same thing or at least different aspects of the same thing: “psychologically an unconditional commitment to theory and epistemologically the severance of knowledge from interest . . . in logic . . . the distinction between descriptive and prescriptive statements, which makes grammatically obligatory the filtering out of merely emotive from cognitive contents” (ibid.). All three aspects have a commonality: purging knowledge of any shades of interest. The ‘theory’ does this by purging practice, epistemology through purging interest and logic through positing emotive as outside the realm of knowledge.

To summarise: According to Habermas’ conception following assumptions are involved in a particular notion of ontology he is rejecting:

a) The notion of pure knowledge devoid of interests, emotions etc. Knowledge, which depicts reality as it is and does not involve anything else, thus a conception of knowledge as pure depiction, the notion of knowledge independent of the knowing subject. Hence the rejection of knowledge as constitutive of reality.

b) The notion of universe or world as ordered cosmos behaving according to immutable laws. Thus the rejection of dynamic universe. Hence the rejection of the concept of world as constituted.

c) The notion of universe having structures, which are independent of the knowing subject. Hence the rejection of the notion of being in itself or facts independent of knower.

The above three aspects are in fact highly interrelated and can be discussed separately only with some abstraction.

Wednesday, February 02, 2005

Transcendnetal consciousness and Nature

“. . . Habermas’ attempt to quarantine the need for a ground in nature to the prehistory of transcendental consciousness is overwritten by three related factors. Firstly, there is the need to supplement our knowledge of nature with a reflection that is not necessarily subject to the technical interest of prediction and control. Secondly, in order to explain the immanent facticity of nature there is admission that nature is disclosed within language. And thirdly, there is the argument derived from Frank that it is the irreducibility of world-disclosure that institutes and maintains the movement towards intersubjective consensus within language. The combined force of these factors is to suggest that not only can an adequate understanding of nature not be confined to any single language practice, but also that nature is an irreducible, immanent, and productive presence within language. If this is the case, then the indefinite deferral of the need to address the issue of ultimate foundations, [which is supposedly required to enable a post-metaphysical quasi-transcendental philosophy such as Habermas’ to focus on issues that can be agreed upon], cannot be justified as these foundations in the form of nature permeate language in a way that disrupts the supposed internality of language. And if the internality of language cannot be maintained, then the question of ultimate foundations cannot be legitimately quarantined from rational discourse.”
"Habermas, Schelling and Nature" in Critical Theory After Habermas

Monday, January 31, 2005

Raising out of nature

Habermas (in KHI):

“What raises us out of nature is the only thing whose nature we can know: language. Through its structure, autonomy and responsibility are posited for us. Our first sentence expressed unequivocally the intention of universal and unconstrained consensus. Taken together, autonomy and responsibility constitute the only idea we posses a priori in the sense of the philosophical tradition.” (p. 314).

Question: what does “raising out of nature” means?

Peter Douglas (in "Habermas, Schelling and Nature" in Critical Theory After Habermas):

“Returning now to the question of in what sense it can be said that we have been raised out of nature, if it can be maintained that nature permeates language, then the answer is not at all.” (p. 161).

Habermas on Language (and its half transcendence)[in TCA: 11]:

"Language and culture neither coincide with the formal world concepts by means of which participants in communication together define their situations, nor do they appear as something innerworldly. Language and culture are constitutive for the lifeworld itself. They are neither one of the formal frames, that is, the worlds to which participants assign elements of situations, nor do they appear as something in the objective, social, or subjective worlds. In performing or understanding a speech act, patricians are very much moving within their language, so that they cannot bring a present utterance before themselves as “something intersubjective,” in the way they experience an event as something objective, encounter a pattern of behavior as something normative, experience or ascribe a desire or feeling as something subjective. The very medium of mutual understanding abides in a peculiar half-transcendence. So long as participants maintain their performative attitudes, the language actually in use remains at their backs. Speakers cannot take up an extramundane position in relation to it." (pp. 125-126, emphasis retained).

An explanation:

The above quote explains how language transports us to this half-transcendence and why. Language does this through taking an extramundane position vis a vis us such that it is neither a formal concept nor an innerworldly thing. However there is no idealism involved in this as far as language discloses this half transcendence only through the initiation of those who speak the language. Language cannot initiate anything, it is dependent on the interpretive accomplishment of participants. The “medium of mutual understanding abides in a peculiar half-transcendence” only “so long as participants maintain their performative attitude”. It is through adopting a performative attitude that participants unleash this half transcendence, language cannot do it on its own and it can do it only to the extent that this performative attitude is maintained. However language can do this, and this is an answer to the why question, because it is a natural language. It is natural language in the sense that it is “thing of this world” and the half transcendence achieved through it is ‘transcendence from within’.

A Critique of Peter Douglas:

Peter Douglas raises a false dichotomy between natural language and “raising out of nature” because he does not consider the possibility of ‘transcendence from within’. He also does not differentiate between a broad concept of nature and a limited concept of nature. Combining these two points we can conceive of (at least of the possibility of) raising out of nature (in the limited sense) however without transgressing the boundaries of nature in the broad sense.

natura naturans in early and later Habermas: A comparison

Habermas: (in PT)

“It seems to me that it has been clear since Marx that the normative content of modernity can be taken up and preserved even and especially under materialist premises.’

““Nature in itself” does not coincide with objectivated nature. What Marx had in mind is the emergence in natural history of the sociocultural form of life of Homo sapiens, which goes beyond physically objectified nature to conceptually include, as it were, a piece of natura naturans.” (p. 20)

Dews’ comments on the above:

“Habermas’s gesture towards the double terminology of natura naturata and natura naturans is as surprising as it is illuminating.”(The Limits of Disenchantment Essays on Contemporary European Philosophy p. 161).

Habermas again (in KHI):

“Marx in the idealist tradition tacitly retained synthesis as a point of reference: the synthesis of a portion of subjective nature with nature that is objective for it, while the contingent conditions of synthesis point to a nature in itself that has been disclosed. “Nature in Itself” is a construction. It designates natura naturans that has created both subjective nature and what confronts it as objective nature. But it does so in such a way that we, as knowing subjects, in principle cannot take up a position outside of or “beneath” the cleavage of “nature in itself” into a subjective and objective nature.” (p. 286).

My question:

Compare what Habermas says in PT and KHI and try to figure out what is surprising in his recent formulation, i.e. in PT.

Sunday, January 30, 2005

Peter Dews and Habermas' weak Naturalism (2)

The fundamental problem with Dews’ interpretation can be articulated by concentrating on the following remarks on Seel. Dews, understands Seel’s and Habermas’ position to be essentially similar, though he asserts that Habermas moves beyond this position in the direction Dews suggest (though not fully it would seem):

“Seel’s conception is, fundamentally, dualistic. On the one hand, he repeatedly emphasizes that human beings are ‘living natural beings’ [lebende Naturwessen]. On the other, he also makes it clear that human beings must be regarded as ‘subjects’ who are capable of reflectively choosing and pursuing their own life projects. But if nature is not at all subject-like [subjekthaft], and yet beings are simultaneously both natural beings and subjects, then the two dimensions of human existence which Seel identifies appear to enter into contradiction. One might ask: where does the subjective freedom of human beings emerge from, if pre-human nature reveals no self-related structures and no capacity – even unreflective one – for self-determination in accordance with an immanent norm?”(The Limits of Disenchantment Essays on Contemporary European Philosophy p. 158).

I take the above to be Dews’ formulation about Habermas’ position as well (form which he moves in his recent articulations according to Dews). So let us try to understand Dews’ argument on this:

1) Habermas’ attempt to combine naturalism with anti naturalism is ‘dualistic’. It is dualistic because on the one hand he categorises human beings as natural being but on the other hand he also considers human beings as being with reflective powers, i.e. power to go beyond nature.

2) In the above formulation Dews seems to be already working with two presuppositions: on the one hand he is supposing that ‘nature’ and ‘reflection’ are mutually exclusive. Unless he is supposing this how can he characterise a position which combines reflection with nature as dualism? It should be kept in mind that making relevant distinction does not necessarily lead to dualisms. Only dichotomous distinctions lead to dualisms. On the other hand Dews also seems to equate nature with nature in a narrow sense, as when we use it for mountains and forests etc. However to contrast human beings to nature in this narrow sense is already presupposing non human nature as paradigm for nature in the broad sense. The fact that human beings are natural beings in the broad sense does not imply (or at least should not necessarily imply) that they have evolved from a long evolution which started with non animate matter? Why, on the other hand, it cannot be presupposed that human beings, and animate and non animate beings are all natural beings in the sense that they are being of this world and that is what they share and that would only require denying supernatural status to human beings-the status as a beings belonging to the other world (who have somehow fallen or find themselves here among alien circumstances).

3) The above becomes clear when Dews rhetorically asks, “But if nature is not at all subject-like [subjekthaft], and yet beings are simultaneously both natural beings and subjects, then the two dimensions of human existence which Seel identifies appear to enter into contradiction.”. But the very question makes it clear that Dews is presupposing that the pre-human nature from which humans evolved is the same as nature in the limited sense (as applied animate and inanimate beings excluding humans) i.e. why pre-human nature (i.e. stones and trees) must have traces of subjectivity that we find in human beings.

4) Dews asks a legitimate and pertinent question, “where does the subjective freedom of human beings emerge from, if pre-human nature reveals no self-related structures and no capacity – even unreflective one – for self-determination in accordance with an immanent norm?”. However there are few things to be noted about this pertinent question. Firstly a 'space for freedom' is not the same as a capacity of 'self determination'. Capacity for self determination surely requires a space of freedom but it does not follow from this that space for freedom already contains capacity for self determination. This would be to confuse the conditions of possibility with what is possible within once those conditions obtain. Secondly, for sure Habermas needs to show if he can how a being with capacity for self determination can come into existence within an overall natural framework but Habremas’ weak naturalism does not aim to show this. It simply assumes it and this assumption is made clear by Habermas. Habermas also makes it clear that this assumption is revisable. Haberms does not try to ground this assumption apart form what is presupposed within modern worldview. Habermas’ problematic starts with the above presupposition it does not end there. Habermas problematic is to show how in an overall naturalistic worldview the existence of the space for freedom can be explained without reverting to or presupposing supernatural being (be it God, or individual or collective transcendent subjectivity). This is a problematic within weak naturalism.

5) For the above Habermas does not need to show or presuppose that pre human nature already contained some sort of subjective self reflective capacity or that stones and trees by extension share the capacity of some sort of primitive self reflective capacity with human beings but to show that given the overall natural origins of human beings, how the space of freedom can be conceptualised without reverting to supernatural explanations. For that Habermas cannot presuppose subjectivity or use it to explain the space of freedom because any such action would lead him back to supernaturalism he wants to avoid(The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, p. 292). Habermas needs to explain space of freedom without presupposing subjectivity or self-reflective powers of human beings (since such power already presuppose space of freedom). Once space of freedom is explained it would be possible to explain the emergence of subjectivity or self-reflective powers within such space.

6) In order to explain the possibility of space of freedom within an overall naturalistic framework Habermas needs to explain relationship between freedom and limits. I would argue that, in order to do this, Habermas needs to go beyond Kantian/Hegelian conceptions of relation between limits and freedom to do this (but on this more later).

Friday, January 28, 2005

Peter Dews and Habermas' weak Naturalism (1)

“Many of the influential philosophers of the twentieth century . . . have felt compelled to contest the cognitive exclusivity of the natural sciences in the domain of nature, without believing that it is possible to establish a metaphysical theory of nature. Since for all these thinkers subjectivity emerges from nature, yet also remains a part of –intrinsic to-nature, we cannot, as thinking subjects, make nature the target of a theory of any kind without distorting an essential co-belonging. But this fact does not preclude philosophical elucidations of a reality which merits the title ‘Nature an sich’ in so far as it cannot be reduced to the forms of its interpretation. Furthermore, such elucidations need not fall victim to the illusion, which both Seel and Habermas so fear, that one could derive detailed prescriptions for the conduct of human life from a totalizing speculation on the meaning and purpose of nature. They can freely advertise their own provisional status.” (The Limits of Disenchantment Essays on Contemporary European Philosophy p. 160).

1) Dews claims that “cognitive exclusivity of the natural sciences in the domain of nature” can be contested without necessarily relegating to “a metaphysical theory of nature.”. I believe that this is a defensible claim if it does not imply (as it seems to imply) that Habermas holds the position it is rebutting. In fact Habermas allows three sorts of claims to be made within communicative action and one of those claims is claim about ‘objective nature’. In so far as communicative action presupposes space of freedom (on which the emergence of the space of reasons is dependent)[for this see "The transcendental turn: Habermas’s ‘Kantian pragmatism’", by Kenneth Baynes; in The Cambridge Companion to Critical Theory] claims raised within it cannot be construed as objectivistic claims in the sense of treating objects of nature as necessarily instrumental. All claims made within communicative action (including claims related to the ‘objective nature’) reveal a primordial space of freedom as the condition of making any such claims. In fact this was Habermas’ point against positivism and scientism. Positivism and scientism come into existence when they forget their root in self-reflection. Self-reflection and (hence freedom) is the condition of the possibility of science, claimed Habermas, as early as in his Knowledge and Human Interests. The fact that we can abstract from the conditions in which scientific claims emerge and depend on, makes us forget that that those conditions are needed to make the very abstraction that are claimed as evidence of the non existence of those conditions. Habermas’ later move from semantics to pragmatics (formal) and his rejections of Chosmskian notion of linguistic competence as abstraction and his making the notion of linguistic performance as the corner stone of his explanation of linguistic competence and hence his move from the monological conception of competence to communicative competence [see T. A. McCarthy, "The theory of Communicative Competence" Phil. Soc. Sci. 3(1973): pp. 135-156] is based on the insight that performance (and hence freedom) is primary and on it depends any abstractions. Freedom is the condition of making any abstraction, communication and performance is the condition of the instrumental use of language and our cognitive faculties (see The Theory of Communicative Action, Volume 2 : Lifeword and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason, pp. 77-118> and "Individuation through Socialization: On George Herbert Mead's Theory of Subjectivity", in Postmetaphysical Thinking, pp. 149-204). The same point is the basis of Habermas’ critique of monological conceptions of modern truth semantics as it has come to us from Frege up to Quine and Davidson. And so is his positive appraisal of Dummet’s move from sentences to assertion (through his distinction between ‘truth’ and ‘assertibility’) as the basic element of semantic analysis ( On the Pragmatics of Communication, pp. 287-288). All this makes it clear that Habermas in no way limits “cognitive exclusivity of the natural sciences in the domain of nature”. Habermas considers scientific enterprise as essentially abstraction but the one, which is legitimate and useful, as far as it acknowledges or at least does not suppress the very conditions of its possibility (i.e. space of freedom, reason and self reflection).

2) Dews further on mentions contemporary scholars who have emphasised the “co-belonging” of human beings and nature. He mentions that for these thinkers although subjectivity emerges from within nature it remains part of nature and thus we cannot talk about nature as whole without compromising this essential ‘co-belonging’. There are few things that should be noted in this context. First, I would emphasise that what Dews says about other contemporary thinkers is also true for Habermas. Dews, tends to think that Habermas only belatedly realize these facts. In fact Habermas’ work from Knowledge and Human Interests to Truth and Justification is permeated by this realisation. Habermas conception of lifeworld, which he rightly equates, with Heidegger’s conception of Being in the world (The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, p. 144),is meant to emphasise the “co-belonging” of human beings and nature Dews talks about. Again Habermas talks about the language as that which brings us out of nature (Knowledge and Human Interests, p. 314), however it should be emphasised that this language for Habermas is always a natural language ( On the Pragmatics of Communication, p. 297). Thus what brings us out of nature is itself natural. A further point which needs to be emphasised in this context is Dews’ ambiguous use of the term nature. We can take nature in a broad sense as including all that is the case, and nature in the narrow sense of objective nature. The former will include human beings, objective nature including living and non living beings while the latter depending on how we define it can be restricted to all other beings except human beings or just to non living beings. Now Dews does not differentiate his concept of nature in the way indicated here and uses the ambiguity that results to make his point. However once we clearly differentiate the concept it becomes clear that there is no justification for expecting more than a general affinity between human beings as natural beings in the broader sense and objective nature. The fact that human beings are natural beings does not entail that they share there distinctive characteristics (i.e. subjectivity or freedom) with objective nature. By ignoring this difference Dews tend to equate (or at least confuse) objective nature with natura naturans.

3) The above takes us to Dews’ final point in the above quote that the conception of co-belonging is compatible with an endeavour to arrive at a conception of ‘nature in itself’ in so far as nature is not reducible to ‘forms of its interpretation.’ However Dews’ use of 'thing in itself' is ambiguous here (as is his use of the term nature). The notion of ‘nature in itself’ can be construed in the Kantian terms and contrasted with ‘nature as it appears to us’ or nature as phenomenon. However this reading of nature in itself is unacceptable given Habermas’ rejection of the whole dichotomy between ‘appearance’ and ‘reality’ (with his rejection of the philosophy of consciousness), which is ultimately derived from Heidegger’s critique of Kant. True that Habermas concedes that Kantian distinctions reappear on the level of formal pragmatics (Truth and Justification, p. 90 but they play different role than creating dichotomy between appearance and reality (essentially their role is to preserve Kantian distinctions, however without reproducing Kantian dichotomies). The purpose is not to reduce an interpretation of reality to reality as such, however without creating the dichotomy between appearance and reality. The notion of ‘nature in itself’ on the other hand can also be construed as ‘ground’ in the Heideggerian sense. According to this interpretation ‘nature’ in the broader sense is the ground of both human subjectivity and nature in the narrower sense. This is a fundamental presupposition of Habermas’ weak naturalism but as we will see (in the next post) it does not lead however to conclusions Dews wants to draw.

Monday, January 24, 2005

Peter Dews and Habermas' weak Naturalism

I have found Dews' work on Habermas' weak naturalism extremely useful and illuminating. However I find his following comments a bit strange:

“Henrich argued that Habermas’ philosophy finds itself torn between the contradictory tendencies of naturalism and transcendentalism. Habermas’ position, he claimed, is philosophically inconsistent, because – on the one hand – it presupposes a pragmatic and socio-scientific conception of language and communication, and – on the other hand – also draws on the tradition of transcendental phenomenology in its elaboration of the conception of lifeworld. In reply to this criticism, Habermas insisted that his naturalism was not to be confused with the physicalism and of the modern natural-scientific world-view: ‘It seems to me that it has been clear since Marx that the normative content of modernity can be taken up and preserved even and especially under materialist premises.’ And he continued: “Nature in itself” does not coincide with objetivated nature. What Marx had in mind is the emergence in natural history of the sociocultural form of life of homo sapiens, which goes beyond physically objectified nature to conceptually include, as it were, a piece of natura naturans.” (The Limits of Disenchantment Essays on Contemporary European Philosophy pp. 160-161).

Commenting on the above remarks he quotes from Habermas, Dews writes the following which I find problematic:

“Habermas’s gesture toward the double terminology of natura naturata and natura naturans is as surprising as illuminating.” (The Limits of Disenchantment Essays on Contemporary European Philosophy p. 161).

Dews implies in the above quotes that Habermas' turn to 'weak naturalism' is only recent (and so is surprising). However I do not see any element of surprise in Habermas' reply to Henrich. It is strange that such a close reader of Habermas as Dews can make such a claim. Habermas' position since Knowledge and Human Interests has been consistently a weak naturalist and has never been a physicalist. Habermas even in Knowledge and human interest has been aiming at combining transcendentalism with naturalism and naturalism in that instance as now was always to be construed in broader sense rather than in a physicalist sense. Habermas clearly states this in his recent work:

"Knowledge and Human Interests answered the basic question of theoretical philosophy in terms of a weak naturalism and a transcendental pragmatic epistemological realism." (Truth and Justification, p. 7).

A further minor point is that Dews mentions Henrich depiction of Habermas' conception of lifeworld as based on and derived from a phenomenological conception of lifeworld and fails to mention that Habermas' conception of lifeworld cannot be reduced to a phenomenological conception.
(to be continued).

previous post

Habermas, Rawls and democracy

Habermas asserts that Rawls gives priority to liberal rights over democratic rights. Habermas rightly sees priority of liberal rights as constraint on democratic rights. Habermas also rightly sees that political liberalism means constitutional Liberalism. And of course Dreben is dead right when he says that for Rawls democracy is always constitutional democracy (Burton Dreben (2003) “On Rawls and Political Liberalism” in Cambridge Companion to Rawls, p. 322). Habermas argues that liberal and democratic rights are co-original or co-primordial (gleichursprünglich) and presuppose each other ( Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, p. 104), Charles Larmore (1995) “The foundations of Modern Democracy: Reflections on Jürgen Habermas” European Journal of Philosophy, vol. 3 (1): pp. 55-68, here, p. 64). However Habermas’ point is more substantial than this. Habermas understands Liberalism to be based on “the intuition that the person and her individual way of life must be protected from the intrusion of state power” (Jürgen Habermas (1998) “Reasonable versus “True”, or the Morality of Worldviews” in The Inclusion of the Other, p. 100). Habermas contrasts this with his own “Kantian republicanism” (ibid; p. 101). Habermas rejects the negative conception of liberty working in political liberalism. As he puts it:

Nobody can be free at the expense of anybody by way of socialization; the freedom of one individual cannot be tied to the freedom of everyone else in a purely negative way, through reciprocal restrictions. Rather, correct restrictions are the result of a process of self legislation conducted jointly.

[I]t is left to the democratic process continually to define the precarious boundaries between the private and the public so as to secure equal freedoms for all citizens in the form of both private and public autonomy (ibid; p. 101).

Habermas, as against most Liberal theorists thinks that human rights are the conditions of the fulfilment of democracy and are rooted in it and are not prior to it (in justificatory terms) or cannot be seen primarily as freedoms from state or any other intervention. Thus Habermas’ notion of autonomy is (primarily) public and is the basis of his romantic conception of the public sphere ( Habermas and the Public Sphere) and his early infatuations with the Greek idea of democracy( Theory and Practice ). Habermas seems to be a proponent of radical democracy as against constitutional democracy at this point.

I have two major criticisms to make here.

First Habermas’ account of democracy as far as it seems to be advocating radical democracy is ahistorical. If Habermas had taken the historicality of democracy seriously he would have realised that the relation between democracy and capitalism is primordial( Foucault and Capitalism: A reconstruction). In the modern world we cannot talk about democracy except in terms of capitalism and hence constitutional democracy is the only democracy we know in immediate historical terms. If Habermas wants to claim the flag of radical democracy he has to show us how he relates it to the hegemony of capital or if he has any plans of overcoming the hegemony of capital. Since Habermas does not do this his talk of radical democracy is simply anachronistic.*

However my second criticism is more fundamental. I would argue that Habermas’ claim of being an advocate of radical democracy is merely a sham. His view ultimately gels very well with constitutional democracy. Thus Larmore writes:

At first glance, Habermas’ vision of radical democracy seems to lack the defining feature of the liberal point of view . . . . But the appearance is misleading. In reality, Habermas’ description of his theory as involving the primacy of popular sovereignty fails to capture its actual structure. Democratic self-rule, at least as Habermas understands it, depends on an unacknowledged premise, a premise expressing an antecedent moral commitment and affirming the existence of a fundamental individual right. Other conceptions of popular sovereignty would have, no doubt, a different character. But Habermas’ conception is so constituted as to imply that political principles ought to be rationally acceptable to all those whom they are to bind. And that is the feature which brings his idea of democracy back within the liberal fold, as generally understood (Charles Larmore (1995) “The foundations of Modern Democracy: Reflections on Jürgen Habermas” European Journal of Philosophy, vol. 3 (1): pp. 55-68, here, p. 66).

Thus Habermas’ emphasis on the political will and public autonomy is blunted by the fact that autonomy is conditioned by the rational. So the emphasis really is not on the political process but on the rationality of the process and what modes are most suited for it. Similarly Habermas emphasises discourse but discourse is only the means, the real thing is rationality which some how only manifests itself in discourse but is not the same as discourse. Habermas says that his criterion of rationality is immanent in discourse but that is what Rawls says too. Rawls’ political liberalism is self-sufficient and its justificatory strategy does not need any direct reference to any non-immanent principles. . Habermas’ straightforward Kantianism is after all not that straightforward. His is also a strategy of avoidance but in a more concealed way than Rawls.

*Although his account of the colonisation of lifeworld seems to be a candidate for such a strategy it has gone in the background in his recent work any way. Not to mention the inadequacy of this account. Habermas does not realise that capital does not only colonise lifeworld it also destroys it in all its non capitalist forms.

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Monday, January 17, 2005

The Linguistic Turn in Hermeneutic Philosophy

A review of Lafont's The Linguistic Turn in Hermeneutic Philosophy can be read here. Few Habermas related excerpts (related to issues discussed in some of the recent posts:

"Lafont is determined to give both the communicative dimension and the cognitive dimension of language their due; indeed, she consistently refers to her central argument that we should no longer defend the reification of language as world-disclosure. Instead, she argues for the use of current theories of "direct reference" to bring the designative ("referential") function of language back into play Accordingly, Lafont finds in Habermas's later thought a dialectic "between an intersubjectivity to be produced through communication, and an intersubjectivity always already produced, thanks to the `lifeworld' shared by speakers" (126). From this perspective, she maintains, we can acknowledge that our relationship with the world is symbolically mediated."

" . . . Lafont also usefully takes us through many years of Habermas's writings and shows how his reliance on a "lifeworld," a holistic concept of shared presuppositions, does not appear to agree with some of his other more universalist claims. In other words, Lafont's agenda is to show how a hermeneutic component to Habermas's philosophy cannot account for how we understand the meaning of what someone says. For example, Lafont claims, Habermas presumes that we share implied background knowledge that we cannot reduce to propositions; but because we cannot formalize this holistic knowledge, then counter to Habermas's intent, we cannot isolate "the acceptability conditions of speech acts from the background knowledge that determines these conditions and thus makes possible the understanding of speech acts" (223)."

"Lafont uses the issue of learning as a limit case to test her strategy: can a philosophy of language explain how we learn through language? To accomplish this task, she analyzes the referential and cognitive use of language to show how language contains within itself the possibility of revising itself (so we can change, learn, and correct previous knowledge). After much abstraction intended to show how referential uses contain possibilities of revisibility, Lafont moves to specific examples in her lively and clear examination of K. Donnellan's distinction between "attributive" and "referential" uses of definite descriptions. An "attributive" description is essential for doing something; it is irreplaceable. A "referential" description is but on, e of many ways to accomplish the same job. For Lafont, Donnellan's distinction helps us understand that the classic theory of reference only applies to the "attributive" use. In the act of redescribing something, hearers can agree to the existence of the referent, but disagree about the specific way the speaker describes that referent; a theory of indirect reference cannot, Lafont asserts, account for this possibility In order to learn, we must have the possibility for cognitive disagreement; we must learn the referential use of language."

full here.

Habermas, Adorno and Heiedegger on "Truth"

The criticism by Habermas et al levelled against Heidegger’s conception of Truth is based on two premises:

1) Heidegger conflates meaning with reference [This is basically derived from Lafont (see her The Linguistic Turn in Hermeneutic Philosophy but has been accepted by Habermas and of course also by Brunkhorst].

2) Heidegger levels out the dialectical relation between the truth as disclosure and innerworldly learning processes. Habermas and others agree with Heidegger that it is indeed the case that we cannot know without the prior disclosing function of language but they go on to claim that this disclosing function should not be understood statically and in one way. Our innerworldly learning experiences in turn modify the “disclosure” which was first the condition of any such process. Thus Habermas and others object to what they understand to be Heidegger's conception of truth as historical destiny (Seinsgeschick).

The above points are well demonstrated in the following (rather extended quotes from Brunkhorst):

“If we want to solve the categorical problem of modern egocentrism we have to draw a clear distinction between reference to things and the descriptions of them. Reference does not – as Heidegger claims- depend completely on description. Whether things are as they are is not determined by our descriptions of them. Heidegger and other linguistic idealists are right when they argue that there is no access to a real world of objects and objective relations other than through our descriptions that always and already are part of the whole network of a historical language. But the linguistic idealists are wrong when they extend this thesis to ‘reference’, and argue that things are way they are because of our descriptions. “

“In so far as Heidegger goes back to a historical apriori which can never be an object of immanent critique, his own thinking neglects and represses the non-identical of everyday experiences in life, art and science as well. Not being fallibilist, Heidegger’s History of Being becomes itself a paradigm of what Adorno calls ‘identity thinking’.” (Adorno and Critical Theory, p. 98)

“Heidegger, who was prey to an extreme intensionalism (the thesis that meaning determines reference, that language determines truth, etc.), did not succeed in solving the problem of reference in the final analysis and relapsed into the higher-level egocentrism of poetry and thought . . . . It is not until we open ourselves, to put it slightly metaphysically but vividly, to what Hugo Dingler (or even Charles S. Peirce) calls the ‘resistance of the real’ and thereby give the entities that have not been identified in advance by Being space to breathe, that we have the innerworldly experiences which compel us at some point to renounce the egocentric projection of an imaginary world. And precisely that is the experience which we have always made in the factual development process of modern science, art and culture. The egocentrism of the modern age, the metaphysics of a subject certain of itself, has long since crashed on the rocks of modern art and science . . . . The ‘clearing’ of the modern understanding of self no longer reveals a higher, a priori truth, but merely knowledge which, in Quine’s sense, is more central than everything else and therefore is more rarely brought into question, but, like all knowledge, is open to question. Falliblism has become a deep-seated understanding of self, an ‘essential feature’ of the clearing of Being and the ground plan of Western culture and its normal sciences.” (Adorno and Critical Theory, pp. 98-99)

“. . . Adorno goes along with Heidegger in rejecting the instrumental theory of language from Plato to Kant and replacing it with the notion of ‘historical constellations’. But his ‘historical constellations’ are no longer historical a prioris like Heidegger’s world-disclosing poetry. They do not determine the realm of contingent, empirical, and material entities, which Adorno also calls the ‘non-identical’. The world-disclosing power of great-poetry (like that of Jesus, Hölderlin, Newton or Marx) is not power enough to overcome the dialectical tension between language as a whole and particular material entities. And it is precisely this tension that opens world-disclosing poetry and the ‘historical constellation’ determined by this poetry for innerworldly experiences of falsification, immanent critique and learning processes. Here Adorno and post-empiricist philosophers are at one in criticising Heidegger’s metaphysics of Seinsgeschick (‘historical destiny’).” (Adorno and Critical Theory, p. 99)

Now I do not want to say I concur with what Habermas or following him Brunkhorst in their reading of Heidegger, but I certainly agree with Habermas and Brunkhorst in claiming a dialectical relationship between “world disclosing function” of language and “innerworldly learning process.” However I want to point out that Habermas and following him Brunkhorst might be underestimating the hold that “world disclosing function” have on us and might be overestimating the efficacy of innerworldly learning process in modifying our presuppositions, on which such process depend for their existence. The point is to say that “our presuppositions” do change, but they change over long periods of time and whenever they change they do not necessarily change according to pre-determined rational plan (The point of brilliant ‘histories’ of Foucault, for example, is precisely to show this). In other words, in my opinion, Habermas underestimates ‘our finitude’ (something he himself, otherwise, emphasises in his work). In so doing he happens to be a child of our long past Modernity, indeed the last great “Enlightenment thinker”!

For the best critique (that I know of) of Habermas’ critique of Heidegger (and Foucault) presented here see Rudi Visker “Habermas on Heidegger and Foucault: Meaning and Validity in the "Philosophical Discourse of Modernity" Radical-Philosophy Sum 92; 61: 15-22.

See also a related post by Gary over philosophical conversations

Sunday, January 16, 2005

Kantian pragmatism of Habermas

Talking of Kantian pragmatism in the previous post reminds me of a new book on Critical Theory in the Cambridge companion series (The Cambridge Companion to Critical Theory). It seems to be a fine product like the earlier (The Cambridge Companion to Habermas). The present volume contains at least two essays specifically on Habermas ("The transcendental turn: Habermas' "Kantian pragmatism" by Kenneth Baynes and "Critical Theory and Poststructuralism: Habermas and Foucault" by Beatrice Hanssen).

I look forward to reading the book pretty soon, especially Kenneth Baynes essay which looks good and related to what I am doing currently. Just at the start I read this puzzling statement which characterizes Knowledge and Human Interests (1968) as a work "which is perhaps . . . most philosophically distant from Kant" (p. 194). It is amazing how people can so contradictory opinion about the same piece, as lot of people would think Knowledge and Human Interest as Habermas' most Kantian work in which he still clings to the so called quasi transcendentalism.

Although as far as Habermas is already operating with his weak naturalism in Knowledge and Human Interest (Habermas clearly states this in Truth and Justification p. 6) it still can be said that his transcendentalism in Knowledge and Human Interest in already very un Kantian.

Kant, Hegel and Habermas

Gary in his comments on one of the recent posts wrote the following:

"I guess everybody is against the absolute character of Hegel's Geist. Does anybody defend it apart from those who reckon they have a theory of everything?

However, I'm not convinced that the Habermas/Hegel relationship is as simple as you say.

A suggestion.

It strikes me that Habermas replaces Hegel's dialectical character of desiring subjects engaged in a struggle for recognition (as an account of intersubjectivity) with a more Kantian account of communicative action as intersubjectity.

It has always stuck me that Habermas has explicitly sought to escape 'the spell' of Hegelian thought and dialectics that so "infatuated" Adorno, and to shift to thinking of communicative rationality in terms of an ideal communicative community.

His turn to language and comunicative action as a way to break away from the subject-object model of philosophy is a turn to pragmatism analytic philosophy and social science.

I'm not criticizing this as I think the turn to Mead is very useful).I'm just drawing attention to the way he moved away from his German roots and developments in continental philosophy --eg Merleau Ponty--that was also breaking away from the subject-object model of philosophy."

I do agree with lot of what Gary says but I think Habermas' Kantianism is the one, which is routed through Hegel and need to be understood as such. In recent days it has been termed as "Kantian pragmatism" however it should not be understood as a simple return to Kant. I will come back to this in coming days, for the moment I would limit myself to quoting Wellmer, just in order to show the complexity of the analysis involved. The aim of Habermas synthesis, he writes, is:

". . . to avoid the pitfalls of empiricism as well as of transcendental and absolute idealism, while relating the respective truth of these different and mutually incompatible epistemological positions. Roughly speaking, this materialist theory of knowledge will therefore have to assimilate Kant's critique of empiricism and Hegel's critique of transcendentalism as well as the empiricist critique of absolute idealism. Reformulated in this way, Marx's programmatic demand for a naturalism which "is distinguished from both idealism and materialism, and at the same time constitutes their unifying truth" now appears as the fantastic demand for a materialist version of the Phenomenology of Mind." (On critical theory / edited by John O'Neill, p. 259).

Saturday, January 15, 2005

transcendentalism and reconciliation with nature

Joel Whitebook in his seminal piece “The problem of Nature in Habermas” (Joel Whitebook, “The Problem of Nature in Habermas” Telos (SUM 79); 41-69.) asserts that “Habermas’ transcendentalism necessarily precludes any reconciliation with nature.” (p. 41) He asserts that Habermas’ transcendental justification of critical theory comes at the expense of the ideal of reconciliation with nature. In this context Whitebook calls for “a non-regressive reconciliation with nature.” (p. 42). A reconciliation with nature would be non-regressive, claims Whitebook, to the extent that it would be able to treat nature in non-instrumental terms while avoiding slide back to what he terms as “pre-rational, e.g; mythical, forms of thought.” (ibid.).

Habermas' acceptance of transcendentalism, asserts Whitebook, involves him in following paradox:

“To the extent that [the] transcendental structures “have their basis in the natural history of the species,” they possess a certain facticity and can be examined through empirical anthropology. If, however, these transcendental structures are only the product of evolution, then a naturalistic interpretation of reason – with its inescapable scepticism – would be unavoidable. Reason would simply be an “organ of adaptation for men just as claws and teeth are for animals,” and no claims for its autonomy could be made. Habermas argues that, although reason has its genesis in natural evolution, at some point in that process, reason transcends the conditions of its genesis and achieves a degree of autonomy.” (p. 48, emphasis in the original).


“[The] dilemma has its origin in the fact that the knowing subject, which constitutes nature as an object of knowledge, is itself a product of nature. In other words, the difficulty arises from the fact that the constituted constitute the constituter. An anthropology of knowledge, if it is to avoid a vicious circle, cannot simply be an empirical theory, but must contain a “reflective” moment as well.” (ibid.)

“Leaving aside attempt to synthesize materialism and transcendentalism arises concerning pre-human nature. Does the “materialist” claim that pre-human nature produces subjective, as McCarthy asks, not throw Habermas back into pre-critical ontology that violates this transcendental posture? The question cannot, account for the transition from pre-human to human nature. In both cases, he wants to say more than can legitimately be said from within the confines of his position.” (ibid; p. 49).

I would like to challange Whitebook's view in the future posts.

Adorno and Critical theory (1)

Brunkhorst contrasts modernity of Judaeo Christian tradition (of whose flag bearer are Adorno,Horkheimer and Habermas!!) with an alleged un-modernity of Greek tradition of whose flag barer is Heidegger.

This is an Habermasian move but Brunkhorst fills in details in a lively manner, which is at times insightful and moving.

“[Adorno and Horkheimer] repudiate a privileged and theoretical model of knowing in favour of the project of practically transforming the world, a materialist this-worldly negativism and fallibilism, all these are central themes which they share with Habermas and the pragmatists from Dewey to Putnam. And they are also themes which distance them from Greek thought and its contemplative metaphysics, along with the correspondence theory of truth, all of them ideas which must be ascribed to the other tradition of European self-understanding, that deriving form the biblical thought of the Jewish and Christian monotheism.”

“In redemptive religions, the privileged access to moral insight is destroyed and exposed as the ideology of the propertied male classes. In order to experience injustice, it is not necessary to have the wisdom of well-to-do, worldly-wise old men experienced in matters of power who, worldly-wise old men experienced in matters of power . . . . Only theodicy of suffering pushes through to the true, the moral, and egalitarian concept of justice; injustice which has been experienced becomes the foundation of a moral insight accessible to everyone. Insight into experienced injustice is the privilege of the underprivileged. Behind the veil of ecstasy, the redemptive religions articulate the reflective force of this insight.” (Adorno and Critical Theory, pp. 107-108).

Though any such view is faced with a paradox: If “Insight into experienced injustice is the privilege of the underprivileged” then how such undeniably privileged people as Habermas and Brunkhorst have access to this?

Thursday, January 13, 2005

Marx-Habermas and Naturalism-Idealism

I thought following interpretation of Marx by Albrecht Wellmer is very close to the interpretation I am trying to develop of Habermas (after taking the difference between Marx’s and Habermas’ position into account). Albrecht Wellmer is one of the “most interesting students of Adorno” (the words are more of less of Andrew Bowie) working today.

Marx calls his philosophy of labour “naturalism” or “humanism” and he opposes it to both idealism and the older forms of materialism (i.e.; in particular the “physicalist” materialism of the eighteenth century). “We see here,” Marx states, “how consistent naturalism or humanism is distinguished from both idealism and materialism, and at the same time constitutes their unifying truth. We also see that only naturalism is able to comprehend the process of world history (Karl Marx's early writings, ed. T. B. Bottomore p. 206)."Habermas on Peirce". ” In the first of this theses on Feuerbach Marx summarizes concisely what he means by his dialectical overcoming of both idealism and materialism: “The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism – that of Feuerbach included – is that the thing, reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the object or of contemplation, but not as human sensuous activity, practice, not subjectively. Hence it happened that the active side, in the contradistinction to materialism, was developed by idealism – but only abstractly, since of course, idealism does not know real, sensuous activity as such.(Marx's and Engls' Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy, ed. L. S. Feuer, p. 283On critical theory / edited by John O'Neill, p. 231]

Habermas like above criticises what he calls strong naturalism of Quine and others (including what he disparagingly calls “empiricist" tradition as a whole) for neglecting the active side of the subject (subject of course re-conceptualised in accordance with the requirements of linguistic turn and emphasis on intersubjectivity) and for that he still turns to “idealism” and try to incorporate that into his overall naturalistic framework. Similarly he criticises “strong” idealism for neglecting the material, naturalistic side. Habermas’ aim, like Marx, is to synthesise the active side of “idealism” and the “passive” side of materialism in an overall naturalistic framework. This is the aim of Habermas’ weak naturalism.

Wednesday, January 12, 2005

Habermas on Peirce (3)

Mormon Metaphysics has had a post entitled "Habermas on Peirce". It refers to discussion on Peirce here and is worth looking at.

Habermas on Peirce (2)

My earlier poston Peirce and Habermas was based exclusively on Habermas' interpretation of Peirce as found in Knowledge & Human Interest. So in order not to give any wrong impression I would add here a paragraph from Swindal which fruitfully summarises Habermas' later views on Peirce.

"It is important to note, however, that Habermas later modifies his early interpretation of Peirce. In "Peirce and Communication" (in Postmetaphysical Thinking) he presents a more sanguine view of the categories of representation present in Peirce' s logic of language. Habermas now acknowledge the intersubjectvity implied in Peirce' s claim that every sign has both a "quasi-utterer" and a "quasi-interpreter" (Postmetaphysical Thinking, pp. 88-89). He admits that Perice expanded the realm of sign usage into the realm of linguistic forms of expression by showing that the indexical and iconic functions refer to "analogous" actuality and object-relations independent from mere propositional representation. For Habermas these two functions open up Peirce's theory of meaning to the realms of the aesthetic and social. But Habermas continues to criticize Peirce for ignoring the broader "world-disclosing" function of signs.*

Habermas continues to level the criticism, however, that Peirce attempted to anchor the chain of signifiers in reality and, like the later Husserl in Experience and Judgment, "decended[ed] from the method of a logical genesis of judgments of perception into the realm of pre-predicative experience"(Texte und Kontexte
, p. 98
). Such semantic realism insufficiently accounts for the distinction between first-and second- person discourse, a claim that Habermas develops more fully after Knowledge and Human Interests. Habermas argues that learning processes must be grounded, not in a metaphysical concept of nature, a position which the later Peirce adopted but in actual argumentation with others about practical conflict. Habermas claims that we cannot break out of the sphere of language and argumentation: "we can only establish the relation to reality, which is not equivalent to 'existence,' by projecting a 'transcendence form within'"(Postmetaphysical Thinking, p. 103).**

For Habermas this view of inner transcendence both respects the 'objectivity' of the intersubjectivity of understanding that has become reflexive and avoids the ontologization of reality. He argues that if the learning processes of human species are limited to mirror only w hat is already contained in nature, they lose the convincing power of the better argument, and he espouses instead a kind of "intersubjective realism": agreement always occurs between ego an about something in the world. Both the topic of the agreement and the other with whom agreement is reached give the intersubjective dialogue an objectivity. Habermas claims that the later Peirce abandoned the very moment of "secondness" that limits and distinguishes the self from the other(Postmetaphysical Thinking, p. 110-111). Peirce thus could not account for the fact that an actor maintains the facticity of his difference and uniqueness (Eigensinn) even in the process of successful communication with the other." [Reflection Revisited: Jurgen Habermas's Discursive Theory of Truth, pp. 96-97]

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* Habermas makes a similar point against Quine in his Truth and Justification p. 23.
** Incidentally this would be Habermas' answer to those who accuse him of returning to pre-critical ontology by presupposing a "weak naturalism".
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Context transcendence and universality

Validity claims are not only universal but also unconditional. In fact Habermas seems at times to suggest that the unconditionality of validity claims follows from their universality. Habermas also occasionally uses the term necessity for validity claims, but the most frequently used term is unconditionality. I shall note the following:

1) Context transcendence does not imply universality. The idea of validity claims shooting each and every context is an empty and meaningless concept. Context transcendence does not mean contextlessness. Only if this were the case would one have been right to think that context transcendence implies universality, in the sense of shooting every context, and hence unconditionality.

2) Thus the concept of universality might be formulated without implying unconditionality. Even validity claims that are claims as to the universality of truth, norms etc., must be raised in a context and can be understood only in a context. And even if we accept claims about the connection between the validity of claims and universal agreement, this idealisation must remain attached to a particular context.

Thus, validity claims can be unconditional neither in the sense that they ‘shoot’ all the contexts, nor in the sense that they can be raised without being situated in a particular context. Habermas has never made the latter contention, but he does seem to have made the former. However, if what I have said above is plausible, then it seems that Habermas’ conceptions of unconditionality and universality are untenable.
 
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