Öffentlicher Raum und politische Öffentlichkeit

Habermas' Nov. 11th acceptance speech for the Kyoto Prize can be read in original German here

courtesy Jeremy J. Shapiro

naturalism in philosophy

Alex Rosenberg writes:

...we may characterize naturalism in philosophy as follows:

1. The repudiation of 'first philosophy'. Epistemology is not to be treated as a propaedeutic to the acquisition of further knowledge.

2. Scientism. The sciences-from physics to psychology and even occasionally sociology, their methods and findings - are to be the guide to epistemology and metaphysics. But the more well established the finding and method the greater the reliance philosophy may place on it. And physics embodies the most well established methods and findings.

3. Darwinism. To a large extent Darwinism theory is to be both the model of scientific theorizing and the guide to philosophical theory because it maximally combines relevance to human affairs and well foundedness.

Naturalism in the philosophy of science adds another element to this credo:

4. Progressivity. Arguments from the history of sociology of science to the non-rationality, or nor cumlativity, or non-progressive character of science, are all either unsound and/or invalid.

A Field Guide to Recent Species of Naturalism

Just a quick note with reference to Habermas:

Speaking very roughly I would say Habermas would accept the first proposition wholeheartedly as far as Epistemology is conceived as a project of first philosophy. He would probably also accept the 4th proposition with may be some rephrasing. However he would reject 2 & 3. He would say about (2) that it is not naturalism it is reductionism. Scientific method and Sciences are tiny part of "nature and knowledge about nature". As for (3) he would say what we need is to combine Kant and Darwin (see
Truth and Justification, introduction)

Professor Rosenberg's above paper can be downloaded from here

Also few other papers by Rosenberg are available for download from his site Alex Rosenberg

Also an interesting course on naturalism with links to some very interesting papers Naturalism Course Schedule

Habermas on Quine

"Strong naturalism, whose paradigmatic representative has been W. V. Quine, allies itself with a scientific understanding of our cognitive abilities. All cognition is ultimately reducible to empirical processes. The transcendental architectonic drops out, as does the difference between the conditions of how world is constituted (or of world disclosure), which calls for conceptual analysis, on the one hand, and states of affairs and events in the world, which can be explained causally, on the other. If we repudiate the transcendental difference between the world and what is innerworldly, then we also get rid of the assumption that it is necessary for governing scepticism about a "world of appearances," which might represent a partial segment or a prospectively distorted view of a "world in itself." And as the methodological dualism of an interpretive reconstruction of our lifeworld, on the one hand, and the explanation of processes in the objective world, on the other, dissipates, so does the paradoxical task of somehow reconciling the "internal perspective" of transcendentally conceived practice of lifeworld with the "external perspective" of their causal genesis."

Truth and Justification p. 23

continued from here

Quine and Habermas

I am planning to write a section on Quine and Habermas in my thesis. I have been thinking about it for some time now and have been reading a lot of Quine (a lot relative to my own standards!). Habermas has not written much on Quine however in his book Truth and Justification he has some discussion of Quine. He brings in Quine as a paradigm case of 'strong' naturalism in order to differentiate his own ‘weak naturalism’ from it [on the other hand he brings in Heidegger as a paradigm case of what I would call 'strong' idealism and again in order to differentiate his own version of anti-naturalism (i.e. why his naturalism is ‘weak’)from it].

Today I am going to put couple of quotes from Quine with brief comments just in order to show the direction of my thinking at this moment:

Qunie describes naturalism in these words:

...naturalism: abandonment of the goal of a first philosophy . . .
The naturalistic philosopher begins his reasoning within the inherited world theory as a going concern. He tentatively believes all of it, but believes also that some unidentified portions are wrong. He tries to improve, clarify, and understand the system from within. He is the busy sailor adrift on Neurath's boat.

Theories and Things p. 72

I will try to note as much similarities between Habermas and Quine as I can think of (or make up) as their differences are already very well known and somewhat overstated.

1) Habermas agrees with Quine on the need for the abandonment of first philosophy and as in Quine, in Habermas as well, it is the logical conclusion of a thoroughgoing naturalism.

2) Habermas would also agree with Quine that we must start with the given (although they would certainly disagree on the nature of this given). Furthermore Habermas shares Quine's 'tentative' (hypothetical) and fallibilistic attitude towards truth claims or theory construction.

3) Habermas would also agree with Quine that we do not have any Archimedean point available to us and we develop our theory or raise validity claims from "within" - the example of sailor and boat is also appropriate to describe Habermas' stance in this regard.

Having noted above points let us quote Quine a bit more:

[Naturalism] sees natural science as an inquiry into reality, fallible and corrigible but not answerable to any suprascientific tribunal, and not in need of any justification beyond observation and the hypothetico-deductive method.

Theories and Things p. 72

This clearly shows what separates Habermas from Quine is the latter's scientism. Importantly Quine contrasts his naturalism to 'suprascientific tribunal' while Habermas would contrast it with 'supernatural tribunal' which implies that for Habermas suprascientific is not supranatural.

Habermas’ weak naturalism

Habermas’ weak naturalism:

. . . “our” learning processes, that are possible within the framework of sociocultural forms of life, are in a sense simply the continuation of prior “evolutionary learning process” that in turn gave rise to our forms of life. For then the structures that form the transcendental conditions of possibility of our kinds of learning process themselves turn out to be the result of less complex, natural learning processes – and thereby themselves acquire a cognitive content. The “continuation” of learning process at a higher level, however must be understood in the sense of a “weak” naturalism that makes no reductionistic claims. A “strongly” naturalistic explanatory strategy aims to replace the conceptual analysis of practices of the lifeworld with a scientific neurological or biogenetic explanation of the achievements of the human brain. In contrast, weak naturalism contents itself with the basic background assumption with the basic background assumption that the biological endowment and the cultural way of life of Homo sapiens have a “natural” origin and can in principle be explained in terms of evolutionary theory.

Truth and Justification pp. 27-28

Few off the cuff remarks (need to edit and revise them later)

1)Habermas introduces his meta-theoretical assumption of ‘weak naturalism’ in the context of his attempt to preserve the distinction between “world” and “innerworldly” even after “detranscendentalisation” (i.e. thoroughgoing naturalism in the sense of soft naturalism).

2)The distinction between world and innerworldly requires some sort of distinction corresponding to Kant’s distinction between “transcendental” and “empirical”. However Habermas wants to do this without reverting back to Kant’s distinction between “pure intelligible” world and “empirical world”. Kant’s realm of pure intelligence has been detranscendentalised that is brought back to “this world”.

3)So Habermas aims at a thoroughgoing detranscendentalisation without however surrendering the Kantian distinction between “transcendental” and “empirical” which now takes the form of distinction between worldly and innerworldly.

4)At this point Habermas suggest that in order to preserve the Kantian distinction we do not need to abandon naturalism, what we need to get rid of is rather a representational model of knowledge.

5)It is here that Habermas introduces his “weak naturalism” as a meta-theoretical assumption.

6)The meta-theoretical assumption is not about the purported “conformity between mind-independent world and the structure of mind.” The problem of the conformity of the structure of mind with reality belongs to the representational model of knowledge and becomes irrelevant after a thoroughgoing detranscendentalisation.

7)What Habermas needs to assume is rather a general notion that both “world” and “mind” are natural (in the sense of soft naturalism).

8)However after above assumption he needs to show that mind’s spontaneity can be explained in naturalistic terms, that is without referring back to the Kantian distinction between intelligible and phenomenal world.

9)If he can show the above it will strengthen his initial assumption in turn.

10)Thus on the one hand (nature and culture) are continuous in the sense that both are to be ultimately explained in natural terms (in the sense of soft naturalism), however we also need to explain discontinuity between them, however without going back to the Kantian dichotomy. Habermas believes that in order to do that he only needs to make one assumption and that is his assumption of weak naturalism.

continued from here

Morality, Law and Deliberative Democracy

Morality, Law and Deliberative Democracy - An Enquiry Concerning Jürgen Habermas’ and Karl-Otto Apel’s Discursive Programs of Justification

It is my overall critical thesis that neither Habermas ́s programs, nor Apel ́s program succeed in fully overcoming the major immanent problems of the discourse ethics. The first major immanent problem consists of the fact that the discourse ethics on the one hand reduces practical validity to be the outcome of a purely formal procedure, but on the other hand strives to give substance (moral relevance) to this formal procedure. The second problem concerns how these few transcendental fundamental norms can play a significant role in regard to all the substantial norms that are not transcendentally justified.


A thesis on Habermas and Apel by Sigurd Lauridsen can be downloaded from here

Heidegger and Habermas

An interesting article on Habermas Heidegger relation is available online Heidegger's Challenge and the Future of Critical Theory

The article seems to be a previous version of what finally appeared in Habermas: A Critical Reader Edited By: PETER DEWS as "Heidegger's Challenge and the Future of Critical Theory / Nikolas Kompridis." I have not checked it though.

There is an interesting discussion of this paper here and here


Earlier I had come across another interesting article on Heidegger's conception of freedom called Primordial freedom: The Authentic Truth of Dasein in Heidegger's 'Being and Time' from here. I have not thoroughly studied it yet but it might be very relevant to Habermas Heidegger debate.

Also see this article which has been very fruitful for my pursuit of Habermas Heidegger connections

Christopher McNicholls (1991) “Ontological Freedom as the essence of Dasein: Heidegger’s overcoming of Objectivism and Subjectivism” Gnosis; 3(4): 1-33.

Reason, Society and Religion

Reason, Society and Religion: Reflections on 11 September from a Habermasian Perspective

Andy Wallace
Department of Philosophy, California State University, Sonoma, CA, USA

I have two main objectives in this essay: (1) to situate the events of 11 September within the context of the impact of modernization on religious consciousness and institutions; and (2) to suggest, albeit without adequate empirical support, that militant Islamic opposition to the West in general and the United States in particular is itself an effect of the peculiar path of modernization that has unfolded in the Gulf region of the Middle East over the last 200 years. To develop my argument, I draw upon Habermas's theory of social evolution. Since this strategy requires explaining the key components of that theory, I devote a good part of the article to this task.

The paper has five parts. In parts one and two, I criticize competing explanations of the events of 11 September from left, right and center. All these positions fail in one way or another to take seriously the religious significance of those events. In part three, I explain the six central dimensions of Habermas's theory of social evolution: (1) communicative rationality; (2) communicative action; (3) life-world; (4) system; (5) social typology; and (6) the systemic colonization of the life-world. In part four, I examine the relation between religion and modernity. In part five, I examine the modernization processes in the Gulf region of the Middle East. Empirical evidence tentatively suggests that such a process has been one-dimensional, focusing on systemic complexity to the detriment of the communicative rationalization of the life-world. Such evidence also indicates the existence of widespread systemic colonization of the life-world. If the empirical data are correct, then we can explain the emergence of extreme militant Islamic fundamentalism as an effect of a retarded development of those socio-political structures necessary for the realization of communicative rationality.

Apparently it can be downloaded for free from here. At least I did.

Henrich's critique of Habermas

I need to consider Henrich's critique of Habermas in detail later but I want to make couple of brief points about Henrich's critique as presented by Peter Dews. Dews writes:

"Recently, however, Dieter Henrich has claimed that the naturalistic strain in Habermas's thought cannot be easily reconciled with his borrowings from the traditions of phenomenology and transcendental philosophy. Habermas claims that one of the tasks of contemporary philosophy is a hermeneutical exploration - from 'within', as it were - of the structures of meaning which constitute the lifeworld. But such a conception of shared meanings as constituting the 'condition of possibility' of experience, is hardly compatible with the efforts to achieve a naturalistic reduction of phenomena of meaning and consciousness which characterise analytical philosophy. On Henrich's view, analytical naturalism has at least the merit of presenting a coherent 'anti-metaphysics', whereas Habermas seems to be pulled in two directions at once."

Naturalism and Anti-naturalism in Habermas's Philosophy

Elsewhere Peter Dews writes:

"Henrich argued that Habermas' philosophy finds itself torn between the contradictory tendencies of naturalism and transcendentalism. Habermas' position, he claimed, is philosophically inconsistent, because - on the one hand - it presupposes a pragmatic and socio-scientific conception of language and communication, and - on the other hand - also draws on the tradition of transcendental phenomenology in its elaboration of the concept of lifeworld."

The Limits of Disenchantment Essays on Contemporary European Philosophy p. 160

I want to make two brief comments on the above passages:

1) Henrich considers Habermas' attempt to combine naturalism with transcendentalism a contradiction while I consider it an innovation and investigate logic of any such enquiry in my thesis.

2) It should be noted that when Henrich talks of "naturalism" or "analytical naturalism" what he means is "hard naturalism" and does not seem to have considered the difference between "hard naturalism" and "soft naturalism" we have mentioned earlier here. If this is true then it takes lot of sting out of Henrich's criticism at the outset.

Ein letzter Gruß

Ein letzter Gruß
Derridas klärende Wirkung
VON JÜRGEN HABERMAS

Jacques Derrida hat, wie nur noch Michel Foucault, den Geist einer ganzen Generation in Bewegung gesetzt. Er hält diese Generation bis heute in Atem. Aber anders als Foucault, obwohl ein politischer Denker wie dieser, hat Derrida die Impulse seiner Schüler in die Bahnen eines Exerzitiums gelenkt. Primär geht es ihm nicht um den Inhalt einer Lehre, nicht einmal um die Einübung in ein Vokabular, das einen neuen Blick auf die Welt erschließt. Darum geht es auch. Aber die Einübung in das mikrologische Lesen und das Auffinden von Spuren in Texten, die der Zeit stand gehalten haben, ist Selbstzweck. Wie Adornos Negative Dialektik, so ist auch Derridas Dekonstruktion wesentlich eine Praxis. Viele wussten von der schweren Krankheit, mit der Derrida souverän umging. Der Tod kam nicht unerwartet. Aber nun trifft er uns doch als ein plötzliches, ein voreiliges Ereignis - es reißt uns aus der Gewohnheit und dem Gleichmut des Alltags heraus. Gewiss wird der Denker, der seine ganze intellektuelle Energie an die inständige Lektüre großer Texte verausgabt und der den Vorrang der überlieferungsfähigen Schrift vor der Präsenz des gesprochenen Wortes gefeiert hat, in seinen eigenen Texten weiterleben. Aber jetzt wissen wir, dass uns Derridas Stimme und Derridas Gegenwart fehlen werden.

Seinen Lesern begegnet Derrida als ein Autor, der jeden Text solange gegen den Strich liest, bis er einen subversiven Sinn preisgibt. Unter seinem unnachgiebigem Blick zerfällt jeder Zusammenhang in Fragmente. Jeder vermeintlich feste Boden gerät ins Schwanken, verrät einen doppelten Boden. Die gewohnten Hierarchien, Ordnungen und Oppositionen eröffnen uns einen gegenläufigen Sinn. Die Welt, in der wir zuhause zu sein scheinen, ist unbewohnbar. Nicht von dieser Welt, bleiben wir Fremde unter Fremden. Zuletzt war die religiöse Botschaft kaum noch chiffriert.

Selten gibt es Texte, die den anonymen Lesern auch das Gesicht ihres Autors so deutlich zu enthüllen scheinen. Tatsächlich gehört Derrida aber zu den Autoren, die ihre Leser bei der ersten persönlichen Begegnung überraschen. Er war anders, als man erwartete - eine ungemein liebenswürdige, fast elegante, gewiss verletzbare und sensible, aber gewandte und, sobald er Vertrauen gefasst hatte, sympathisch offene, eine freundliche und zur Freundschaft bereite Person. Ich bin froh, dass Derrida wieder Vertrauen gefasst hat, als wir uns hier in der Nähe Chicagos, in Evanston, von wo aus ich ihm diesen letzten Gruß zuschicke, vor sechs Jahren wiedersahen.

Derrida ist Adorno nie begegnet. Aber bei der Verleihung des Adorno-Preises hat er in der Paulskirche eine Rede gehalten, die im Gestus des Denkens, bis in die geheimen Falten der romantischen Traummotive, Adornos eigenem Geist nicht hätte verwandter sein können. Die jüdischen Wurzeln sind das verbindende Element ihres Denkens. Gershom Scholem blieb für Adorno eine Herausforderung, Emmanuel Levinas ist für Derrida zu einem Lehrer geworden. Derridas Werk kann in Deutschland auch deshalb eine klärende Wirkung entfalten, weil es sich den späten Heidegger aneignet, ohne an den mosaischen Anfängen neuheidnisch Verrat zu üben.

Jürgen Habermas ist em. Professor für Philosophie an der Universität Frankfurt/M. und lehrt Philosophie an der Northwestern University in Evanston bei Chicago.

Ein letzter Gruß Derridas klärende Wirkung VON JÜRGEN HABERMAS

Habermas and Schelling

"For the Kant of the Critique of Pure Reason (1781, 1787) nature is largely seen in the ‘formal’ sense: nature is that which is subject to necessary laws. These laws are accessible to us, Kant argues, because cognition depends on the subject bringing necessary forms of thought, the categories, to bear on what it perceives. The problem this leads to is how the subject could fit into a nature conceived of in deterministic terms, given that the subject's ability to know is dependent upon its ‘spontaneous’ self-caused ability to judge in terms of the categories. Kant's response to this dilemma is to split the ‘sensuous’ realm of nature as law-bound appearance from the ‘intelligible’ realm of the subject's cognitive and ethical self-determination. However, if the subject is part of nature there would seem to be no way of explaining how a nature which we can only know as deterministic can give rise to a subject which seems to transcend determinism in its knowing and in its ethical doings. Kant himself sought to bridge the realms of necessity and spontaneity in the Critique of Judgement (1790), by suggesting that nature itself could be seen in more than formal terms: it also produces self-determining organisms and can give rise to disinterested aesthetic pleasure in the subject that contemplates its forms. The essential problems remained, however, that 1) Kant gave no account of the genesis of the subject that transcends its status as a piece of determined nature, and 2) such an account would have to be able to bridge the divide between nature and freedom."

Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling

Compare with Habermas' Ontological conception of Freedom: Some preliminary Reflections
--------------------

"In the fullest statement of his identity philosophy, the unpublished 'Würzburg System'of 1804, Schelling equates natura naturans with the infinite self-affirmation of a pantheistically interpreted God, while natura naturata is understood as the world of dependent - and thus transient - things. The characterisation of natura naturans as the spontaneous creative principle of the natural world has the consequences that even the most elementary forms of the material world conceal a core of self-relatedness, without which the emergence of organic life, and ultimately the conscious life of humanity, would remain inexplicable . . . Habermas would presumably reject such assertions as extravagant speculation, yet . . . even he must admit that, in the final analysis, we cannot rest content with understanding nature in terms of physicalistic world-view inspired by the natural sciences. If this is indeed the case, then the question is raised of whether it might not be legitimate at least to speculate about an alternative image of nature to that which predominates in our technological society, and about what its ethical consequences might be"

The Limits of Disenchantment Essays on Contemporary European Philosophy p. 161

-----------
Having Dews' above comments in mind let us consider Maeve Cooke's consideration of Habermas' thesis about "Weak naturalism". Cooke says that there are three possible ways in which to consider Habermas' "hypothesis":

"One possibility is that it should be understood as an empirically based, essentially fallible hypothesis about the natural history of human spices, and the socio-cultural forms that have emerged in connection with this; on such an interpretation, Habermas' meta-theoretical assumption would amount to a weak transcendental argument about a conformity between a mind-independent world and the structures of the human mind. A second possibility is that it is strong transcendental argument: the assumption in question would be seen as a metaphysically based, apriori assumption about the structure or shape of the world that reflects an apriori truth about the structures of the human mind-one that could not be disproved by empirical findings of any kind. A third possibility - not one mentioned explicitly by Habermas - is that it is a 'moderate' transcendental argument: the assumption about the structure of shape of the world that reflects a similar kind of assumption about the structures of human mind, whose claim to truth has to be subjected to critical scrutiny in essentially open-ended intersubjective process of rational evaluation; whereas empirical findings are always relevant in such argumentative processes, they lack the power to refute conclusively the metaphysically based claims under discussion"

Socio-Cultural Learning as a 'Transcendental Fact': Habermas's Postmetaphysical Perspective

[my comments to follow]

Naturalism and Anti-naturalism in Habermas's Philosophy

Naturalism and Anti-naturalism in Habermas's Philosophy
Peter Dews
Habermas's philosophical work has been shaped, all the way through, by the motif of the "desublimation of reason", a motif which derives from the Young Hegelians and from Marx. The suggestion is that the metaphysical tradition of Western thought has hypostatised an unchanging, ideal realm to which thought and action must conform, thereby inhibiting the possibility of human beings taking their destiny into their own hands. Since it is suspicious of the ideal, the project of the desublimation of reason involves an emphasis on our status as natural beings, and an attempt to provide a naturalistic genetic account of phenomena such as meaning, truth, and moral normativity.
Clearly, there are parallels between this notion of desublimation and a dominant strain within analytical philosophy in the twentieth century. Analytical philosophers, too, have been suspicious of the ambitions of traditional metaphysics and have - for the most part - sought to provide local explanations within the framework of a naturalistic world-view. It might be argued that these parallels are deceptive, since the pressure towards naturalism in analytical philosophy largely stems from the successes of the natural sciences. By contrast, in the case of continental philosophy naturalism has never been without powerful opposition, and is usually part of a specific political or moral project, one which is often suspicious of the epistemological hegemony of the natural sciences. It is arguable, nevertheless, that the predominant naturalism of the analytical tradition has helped to make some aspects of analytical philosophy congenial and useful for Habermas's enterprise.
Recently, however, Dieter Henrich has claimed that the naturalistic strain in Habermas's thought cannot be easily reconciled with his borrowings from the traditions of phenomenology and transcendental philosophy. Habermas claims that one of the tasks of contemporary philosophy is a hermeneutical exploration - from 'within', as it were - of the structures of meaning which constitute the lifeworld. But such a conception of shared meanings as constituting the 'condition of possibility' of experience, is hardly compatible with the efforts to achieve a naturalistic reduction of phenomena of meaning and consciousness which characterise analytical philosophy. On Henrich's view, analytical naturalism has at least the merit of presenting a coherent 'anti-metaphysics', whereas Habermas seems to be pulled in two directions at once.
Habermas has replied to this criticism, of course. He contends that we are not in fact faced with such a stark choice. Many of the most influential twentieth century philosophers have operated in an intermediate domain, developing concepts of language, or of the body, which bridge the gap between the naturalistic and the transcendental standpoints. It is Henrich who is trapped in an antiquated dualism. My paper will evaluate the arguments on each side of this debate. My suggestion will be that the conflict between naturalism and anti-naturalism cannot be overcome as easily as Habermas supposes. If this is the case, then there will also be consequences for our understanding of the relation between analytical and continental philosophy.

Naturalism and Anti-naturalism in Habermas's Philosophy

----------------
"[Even after the detranscendentalisation of the knowing and acting subject] the problem of naturalism does not simply vanish into thin air. It merely arises in another way for those theories that do indeed being with questions posed transcendentally, yet do not get stuck cutting the intelligible off from the phenomenal once for all. These theories must find answer to the question of how Kant can be reconciled with Darwin. It seems to me that it has been clear since Marx that the normative content of modernity can be taken up and preserved even and especially under materialistic premises. "Nature in itself" does not coincide with objectivated nature. What Marx has in mind is the emergence in natural history of the sociocultural form of life Homo sapiens, which goes beyond physcially objectified natura naturata
to conceptually include, as it were, a piece of natura naturans
. A naturalism of this sort need not be accompanied by an objectivistic self description of culture, society, and the individual."

Postmetaphysical Thinking Philosophical Essays p. 20

---------------------------------------------

Related post 1: Habermas' naturalism/anti-naturalism

Related post 2: Habermas and Idealism

Related post 3: Habermas and Naturalism

Habermas' naturalism/anti-naturalism

The issue of naturalism/anti-naturalism of Habermas can be dealt with from three different angles. In what follows I shall briefly explain these three different approaches and their interrelation:

a)Initially the issue of naturalism/anti-naturalism was raised by environmentalists within Critical theory tradition (mainly by followers of Marcuse such as Hans Joans and minor figures such as Joel Whitebook. In English speaking world Peter Dews has consistently followed this line of argument). Here the debate focused on the concept of “nature” in Habermas. The critique/questioning concentrated on Habermas’ presumed privileging of human beings over nature. Thus the object of questioning in this line of critique has been Habermas’ alleged “anthropocentricism” and his “humanism”. This kind of thinking focuses on Habermas’ early take on Schelling and urges him to expand his conception of “nature” in such a way that it can be rendered sensitive to new environmental ethos.

b)While the first line of critique questions Habermas’ alleged anti-naturalism the second kind of critique questions his alleged naturalism. The second line of critique focuses on the ‘mind’ ‘body’ problem. Habermas’ so-called weak naturalism has been the object of speculations in this context. Habermas’ critique of ‘subject’ and his proposal for the detranscendnetalisation of the subject have been interpreted as drift towards ‘naturalism’. Dieter Henrich is a key figure in this debate. His allies in English speaking world in this context are Peter Dews (somewhat surprisingly given his position in a) and Dieter Freundlieb among others.

c)There is a third consideration which has been absent from the discussion to this day. The position can be best understood as classifying naturalism into ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ naturalism.Soft naturalism can be understood in contrast with supernaturalism, while hard naturalism should be understood as a position within ‘soft naturalism’ which tries to explain all natural phenomena including human mind and subjectivity in physicalistic terms. Thus there can be a a naturalist position in the first sense (soft naturalism) which is not necessarily naturalist in the second sense (hard naturalism) [I have taken the distinction between 'soft' and 'hard' naturalism from Frederick A. Olafson's excellent short study Naturalism and the Human Condition: Against Scientism

As a thinker of the stature of master thinkers Habermas focuses mainly on the question of ‘soft naturalism’ and its compatibility with certain idealist/anti naturalist assumptions about subject and reason.

If we approach the issue from third angle, the first two approaches can be reformulated in a way in which they do not necessarily remain exclusive approaches. It may be the case that Habermas is anti-naturalist and naturalist at the same time and this would require a total reconfiguration of debates in a and b.

---
"P.Dews correctly characterizes my account of the consistency of an uncommon combination as follows: "It is the combination of the anti-idealism with anti-scientism and a propensity toward naturalism which makes for the distinctiveness of Habermas' work. It marks him out as belonging to a sub-tradition which ultimately derives from the world of Hegel's left-wing followers during the 1830s and 40s""

Truth and Justification p. 296 n. 37

Henrich after Habermas

On the Incompleteness of George Herbert Mead's Theory of the Social Self as an Account of Intersubjectivity: Re-reading Henrich after Habermas

New Habermas related titles

Two of the following are from Australian authors and are good:

Critical Theory After Habermas Encounters and Departures Edited by Dieter Freundlieb, Wayne Hudson and John Rundell

Mostly consists of already published papers in Critical Horizon but some have been revised for this edition with a noteworthy introduction.

Dieter Henrich and Contemporary Philosophy
The Return to Subjectivity Dieter Freundlieb

First book legnth lucid introduction to Henrich in English but half of it is really about Habermas Henrich debate. Shows the importance of Habermas for the contemporary philosophy.

Habermas, Nietzsche, and Critical Theory

Contains important article by Max Pensky and Habermas' "Nietzsche and Habermas's discourse of modernity -- Postscript from 1968 : on Nietzsche's theory of knowledge"

New Schelling

Contains an article by Habermas.

Between Facts and Norms

Gary Sauer-Thompson at his excellent Philosophy.com has posted interesting thoughts on Habermas' Between Facts and Norms. I have also left short comments.

Related post 1: Habermas’ Between Facts and Norms:Legitimizing Power? by Abdollah Payrow Shabani

Related post 2: Transcendence from within

New search resource: Google Scholar

I just had a go at it, and it is amazing, much powerful than Philosopher index for example!

Google scholar

As Gary says it is destined to become a major academic resource.

Good thing for the final stages of my Ph.D:)

And now this as well, thanks to Thivai Abhor for the link.

Habermas and Blogs

Some thoughts on Habermas' theory of communicative action and its application to the phenomenon of blogging Blogs and Habermas Referrs to Understanding Weblogs: A communicative perspective and emergent democracy.

I have also come across a Habermasian blog today Discourse.net

This should be of use to all those interested in speech act theory, Searle Habermas debate etc. as well Deconstruction and Speech Act Theory:A Defence of the Distinction between Normal and Parasitic Speech Acts by Kevin Halion

via Mormon Metaphysics

Validity claims, Unconditionality, Universality and Modernism in Habermas: A reappraisal

Please note that this is a work in progress, so your comments etc. are most welcome and much appreciated.

Reading Owen’s "Between Reason and History: Habermas and the idea of Progress"

One of the most interesting recent pieces on Habermas' changing views on justification and its need Farewell to Justification by Farid Abdel Nour

Farewell to Justification
Habermas, Human Rights, and Universalist Morality
Farid Abdel-Nour
Department of Political Science, San Diego State University, CA, USA

In his recent work, Jürgen Habermas signals the abandonment of his earlier claims to justify human rights and universalist morality. This paper explains the above shift, arguing that it is the inescapable result of his attempts in recent years to accommodate pluralism. The paper demonstrates how Habermas’s universal pragmatic justification of modern normative standards was inextricably tied to his consensus theory of validity. He was compelled by the structure of that argument to count on the current or future availability of a unified framework within which all can potentially articulate their needs and interests. With his abandonment of the justification Habermas has rid discourse theory of this controversial assumption. In weakening its defense of human rights and universalist morality against the charge of ethnocentrism, he has strengthened his theory’s foothold in the lived pluralist world.


Key Words: argumentation • ethnocentrism • Habermas • human rights • justification • legitimacy • pluralism • rational consensus • Rehg

Habermas and Idealism

Habermas continues to cleave to key idealist premises and presuppositions even after the linguistic turn and detranscendentalisation. Habermas holds fast to the fundamental idealist premise that empirical order and rational order are mutually exclusive. Habermas’ claims about the detranscendentalisation of the subject and reason, and his claim that reason is a ‘thing of this world,’ does not in any way mean that he has given up the fundamental idealist belief mentioned above. Rather what he does, in his own words, is to bring down the idealisation “from transcendental heaven to the earth of the lifeworld. The theory of communicative action detranscendentalizes the noumenal realm only to have the idealizing force of context transcending anticipation settle in the . . . heart of ordinary, everyday communicative practice.” (Between Facts and Norms p. 19). Habermas does not aim to abolish the noumenal realm; so much as to bring it back to the earth.

Hence Habermas does not abolish the realm of pure intelligibility- the realm of reason devoid of any empirical impurities. He detranscendentalises it, i.e. brings it back to the earth. However by effecting this relocation he does not aim to merge the empirical and the rational order. This is what he means when he talks about the tension between facts and ideals. Habermas wants to preserve the transcending power of reason even in the face of detranscendentalisation. The problem for him now becomes how to show that the transcending power of reason emerges from within a world that is empirical and contingent. Habermas dubs his strategy ‘transcendence from within and into this world.’ Now he has to show not only how ideality and factuality coexist in this world without merging into each other, but also how ideality emerges from within the contingent world in the first place.

related posts 1: transcendence-from-within.html

related posts 2: Validity claims, Unconditionality, Universality and Modernism in Habermas: A reappraisal

Habermas and Naturalism

One of the key features/characteristics of Habermas’ long oeuvre is his constant attempt to go beyond empiricism and idealism/ naturalism and anti-naturalism. Empiricism and Idealism as well as naturalism and anti-naturalism are to be taken in the broad sense of the terms.

Habermas’ purpose has always been to combine the ‘empirical’ and ‘transcendental’ in his constant effort to go beyond transcendence-less empiricism and highflying idealism. The project is in fact a continuation of Kant who was on of the first in modern philosophy to combine rationalism and empiricism through his transcendental/empirical project (hence transcending empiricism rationalism dichotomy). However Habermas wants to do this without reproducing the two-world dichotomy Kant ended up with. Kant, as Habermas reads him, on the one hand posited a world of pure intelligibility (the realm of necessity, transcendence and unconditionality) and on the other hand he posited a phenomenal world (the realm of contingency, natural and conditional). Habermas’ overall position is naturalist (as against Kant for example) in the sense that he wants to preserve the Kantian distinction between ‘empirical’ and ‘transcendental’ however without reproducing the two world dichotomy. In other words, Habermas wants to incorporate the Kantian distinction in an overall naturalistic picture of the world (in the broad sense of the word natural).

Habermas’ another great model is Marx in this respect. Marx on the one hand rejects idealism fiercely and ferociously and puts forward a position that is thoroughly materialist and naturalist. However Marx retains certain anti-naturalist premises of idealism, such as his notion of human action as a truly creative force rather than an adaptive mechanism. However Marx wants to reformulate these anti-naturalist premises within an overall naturalist and materialist position. Thus Marx tries to overcome the naturalist anti naturalist dichotomy within an overall naturalist position, so he wants to arrive at an overall naturalist position however the one which is compatible with certain idealist insights about the necessity of explaining the spontaneity of human action and rationality in non reductionist terms. Habermas agree with Marx in this aim however he does not think that Marx ever achieved his goal.

related posts

Habermas’ Between Facts and Norms:Legitimizing Power?

Habermas’ Between Facts and Norms:Legitimizing Power? by Abdollah Payrow Shabani

Related post 1: Transcendence from within

Related post 2: Between Facts and Norms