Sunday, October 17, 2004

Generality, Rationality and Morality . . .

Thus rational argumentation in itself requires the possibility of detachment and reflection (which in a crucial sense requires the production of generality), however moral discourse requires generality more than other discourses because it requires agents to bracket their whole particular orientations and be open to the “other” and her perspective in her unique and irreplaceable otherness. This can not happen without the all inclusivity that involves generality. All rational argumentation requires bracketing particularity, but in moral argumentation this happens in a more radical and all pervasive ways. Moral argumentation like the truth claims and theoretical argumentation, it does not exclude any one in principle. This can in turn happen only to an extent that we are convinced that the particular value orientations and lifeworlds in which we are embedded do not play any essential direct role in regulating human relations as relations.

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