tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8259704.post3511749983682204315..comments2023-03-20T02:38:22.109+11:00Comments on Habermasian Reflections: Habermas and Post-Metaphysical approach.Ali Rizvihttp://www.blogger.com/profile/18007625357436861947noreply@blogger.comBlogger2125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8259704.post-26158008617329901542007-10-18T18:39:00.000+10:002007-10-18T18:39:00.000+10:00Carl thanks for the comments. I will deal with som...Carl thanks for the comments. I will deal with some of them in my next two posts. <BR/><BR/>Cheers<BR/>AliAli Rizvihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18007625357436861947noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8259704.post-81951514330346964772007-10-18T00:11:00.000+10:002007-10-18T00:11:00.000+10:00There's a problem lying in wait for Habermas, a pr...There's a problem lying in wait for Habermas, a problem that he may be especially vulnerable to in light of his Kantian inheritance. <BR/><BR/>Kant famously argues, as noted correctly above, that the concepts of traditional metaphysical speculation cannot be determined in any possible cognition (i.e. experience). Thus, such concepts -- the existence of God, the immortality of the soul, and the freedom of the will -- are necessarily unknowable. <BR/><BR/>But, for all that, they are also no less necessary, in two senses. Firstly, metaphysical concepts are constructed through reason's own desire for the unconditioned. It's clear to me that some "weak" notion of the unconditioned can play a role in Habermas, because he does think that participants in discourse are necessarily committed to universal validity as a regulative idea. But I don't know <I>how</I> Habermas is entitled to retain this Kantian thought that reason transcends understanding. <BR/><BR/>That reason transcends understanding is central to Kant's response to empiricists and skeptics. And it creates the room he needs in order to show why metaphysics, although impossible <I>as knowledge</I>, is nevertheless <I>necessary</I> to reason in some other sense. It seems that "postmetaphysical philosophy" would want to deny this, but I'm not sure how he can get away with it.<BR/><BR/>Secondly, of course, metaphysical concepts are necessary as "postulates of pure practical reason" in order to resolve the antinomy of practical reason, and thereby giving sensuous, finite, and yet also rational beings a motive (as well as a justification) for acting from duty. <BR/><BR/>As a final thought: I don't see why Darwin is necessary here. That is, I don't see why bringing Darwin(ism) into the picture allows one to get out of idealism. Surely one could be both a Darwinian and a transcendental idealist -- one would simply say that Darwinism is merely empirically real, and the truth (or falsity) of transcendental idealism is untouched.<BR/><BR/>Granted, I haven't yet read <I>Truth and Justification</I>, so think of these as questions to be addressed rather than challenges to what he actually says.Carloshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10572308579922684264noreply@blogger.com