tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8259704.post111888956845286347..comments2023-03-20T02:38:22.109+11:00Comments on Habermasian Reflections: A brief statement about my Ph.D. thesisAli Rizvihttp://www.blogger.com/profile/18007625357436861947noreply@blogger.comBlogger4125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8259704.post-1125322445337114582005-08-29T23:34:00.000+10:002005-08-29T23:34:00.000+10:00Gary,1) In my thesis I am using 'transcendentalism...Gary,<BR/><BR/>1) In my thesis I am using 'transcendentalism' in quite specific sense and I explain it in the first chapter. In fact what I understand by 'transcendentalism' is not at all different from what you call a cognitive matter of reflectivity.<BR/><BR/>2) There is a sense in which Habermas transcends German idealism and there is a sense in which he does not transcend it, in fact he continues it. He preserves insight of German idealism that 'space of reasons' is irreducible to 'space of law. 'However he does not establish this distinction by positing two realm ontology, in the manner of Kant. In this sense he definitely transcends German idealism. Thus he wants to establish this distinction from 'within,' and this is one more way in which I understand Habermas' term 'transcendence from within.'<BR/><BR/>I agree with your suggestion re b.<BR/><BR/>AliAli Rizvihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18007625357436861947noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8259704.post-1125281062045740962005-08-29T12:04:00.000+10:002005-08-29T12:04:00.000+10:00Ali,Habermas does not display any "transcendentali...Ali,<BR/><BR/>Habermas does not display any "transcendentalism (about reason)" that is mysterious; it's a cognitive matter of reflectivity---capability for "field independence"---which is an ontogenic achievement, relative to capacities we have inherited from our evolution. <BR/><BR/>In a) and c) of your statement above, you're thinking in terms of a paradigm of German Idealism that Habermas left behind (as a matter of his self-understanding) long ago---a paradigm, however, that one still faces in the academic culture (thus Habermas' critical engagement with its trace-rhetoric). <BR/><BR/>Habermas' understanding of reflectivity ("transcendence from within this world") is a matter of cognitive development of postconventional processes of thinking. Your "conditions of possibility" above are, for Habermas, matters of cognitively-based competences, not something associable <I>for him</I> with Heidegger or Schelling. <BR/><BR/>You face the common graduate student problem of distinguishing what "permeates" <I>your</I> reading and what belongs to the other, i.e., for <I>Habermas'</I> self-understanding, when you claim that something "permeates his work" which "Habermas has never argued." It's more plausible that <I>you</I> are working to overcome transcendentalist longings rather than that Habermas is trying to "retain...the Kantian vision" that he has overtly distanced himself from so overtly, as I indicated at the top of my discussion of "Habermas and Naturalism," cited in my <A HREF="http://groups.yahoo.com/group/habermas/message/1275" REL="nofollow">posting earlier today</A> about your issue of "ontological conception" relative to Habermas' work. "Habermas" is perhaps the straw man in your own process of self-reflectivity, which associates to his early model of emancipatory reflection in terms of psychoanalytic dynamics. <BR/><BR/>re b) above: To "situate Habermas' 'weak' naturalism" properly, one should need to focus on the <I>cognitive</I> background of learning theory, not the idiom of his response to traditional conceptualizations. Such a focus accords with Habermas's overt claims, in the "Introduction" to <I>Truth and Justification</I>, about what he has in mind when he refers to weak naturalism: <B>evolutionary conditions for the possibility of learning</B>.<BR/><BR/>But don't misunderstand: I'm enthusiastic about your project. I wouldn't give time to the long posting today (indicated above) or this note if I was not enthusiastic about your project. I just want to see it go in a direction that may advance Habermasian researches, rather than be regressive.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8259704.post-1119524616609013212005-06-23T21:03:00.000+10:002005-06-23T21:03:00.000+10:00Matt I agree with your comments that Habermas woul...Matt I agree with your comments that Habermas would not rule out the idea and reality of soul. However it depends on what conception of soul you have. A soul that is understood in “this worldly” terms as having evolved "naturally" is at least compatible with Habermas' conception. I take this to be the maxim of Habermas' following comments:<BR/><BR/>" ...blanket assumption of an evolutionary continuity that permeates the culture, as it were, refrains form making any philosophical assumptions about the relationship between mind and body (in the sense of eliminative or reductive materialism, for example); on the contrary, it keeps us from reifying a difference between methodological approaches that are themselves ontologically neutral.” (TJ: 28).<BR/><BR/>BTW Habermas has been increasingly writing on the notion of religion. I will post few links which you might like shortly.<BR/><BR/>thanks again.Ali Rizvihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18007625357436861947noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8259704.post-1119523363448738362005-06-23T20:42:00.000+10:002005-06-23T20:42:00.000+10:00Excuse if this seems silly, as I know it is outsid...Excuse if this seems silly, as I know it is outside the scope of your thesis, but I've been studying alot of Kierkegaard and also a frenchman Jacques Maritain, both Christian. So I'm wondering in Habermas' concept of freedom if there is contemplation of the idea/reality of a soul. If his hypothesis is "that 'reason' and our form of life based on this is the continuation of a prior 'evolutionary learning process'" then it seems he doesn't mention, or rules out, the soul. If there are any links or previous posts I should check out email me and let me know if you would.<BR/><BR/>And just in case you are concerned about the opinion of a rather smart layman, I'd like to say that you explained your thesis quite well here. Your reasoning is clear and I could understand the resulting structure of your work.Markhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04575744386902866631noreply@blogger.com