tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8259704.post111379271692093463..comments2023-03-20T02:38:22.109+11:00Comments on Habermasian Reflections: Habermas and McDowell: Two conceptions of transcendenceAli Rizvihttp://www.blogger.com/profile/18007625357436861947noreply@blogger.comBlogger3125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8259704.post-1113965176075366452005-04-20T12:46:00.000+10:002005-04-20T12:46:00.000+10:00As an afterthought, I thought I should add that, H...As an afterthought, I thought I should add that, Habermas and McDowell can escape Rorty's objection only if they accept Rorty’s basic position that mere appeal to "the world" cannot solve certain fundamental questions which are the basis of disagreement among interlocutors "within a particular lifeworld" or across different lifeworlds. However Habermas and McDowell are right to insist that from the acceptance of the above Rortian position it does not follow that we are not “answerable to the world," for claims we raise within a conversation.Ali Rizvihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18007625357436861947noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8259704.post-1113960157970065452005-04-20T11:22:00.000+10:002005-04-20T11:22:00.000+10:00Carl,It is not clear to me what the confusion is? ...Carl,<BR/><BR/>It is not clear to me what the confusion is? I think what (both) Habermas and McDowell are saying is that though world transcends our desires and beliefs it is still a "this worldly" world and not something beyond the "this worldly" world. <BR/><BR/>Rorty is a very smart man but it seems to me that his position regarding "objectivity" vs. "solidarity" is a very weak position, as both McDowell and Habermas show, from two different angles, in their contributions. <BR/><BR/>Rorty is right to object to the old Cartesian/metaphysical conception of objectivity which severe the concept of objectivity from subjectivity or intersubjectivity entirely, but Rorty seems to be heading towards another extreme of reducing objectivity to intersubjectivity. <BR/><BR/>In order to avoid both kinds of reductions we need to adopt what Brandom calls “relational thinking.” However relational thinking can only prosper if we give due to both terms as well as recognise the priority of relations. <BR/><BR/>In order to do that we need, as Habermas keep telling us following Hegel, a third term. In order to avoid reductionism of subjective as well as objective type what we need is a third term, which has been called "being in the world" following Heidegger. <BR/><BR/>It is only by giving priority to the notion of being in the world that we can reconceptualise the Cartesian notions of ‘subject’ and ‘object’ in such a way that not only the gulf created between subject and object is overcome but also both types of reductionisms are avoided. Both subject and object are individuated within "being in the world." and this is what Habermas means when he talks about individuation through socialisation.Ali Rizvihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18007625357436861947noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8259704.post-1113879362471289432005-04-19T12:56:00.000+10:002005-04-19T12:56:00.000+10:00I'm glad you found the McDowell article helpful. ...I'm glad you found the McDowell article helpful. Looking over your comment on it suggested to me that there's some ambiguity over what is meant by "transcendent world." In one sense--the 'illusory' sense--the transcendent world means "some other world which transcends this one." In another sense--the 'innocuous' sense--the transcendent world means "this world which transcends our beliefs and desires." So maybe there's just some confusion about what "transcendent world" means?<BR/><BR/>Rorty might wonder how even the innocuous sense of a transcendent world can be sustained without falling into Cartesianism. But here I think that Davidson and McDowell have done a great deal to show us how that can work, how we can have objectivity--or at least all the objectivity <I>we need</I>!--without Cartesianism.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com