tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8259704.post111013497053571288..comments2023-03-20T02:38:22.109+11:00Comments on Habermasian Reflections: Six theses on Habermas, Naturalism and anti-NaturalismAli Rizvihttp://www.blogger.com/profile/18007625357436861947noreply@blogger.comBlogger3125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8259704.post-1110671405765069502005-03-13T10:50:00.000+11:002005-03-13T10:50:00.000+11:00"While Anglo Saxon philosophers are still positing..."While Anglo Saxon philosophers are still positing the problem at the level of knowledge and perceptual experience Habermas posits it at the level of communicative action and argumentation. That is the reason why, while for Habermas', as a good Heideggerian, 'mind'/'body' problem is no problem at all, thus he says that his weak naturalism is neutral as to the ‘nature’ of mind, for Anglo Saxon philosophers it is still a central problem, and it is through the prism of this problem that they approach the problem of naturalism."<BR/><BR/>On rereading the above I am not convinced I described the difference correctly. I should have rather said that their (i.e. Habemras' as against Anglo-Saxon philosophers) conception of "experience" is totally different which lead Habermas to posit the problem differently than them.Ali Rizvihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18007625357436861947noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8259704.post-1110334316777543092005-03-09T13:11:00.000+11:002005-03-09T13:11:00.000+11:00Carl,
Thanks for your very profound and stimulati...Carl,<br /><br />Thanks for your very profound and stimulating comments and your kind words.<br /><br />I believe some sort of experience (I would have called it communicative experience) is needed to complement Habermas' weak naturalism in order for him to explain the possibility of transcendence from within. In fact I had started trying to explain the possibility of such an experience in Habermas (where somehow Kant's "realm of pure intelligence" opens up within communicative action itself) without ever suspecting any relation to his weak naturalism. It is only lately that I have realised this and that sort of changed the nature of my whole project, however luckily without affecting much of the work I had done on the topic since now I realise that the possibility of 'transcendence from within' is situated in the context of Habermas' weak naturalism.<br /><br />My muddled attempts to explain the phenomenon can be found here:<br /><br />http://mc2.vicnet.net.au/home/ltppc/shared_files/transcendencefromwithin.pdf<br /><br />and here<br /><br />http://members.optusnet.com.au/~alimrizvi/Validityuncondituniver.doc<br /><br />[I have not revised these papers for a year or so and later versions exist in both cases; however they will indicate the general thrust of the argument I hope]<br /><br />You can call it phenomenological experience in the Heideggerian sense if you like, and I know of one piece which actually does try to explain what I call communicative experience in terms of the phenomenological tradition ["A moment of unconditional validity? Schutz and the Habermas/Rorty debate" Michael D. Barber, Human Studies 27: 51-67, 2004].<br /><br />I have been reading a lot of Quine, Putnam, Brandom and McDowell since I have realised the importance of the problem of naturalism. McDowell is particularly important for understanding Habermas' argument about naturalism but Haberams differs from those in the Anglo Saxon tradition including McDowell in that he posits the problem of naturalism on a different plain than they do. While Anglo Saxon philosophers are still positing the problem at the level of knowledge and perceptual experience Habermas posits it at the level of communicative action and argumentation. That is the reason why, while for Habermas', as a good Heideggerian, 'mind'/'body' problem is no problem at all, thus he says that his weak naturalism is neutral as to the ‘nature’ of mind, for Anglo Saxon philosophers it is still a central problem, and it is through the prism of this problem that they approach the problem of naturalism.<br /><br />I also noticed Sami Pihlstrom’ connection you mention. In fact that is what I am try to argue as to what Habermas’ position is, although I have still delve into Sami’s book in order to see how he actually argues for his position.<br /><br />cheers<br />AliAli Rizvihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18007625357436861947noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8259704.post-1110263100426373202005-03-08T17:25:00.000+11:002005-03-08T17:25:00.000+11:00Ali,
Firstly, allow me to say that I've been f...Ali,<br /><br /> Firstly, allow me to say that I've been following your thoughts (here and on "Foucaultian Reflections") for a few weeks, and I'm grateful for your having indicated the richness of some of Habermas' latest work (esp. <I>Truth and Justification</I> and the recent essays on religion). <br /> <br /> Habermas' version of "weak naturalism" has clear affinities with some recent Anglophone thinkers (Putnam, McDowell, and Brandom), and Habwermas clearly acknowledges these connections. Habermas also expresses, more clearly than they do, that what he is doing is distinguishing the transcedental/empirical distinction from the noumenal/phenomenal distinction. In Habermas' hands, the transcendental/empirical distinction becomes a distinction that is wholly <I>natural</I>. (Sami Pihlstrom has also developed this theme in his recent <I>Naturalizing the Transcendental</I>, though he does not cite Habermas.) <br /><br /> On the other hand, I have recently begun to think that "weak naturalism" really needs a phenomenological complement, and I don't yet know if there is such a complement in Habermas. Both Kant and Heidegger (and I've been struck by how Heidegger <I>Truth and Justification</I> is!) have some account of how we can become conscious of that which is transcendental (ontological) as distinct from that which is empirical (ontic). There are specific sorts of "experiences" which reveal the constitutive structures of experiences. Heidegger locates these in the work of art. Despite my reservations about Heidegger, I think that the distinction between the transcendental and the empirical cannot be <I>only</I> a formal distinction, but also an <I>experiential</I> one. I've recently turned to Adorno in hopes of being able to articulate something of the phenomenology of "transcendental experience." It might be possible to provide an account of "revelation" in terms of transcendental experience. If so, that would show some connection between Habermas' recent epistemology and his recent work in (for lack of a better word) theology. <br /><br />Do you think that "weak naturalism" requires a phenomenological complement, and if so, do you think that Habermas provides it?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com